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NORMALIZATION OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE
CASE OF GERMANY, 1990-2005

M. A. THESIS

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“This M.A. thesis is the result of my independent research. All ideas and concepts borrowed from the works of other authors and other sources have been provided with proper references.”

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION.....	7
1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.....	20
1.1 <i>Neorealism</i>	20
1.2 <i>Discourse analytical approach</i>	26
1.2.1 The notion of discourse and the discourse analytical approach.....	26
1.2.2 Critical discourse analysis.....	29
1.3 <i>The problem setting of the study</i>	30
1.3.1 The objectives of the study.....	30
1.3.2 Hypothesis.....	32
1.4 <i>The methodology of the study</i>	32
1.4.1 The choice of method and the description of the sample.....	35
2 THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON DEPLOYING GERMAN TROOPS TO FORMER YUGOSLAVIA.....	38
2.1 <i>The background of the Dayton peace agreement</i>	39
2.2 <i>German involvement in the Balkans</i>	41
2.3 <i>Summary of the debate</i>	44
2.3.1 Preponderance.....	45
2.3.2 <i>Size</i>	48
2.3.3 <i>History</i>	50
2.3.4 <i>Geography</i>	54
3 THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON DEPLOYING GERMAN TROOPS TO THE NATO LED OPERATION ON THE TERRITORY OF MACEDONIA.....	58
3.1 <i>The background of the debate</i>	59
3.2 <i>Germany's involvement in the Balkans</i>	61
3.3 <i>The summary of the debate</i>	65
3.3.1 Preponderance.....	67
3.3.2 <i>Size</i>	70
3.3.3 <i>History</i>	71
3.3.4 <i>Geography</i>	77
4 THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN “WAR OF TERROR” IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN IRAQ.....	82
4.1 <i>The background of the debate</i>	84
4.2 <i>Germany and the use of force in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq</i>	87
4.3 <i>The summary of the debates</i>	91

4.3.1	Preponderance.....	94
4.3.2	Size.....	98
4.3.3	History.....	100
4.3.4	Geography.....	104
5 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN GERMAN		
	PERSPECTIVE.....	110
5.1	<i>The background of the debate</i>	112
5.2	<i>The summary of the debate</i>	114
5.3	<i>Common Foreign and Security Policy in German context</i>	116
5.3.1	Preponderance.....	118
5.3.2	Size.....	121
5.3.3	History.....	123
5.3.4	<i>Geography</i>	128
	CONCLUSION	135
	RESÜMEE.....	145
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	147

ABBREVIATIONS

BdV	Bund der Vertriebenen (Union of the Expellees)
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CE	Council of Europe
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CDA	Critical Discourse Analysis
CDU	Christian Democratic Union
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU	Christian Socialist Union
DA	Discourse Analysis
DPA	Democratic Party of the Albanians in Macedonia
EC	European Commission
ECR	Electronic Combat Reconnaissance
EFTA	European Free Trade Association
EMU	European Monetary Union
EP	European Parliament
ESDI	European Security and Defense Identity
ESDP	European Security and Defense Policy
ESDU	European Security and Defense Union
EU	European Union
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GNP	Gross National Product
GFAP	General Framework Agreement for Peace
FDP	Federal Democratic Party
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
FRY	Former Republic of Yugoslavia

IFOR	Implementation Force
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
KFOR	Kosovo Force
NAC	North Atlantic Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NLA	National Liberation Army
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical warfare
NVA	Nationale Volksarmee (National People's Army)
OHR	Office of the High Representative
OSCE	Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDP	The People's Democratic Party
PDS	Socialist Party
PKK	Kurdistan Workers Party
PKO	Peacekeeping operations
SC	Security Council of the United Nations Organization
SDSM	Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SPD	Social Democratic Party
TEU	Treaty of the European Union
UCK	Kosovo Liberation Army
UNO	United Nations Organization
UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
VMRO-DPMNE	Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity

INTRODUCTION

Gregor Schöllgen's statement "Germany is back"¹ summarizes the provisional nature of German foreign policy between 1945 and its return in 1990. Definitely, foreign policy of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) as a divided state cannot be considered to be normal, characteristic of any other state in Europe. It was abnormal in the sense that external foreign powers imposed limitations on German sovereignty, the existence of two German states created an anomaly for the representation of the German nation-state. The Cold War created an exceptional security situation which brought along a permanent frozen front line. The return to normalcy did not denote only the full reversal of these obstacles, but it required a complete transition from a recently divided country to varying conceptions of modern nation-state. Therefore, Germany required a process of normalization in the course of which its natural position as a great power status in Europe was restored. The criteria for great power status are determined by objective facts such as geography, demography, although the nation-state requires freedom of action from its people to validate its power status².

Broadly speaking, normalization is understood as any process that makes something more normal, which typically means conforming to some regulatory or rule or returning from some state of abnormality. The word "normal" has outside of the natural sciences, two basic meanings: "not deviating from an established norm" and "naturally occurring"³. The established international norm to which Germany aspires is best summarized by Winston Churchill who stated that "The governments of the world must be entrusted to satisfied nations, who wishing nothing more for themselves than what they had. If the world government were in the hands of hungry nations, there would always be danger...Our power placed us above the rest"⁴. Churchill wrote this statement

¹ Schöllgen, G. (1993). *Angst vor der Macht: Die Deutschen und Ihre Aussenpolitik*.

² Bach, J. (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*, p.64.

³ Websters Dictionary, 1941, edition: 677.

⁴ Quoted in Bach (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*.

in the aftermath of the Cold War, when Germany was one of the “hungry nations”. Fifty years later Germany was different of being a satisfied country.

Under normal conditions, the hierarchy of states whose positions are defined by geographic, economic and military indicators, Germany is by its nature (territory, economic strength, population, etc.) a great power. According to Schöllgen, Germany is both becoming normal and returning to normalcy: becoming normal because as a sovereign nation it is following the rules which insure acceptance in the international community, and returning to normalcy because German nation-state always was a great power, until its dissolution terminated this status⁵. Fifty years after the World War II, Germany was again united, and a nation-state and through this again on the way to a European great power.

Philip H. Gordon launched the normalization debate in 1994 with his article „The Normalization of German Foreign Policy“⁶. His article provides an excellent overview of the competing views of post-Cold War German foreign policy, but his conception of normalization is viewed through the prism of realist assumptions of foreign policy making: the debate focuses of what is meant by „normalization“ of German foreign policy: the gradual attenuation of the particular restrictions that have influenced and constrained Germany’s international actions since and because of the World War II⁷. Gordon highlights the constraints on a universal and static set of state interests (seeking to increase power in a self-help world). Günther Hellmann extends the concept of normalization and speaks of different uses thereof⁸: normalization versus militarization. For example, he refers to one school of foreign policy thought in Germany, known as the „*Normalisierungsnationalisten*“ (normalization nationalists) who call for a „renewal of German self-consciousness“. Two normalists in Germany, Helmut Hubel and Bernhard May pose a question: „What is normal supposed to mean? ... is normal supposed to mean that „old fears“ of Germany’s power in the middle of Europe and of Germany’s changed

⁵ Schöllgen, G. (1993). *Angst vor der Macht: Die Deutschen und Ihre Aussenpolitik*, p. 27, emphasis added. The original reads: ...der [German nation-state] eben immer auch Grossmacht war, bis seine Auflösung zugleich diesen Status beendete.”

⁶ Gordon, P. (1994). The Normalization of German Foreign Policy. – *Orbis, Spring*, vol.38, Issue 2, p.225.

⁷ See *ibid.*

⁸ Hellmann, G. (1997). Jenseits von Normalisierung und Militarisierung: Zur Standortdebatte über die deutsche Aussenpolitik – *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, no. 2.

interests in a changing world... could again be on the political agenda?⁹ . Hubel and May drew the same conclusion as Franz Josef Meiers concerning Germany's normalcy, namely that the FRG's capacity for foreign policy normalcy was significantly constrained by the lasting fears in the international community about German national interests.

In the German case the normalization debate foremost focused on the issue whether Germany should pursue a more active and assertive foreign policy. The aim of the debate was to ascertain if there has been a fundamental change in German foreign policy since unification. Is Germany's international behavior--in terms of both style and substance--becoming more "normal," that is, more like that of other large Western states? If so, what might explain why the new Germany would act differently in the world from the old? The old foreign policy of the FRG was distinctively different from the other Western countries due to its status as a divided state. Analysts of the postwar foreign policy of the FRG have largely agreed that it was distinctive in comparison with other large, Western states. Richard Rosecrance called West Germany a "trading state," one whose international relationships are deemed more by its commercial and financial roles than by its military or political power¹⁰. In a similar way, German political scientist Hans-Peter Schwarz coined a term--*Machtvergessenheit*--to describe the tendency of his compatriots to shy away from or forget about the military and political power with which their ancestors were once obsessed¹¹. More recently, German political scientist Hanns W. Maull has described Germany as a "civilian power," one that not only concentrates on non-military means, but one that pursues its international objectives cooperatively and primarily through supranational institutions¹².

The naturally occurring reasons for Germany's satisfied normalcy are as Michael

⁹ Hubel, H., May, B. (1995). Ein "normales" Deutschland? Die souveräne Bundesrepublik in der ausländischen Wahrnehmung. – *Arbeitspapiere zur internationalen Politik*, Forschungsinstitut der DGAP, p.6.

¹⁰ Rosecrance, R. (1986). The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World. – *The Journal of Sociology*, vol. 92, no.3, pp.709 – 711.

¹¹ Schwarz, H. (1985). *Die gezähmten Deutschen: Von der Machtbesessenheit zur Machtvergessenheit* defines two controversial concepts "*Machtbesessenheit*" (obsession with power) and "*Machtvergessenheit*" (showing no interest towards power) that depict two German states: one under Nazi regime and the other after the post-unification period. These two conceptions according to the author highlight the transformation that Germany has undergone.

¹² See Erb, S. (2003). German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era. The concept of Germany as a „civilian power“ is thoroughly dealt with in Harnisch, S. and Maull, H. (2001). *Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*. See also Maul, H. (1990/1991). Germany and Japan: The New Civilian Powers. – *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 69, Issue 5, pp. 91 – 106.

Stürmer alliteratively alludes, the four “G’s”: Gewicht und Grösse, Geschichte und Geographie,” or Weight and Size, History and Geography – the concepts that are elaborated as follows that become the nodal points of the normalization discourse of German foreign policy¹³.

Due to its geographical location, demographic, economic and financial preponderance, Germany can assume a leadership role. The normalization process got a new boost after the terrorist attacks against the USA on September 11, 2001 and by that time Germany had significantly changed- became more assertive, self-confident. Thus, under the leadership of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder the new image of Germany as a „normal“ nation was brought forward. It depicted Germany as a great power that is entitled to articulate its national interests as the other states did¹⁴. Its aim is to enhance power and preponderance via these national interests and to implement them against the will of other states, if necessary. It means that military aspect in German foreign policy becomes more significant that manifests itself in the participation of German military in different assistance, development or reconstruction programmes in different spots all over the world. Germany has become „a normal“ ally that participates in out-of-area operations. Normalcy does not definitely mean that Germany should participate in every deployment, but it is dependent on the national interests of the state whether to participate or not. Therefore, Germany’s decision in case of Iraq crisis, not to contribute this time militarily can be considered as entirely normal. Another step on the way to normalcy is Germany’s attempt to get a permanent seat at the UN Security Council that speaks for itself. It would be normal to have a “seat around the table” There are a number of grounds for that attempt. Firstly, after the World War II Germany was an importer of security due to its historical conditions as the state was divided into two separate entities. Today, Germany itself exports security and it carries an increased global military role. This manifests itself in the fact that about 8000 civilian as well its military experts participate

¹³ Stürmer quoted in Schöllgen (1993). *Angst vor der Macht: Die Deutschen und Ihre Aussenpolitik*, p.140.

¹⁴ Hellmann,G. (2003). *Agenda 2020: Krise und Perspektive deutscher Aussenpolitik – Helga Haftendorn zum 70.Geburtstag. –Internationale Politik*, vol. 9, pp.41 – 43.

in the peacekeeping missions under the auspices of the UN¹⁵. These experts participate in the missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, in Africa, as well in Georgia. Thus, Germany demonstrates its ability to take responsibility for the stability and order in the world. Secondly, Germany is seeking a permanent seat at the UN Security Council due to the fact that it is one of the greatest net-donators to the budget of the UN. Germany together with Japan contributes 30 % to the developmental aid and about 30 % of the relevant UN budget. Therefore, it is entitled to speak in a louder voice in the decision-making that relates to stability and order in a more influential way. This new kind of representation would conform to the new realities better because today the permanent seats at the Security Council represent the power relations as they were in 1945.

As concerns Germany's size – economic, military or political, it can be stated that Germany had restored its positions in this field. It was traditionally the dominant power in this part of Europe, but its influence had been reduced by its defeat in the World War II, the truncation of the state. Thus, German unification in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet empire had re-established the conditions for Germany's dominance in Central and Eastern Europe. A united Germany due to its economic power and central geographical location has regained its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. It means that Germany is again situated at the center, whereas other traditional European powers – France and UK would be relegated to the periphery. Germany's size and economic power would inevitably give it political influence. However, this would have to be exercised carefully as the legacy of the past and political and cultural sensitivities on both sides would not allow Germany to exert direct political influence over its eastern neighbors. Since 1989 Germany has established good relations with each of the Central and East European countries, overcoming lengthy historical legacies of conflict and distrust. It can be concluded that Germany has become a “normal” country that is able to overcome the problems related to its past and move on.

¹⁵ Mützelburg, B. (2005). Grossmannsucht oder aufgeklärte Interessenpolitik? Die Deutschen und die Welt. – *Internationale Politik*, vol. 9.

One aspect of normalcy includes reviewing the interpretations of German national history. Before unification it was a taboo to debate openly on certain topics of German history, especially its Nazi past. In the 1980s, most intellectuals accepted German division as a fitting form of collective punishment for the crimes of the Hitler years. Several years after unification, mostly intellectuals started speaking openly on German post World War history. The abundance of history related debates in German society indicates that Germans wanted to know all aspects of their history in order to accept it and leave it into the past, which does not mean to forget history. Martin Walser, a well-known writer in his writings began to break down certain taboos and to challenge the norms that Germans had long felt were politically wise to accept. Walser did not become an extremist on the right- he stated that no honest man could deny *Auschwitz* or reject the past. He also expressed the conviction that the German people no longer tolerate being reproached for their past. In his acceptance of the 1998 Peace Prize, he refers to the Holocaust as a “moral cudgel” used against the German people, Auschwitz as a “routine threat” of intimidation, and to the proposed Holocaust memorial in Berlin as a “memorializing of our shame”¹⁶. Walser’s well-known pronouncement is that the national shame is being “instrumentalized for present purposes”¹⁷. Without specifying who is doing the instrumentalizing, his charge seems to imply that the instrumentalizers are the Jews and that their purposes are to extort money from German firms, banks. Walser’s attack at the status quo and his desire to change things demonstrate that Germany is at present a democratic nation free to act as such and normal enough to be treated with respect, no different from any other nation in the West despite its recent past.

According to Gerhard Schröder’s vision, Germany is a “grown-up” and “self-confident” nation and therefore, he called on it to exorcise the ghosts of the World War II and to assume a full leadership role in Europe. It should shoulder its share of the international burden and pursue its interests. This message was also symbolized by a transfer of capital from Bonn to Berlin. It denoted that Germany’s westward-looking and to some extent provincial character was transformed into a “normal” country now

¹⁶ Conard, C, R. (1999). Eye on Germany: The New Morality and the Politics of Memory. *Debatte*, vol. 7, no.2, p.177.

¹⁷ Ibid.

residing in the former Prussian capital with all its inescapable memories of military conquest. It was also shown in practical signs of German confidence. These included the appointments of Horst Köhler as Executive Director of the IMF and Bodo Holmbach as co-ordinator of the Balkan Stability Pact. Especially, the military intervention in Kosovo can be regarded as a visible step towards becoming a “normal” country¹⁸.

The transfer of the capital did not affect its foreign policy; its interests remained the same. Germany had to get accustomed to its *Mittellage* position again. Definitely the notion “*Mittellage*” makes many Germans nervous, as it is associated with dark intentions at the background of history. The understanding of the notion *Mittellage* in the Bonn Republic denoted obsession with power, but the new *Mittellage* on the contrary meant that Germany had to co-ordinate its activities with many different neighboring countries that often have clashing interests. What is new for Germany is its location in Central and Eastern Europe and in Europe as a whole in the new framework. Germany becomes again a “normal” Central-European nation-state besides a number of other nation-states.

The German dilemma is summed up by Timothy Garton Ash “the re-unified Germany was a new circumstance of 3 October 1990 whether it liked it or not to become again a leading power at the center of non-unified Europe”¹⁹. It is obvious that in these new circumstances Germany wanted to cope with the problem of *Mittellage*.

In this light, the post unification Germany was free to regain its rightful role as a great power, becoming “normal” in the sense like France, Great Britain or the United States are “normal” powers who do not avoid from talking sincerely about their interests. Günther Gillessen provides an overview of “normalcy” and interests:

Germans feel tempted to negate their nationhood in a vain attempt to flee from the shame which Hitler and his followers brought upon their country. But those who want to forget in fact feel ashamed and do remember in a round about way. And those who try and run away from their nationality into a “European” identity remember too in a different manner. No attempt at flight will help. Germany will have to become a

¹⁸ Marsh, S. (2002). The Dangers of German History: Lesson from a Decade of Post Cold War German Foreign and Security Policy. –*Perspectives on European Politics and Society* vol.3, p. 405.

¹⁹ Ash, T.G. (1994). Germany’s Choice. – *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, pp.65 – 81.

“normal” nation among other nations....A bad collective conscience will not serve as a guide...Identifiable national interests are the basis of continuity, credibility and trust...For the guilt ridden collective national consciousness, the term “national interests” is banned from the domestic debate and widely regarded as “politically” incorrect language. Yet, a nation which is not able to talk about its national interests openly and clearly will appear to pursue a hidden and perhaps suspect agenda²⁰.

So a normal German nation, in order to form national interests, must neither reject the past nor feel guilty about it. A normal Germany will be seen as non-threatening due to its transparency of interests and most importantly because the post-Cold War geopolitical situations is now seen as allowing the compatibility of German power and European security interests. As a normal great power, Germany can fulfill its responsibility to the “European responsibility for peace”²¹. Only by becoming more self-interested can Germany become “normal” and only by becoming “normal” can Germany prevent itself from going on a “special path”²². The normal state is understood as a state which accepts its natural role in the great distribution of capabilities dutifully and rationally. The central part of this natural role is defining national interests which are unique due to a nation’s history, context and character. National interests are understood as a country’s goals and ambitions whether military, economic or cultural. Germany will define its national interests narrowly which is another indication of its becoming “normal” again as normal states use pragmatic considerations while defining their national interests.

The out-of-area debate about German military deployment at the beginning of the 1990s did not only redefine the boundaries for legitimate use of military force, but the proponents of German participation in out-of-area operations managed to introduce a new meaning of the term “responsibility” (*Verantwortung*) to the political discourse²³. Representatives of the Kohl government argued that the unified Germany was expected by its partners to “take over more responsibility” by contributing to international military

²⁰ Gillessen, G. (1994). Germany’s Position in the Centre of Europe: The Significance if Germany’s Position and Misunderstandings about German Interests. – In.: *Germany’s New Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives*, edited by A.Baring.

²¹ Hacke, C. (1993). *Weltmacht wider Willen: Die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, p.466.

²² Bach, J. (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*.

²³ Baumann, R., Hellmann, G. (2001). Germany and the Use of Military Force: „Total War“, the „Culture of Restraint“ and the Quest for Normality. – *German Politics*, April, vol.10, pp. 71-72.

operations. The word was no longer used to refer to a “politics of responsibility” (*Verantwortungspolitik*) that stood in contrast to old-style power politics (*Machtpolitik*). Instead, “*Verantwortung*” was used to indicate that responsible German foreign policy would be in contrast to the old FRG’s privilege of standing by and leaving dangerous missions to its allies. After the 1994 ruling of the German Constitutional Court and against the background of the deteriorating situation in the Balkans, new coalitions were formed. In the domestic context of Germany, Srebrenica served as a catalyst for the formation of a coalition in favor of an allied intervention demands comprising normalisers’, on the one hand, increasing numbers of more left-wing internationalists, on the other hand, who were having more difficulties rejecting the analogies between the cruelties in the Balkans and Germany’s historical legacy of *Auschwitz*. In the light of Srebrenica it was now widely accepted in the German political elite that the legacy of German history should not only be to call for “No more wars” (“*Nie wieder Krieg!*”), but also for “No more Auschwitz!” (“*Nie wieder Auschwitz!*”). This became visible after a request by NATO in February 1995 when after the entry of the Dayton peace accords’, Germany deployed more than 3000 troops to the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Germany’s participation in NATO’s Kosovo War was the breakthrough point in this realignment and the most stunning about was the fact that this development took place under a government formed by the two German parties that held anti-militarist platforms. During a prominent transatlantic conference in 1999, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder declared that Germany would remain a reliable partner²⁴. Moreover, in contrast to past attitudes, according to which Germany’s historical legacy “prohibited any deployment of German troops out-of-area, the Chancellor emphasized that Germany’s historical responsibility made it “imperative” to prevent mass-murder with all necessary means. In this view, Germany had “come of age” as a full member of NATO to assume responsibility as a “normal” ally.

It means that the new Germany moves from power to responsibility”. New power calls for “special responsibility. The dictionary definition of being responsible means both “having capacity for moral decisions and being therefore accountable” and “being

²⁴ Schröder, G. (1999). Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur offiziellen Eröffnung des Sitzes der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik. – “Aussenpolitische Verantwortung” Deutschlands in der Welt, 02 September.

capable of rational thought or action”²⁵. In this context and taking German history into account, power carries in historical memory a negative connotation that is linked with the misdeeds carried out by the Germans under the auspices of getting more power, responsibility on the other hand carries positive connotation meaning taking into account the consequences of one’s deed. That is something the Germans did not realize during the World Wars. In this new context, Germany attempts to gain greater economic, geopolitical, demographic and political weight, not more power, but for more responsibility. Thus, Germany wants to contribute to Europe’s being able to rightly assume its responsibility. Therefore, getting more power (as a result of greater economic weight) does not imply getting “more power”, but in this case power is correlated into responsibility. Special responsibility manifests itself in Germany’s increasing readiness to use force either as a process of “normalization” or “abnormalization”. Thus, in the German political discourse, “taking over responsibility” today means playing the same role militarily as the other western partners. Germany is in the process of “coming of age”, becoming more self-confident and assertive, feeling less inhibited by its pre-Second World War legacy. Germany emerged as a reliable partner that manifests itself in its progressive military engagement in collective responses to international crises in Europe and elsewhere. By the late 1990s, Germany seemed to have resolved the relationship between force and diplomacy. Germany’s participation in the military operation in Kosovo in 1999 – a NATO campaign launched without a UN mandate – suggested Germany’s foreign policy was normalized.

The author examines how successful the normalization of German foreign policy has been taking its national interests and eagerness to assume greater responsibility into account. Fifteen years after reunification, Germany can be considered a typical European country. Its parties debate about its national interests whereas the right favors strategic interests and the left in turn, supports more humanitarian causes. Almost immediately after the independence the CDU began to speak about the need for unified Germany to be capable of acting militarily in operations other than its territorial defense and the protection of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies. Sometimes the phrase “normal” was used. More often it concerned the concept of *Handlungsfähigkeit* (it

²⁵ Random House Dictionary, 1987.

denoted capability for action). On the one hand, the aim of the CDU politicians was definitely to increase Germany's influence which, on the other hand, did not mean that Germany wanted to regain the possibility of unilateral military action. The degree of German participation in humanitarian and other UN peace operations steadily increased, including those in Yugoslavia. The government steadily escalated its degree of involvement, beginning with the deployment of personnel and equipment to monitor the embargo against Serbia and aircraft to detect violations of the no-fly zone over Bosnia during the early years of the Balkan wars. For example, the government refused to send troops to Haiti at the time, as it was situated beyond the security periphery of Europe. It justified its differing level of enthusiasm for participating in the Balkans on the basis of the geographical proximity to Germany, the threat to regional stability and massive refugee inflows. This narrower definition of national interest was also evident many years later when CDU deliberated about contributing to the mission in East Timor. Despite the claims of a consensus on Germany's role abroad by outside observers, the Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens contested in the strategy of habitation. Gaps in the leftist consensus appeared, as an increasing number of civil wars proved incapable of finding solutions through diplomacy and peacekeeping with disastrous consequences, notably in Rwanda and in Bosnia. The events in Bosnia changed the quality of opposing further military involvement. It became increasingly difficult to stand by and watch murders take place. The SPD realized that if they did not intervene, they bore the guilt for failing to protect people. The SPD went through a learning process in which it exchanged its complete pacifism for a more nuanced approach that allowed exceptions in case of human rights violations. Overall, the German public has thus moved by the mid-1990s towards a more active German foreign policy: the proposition that Germany had to accept "more responsibility in the world". Shocked by mass murder in Srebrenica German foreign policy has been normalized.

The normalization process has not only taken place in the domain of foreign policy, but it has affected some other policy fields: asylum and refugee policy and development policy to underline some fields. The recent changes in Germany's policy regarding those who seek political asylum within its borders--Germany brought an

exceptional system more in line with that of other states--can also be seen as a sign of normalization. When the Federal Republic of Germany was created in 1949, it adopted an extremely liberal policy toward political refugees in order to compensate for violations of political rights during the Nazi era. The Basic Law's Article 16 stated simply that "subjects of political persecution enjoy the right to asylum" and accompanying laws allowed anyone claiming political persecution the right to temporary asylum, financial support, and a legal process that could sometimes take years. The asylum law was also politically and economically convenient during the Cold War, allowing West Germany to "keep" many of the young refugees who fled communist regimes in Eastern Europe and came to Germany to work during the country's economic boom.

As the numbers of refugees began to mount in the 1980s, however, the consequences of such a generous law became difficult to bear. With economic chaos in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, hundreds of thousands of persons began to take advantage of their regimes' new willingness to let them leave, and Germany, in a period of economic stagnation, budgetary constraint, and rising unemployment, quickly became flooded with asylum seekers. Germany accepted nearly five hundred thousand refugees in 1992 alone. With Germany bearing an inordinate share of the refugee burden (in 1992, Germany took in 79 percent of all the refugees accepted by the EC and six times as many as the much larger United States), the question arose: Does Germany have "special" obligations toward asylum seekers because of its past, or is Germany now a "normal" state that can decide like others how much generosity it can bear? In May 1993, the Bundestag voted to change the constitution, thereby ending Germany's exceptional asylum policy. The constitutional right to asylum was preserved, but a new law severely restricted that right. According to the law, asylum seekers who come from a country that Germany considered free of persecution were denied asylum, unless they proved that they had been singled out for persecution.

The thesis is structured as follows: the first chapter on the theoretical framework. The second chapter deals with German foreign participation in the out-of-area mission in Bosnia – Herzegovina in 1996. The third chapter deals with the next out-of-area mission,

this time a NATO led operation in Macedonia in 2001. The differences between these two missions are outlined and the changes in the thinking on foreign policy matters are clearly visible. Germany assumes greater responsibility for the conflicts on European soil. The context has definitely changed and foreign and domestic policy become intermingled. Foreign policy issues are used in domestic debates, especially when the federal elections are approaching. The fourth chapter deals with the out-of-area missions to Afghanistan and also gives the reasons for not deploying troops to Iraq. It can be seen that military aspects of foreign policy become more visible and it becomes the main issues at the parliamentary debates. The fifth chapter deals with the Common Foreign and Security Policy in German perspective that enables the reader to have a look at the conception of nation-state and national interests. It simultaneously enables us to find answers to the questions about why and how certain policies developed at particular time-periods, including speculation on what this stores for the future.

The postwar national security culture changed in connection with unification and the end of the Cold War. Thus, German societies as whole and German political elites in particular share a well-defined set of fundamental beliefs and values that are of great relevance to national security, as well as foreign policy. These include deep skepticism about the appropriateness and utility of military force, a clearly defined preference for multilateral action over unilateral one. It also includes desire to be regarded as a trustworthy partner and strong aversion to assuming a leadership role in international affairs.

1 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

1.1 Neorealism

Neorealism, a theory of international relations argues that the scope and ambition of a country's foreign policy is driven first and foremost by the country's relative material power²⁶. The impact of power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening unit level variables, such as decision – makers' perceptions and state structure²⁷. Understanding the links between power and policy requires close examination of the international and the domestic contexts within which foreign policy is formulated and implemented. Neorealism can be defined as a theory of international relations that presents itself as a systemic approach: the international structure acts as a constraint on state behavior, so that only states whose outcomes fall within an expected range, survive²⁸.

In developing a theory of international politics, neorealism retains the main tenets of *realpolitik*, but views not only means and ends differently, but as well causes and effects²⁹. Classical realist Hans Morgenthau, for example, thought of the „rational“ statesman as ever striving to accumulate more power. He viewed power as an end in itself³⁰. In contrast, neorealism sees power as possibly useful means, with states running risks if they have either too little or too much of it. On the one hand, excessive weakness may bring about an attack that greater strength would have avoided from launching³¹. On the other hand, excessive strength may prompt other states to increase their arms and enhance their efforts against the dominant state³². In crucial situations, however, the

²⁶ Gideon, R. (1998). Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy. – *World Politics*, vol. 51, no. 1, pp.144 – 171.

²⁷ Ibid, pp.144 – 171.

²⁸ Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Relations*.

²⁹ Waltz, K. (1995). Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. In.: *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, edited by C.Kegley, pp. 67 – 82.

³⁰ Ibid, pp. 78 – 79.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

ultimate concern of states is not for power, but for security. Thus, neorealists as compared to the realists view power in a different way: they assume that the ultimate state interest is in security. Whilst realist theory sees power as a factor in the lives of humans, peoples and states, in neorealist understanding power acquires a new meaning and foremost it denotes responsibility³³. In this understanding more power means more responsibility. This is an important revision³⁴. The centerpiece of the present thesis is the evolution of the normalization process in German foreign and security policy that at best manifests itself in the increasing role of military component in German foreign policy. It refers to the neorealist interpretation of the balance-of-power according to which states rationally respond to the incentives generated by their relative position³⁵. This reaction can also involve the deployment of the armed forces abroad (out-of-area missions) with the purpose of guaranteeing security. Thus, as Germany after re-unification has become more powerful in economic as well in political terms, it means that it actively participates in crisis management operations wherever the need arises. Therefore, neorealist dictum that state's power position is dependent upon its position in the international system best depicts Germany's predicament and seems to be the most appropriate theoretical framework for the treatment of the issue³⁶.

Despite different emphasis, prominent neorealists have arrived at pessimistic conclusions about the role, a united Germany will play in the emerging structure of the international politics³⁷. Neorealists see unification leading Germany to seek much greater prominence within the international system. Moreover, at the absence of a strong Soviet threat there is much less need for Germany to remain tied to the security guarantee provided by NATO³⁸. Germany is therefore likely to become more assertive in defense of its national interests and act more independently in pursuit of its foreign policy

³³ See Schöllgen, G. (1993). *Angst vor der Macht: Die Deutschen und Ihre Aussenpolitik*, p.154.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Waltz, K. (1995). Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory. In.: *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, edited by C.Kegley.

³⁶ Waltz, K. (1979). *Theory of International Relations*.

³⁷ Harrison, E. (2004). The Post – Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity, p.51. See also Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*.

³⁸ Ibid.

objectives³⁹. A number of German foreign policy analysts support the neorealist claim that changes in the international system will encourage Germany to behave more independently within multilateral institutions that it has done in the past⁴⁰. Various aspects in the unification process reflect the neorealists' predictions about Germany's post-Cold War strategies. Firstly, the Kohl administration failed to consult Anglo – French opinion on the issue of German unification before making this policy a stated objective. Secondly, the negotiations with the Soviet Union and Poland were conducted bilaterally⁴¹. These events indicate that the German politicians refused to use multilateral decision-making frameworks if decisions concerned German vital interests. Further evidence in support of neorealists' hypothesis can be seen in German behavior in international crisis situations in the early post-unification period⁴². For example, in December 1991, Germany announced that it would formally recognize Slovenia and Croatia by the end of the year even if it meant doing so unilaterally. This step brought about EC recognition of these countries in 1991, and Germany had used the threat of unilateral action to prompt a change in the European line⁴³.

Neorealists might cite evidence in favor of Germany having weakened its ties to NATO⁴⁴. With the dissolution of the Soviet empire in East Europe and the unification of Germany, the Federal Republic has acquired a considerable range of new security interests in the East and Central Europe. In addition, the decline in the immediate threat of an invasion by Russia from the East means that it has less need to remain firmly anchored to the security guarantee that NATO provides⁴⁵. Neorealists therefore argue that it is now more likely for Germany to be pre-disposed to developing favorable relations with Russia, and this has led German elites into a series of internal debates⁴⁶. The tensions between the unified Germany's interests in developing its relations with Russia

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Baring, A. (1994). Germany, What Now? In: *Germany's New Position in Europe: Problems and Perspective*, edited by A.Baring. See also Gillessen, G. (1994). Germany's Position in the Centre of Europe: The Significance of Germany's Position and Misunderstandings about German Interests. In: *Germany's New Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives*, edited by A.Baring.

⁴¹ Harrisson, E. (2004). Post- Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Harrisson, E. (2004). Post- Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p.54.

⁴⁶ Otte, M. (2000). *A Rising Middle Power: German Foreign Policy in Transformation, 1989 – 1999*.

and participation in NATO, first became apparent in debates over NATO enlargement in the early 1990s. Germany has engaged in initiatives designed to placate Russian fears over NATO enlargement⁴⁷. As a result of intense diplomatic efforts (the visits of Helmut Kohl to Russia in 1996 and in 1997), Germany played a central role in the negotiation of the NATO – Russia permanent Joint Council, a consultative body that came into being in 1997 to strengthen NATO's ties with Russia⁴⁸.

Modern day realists admit that amorality and mistrust in international affairs leave little way out of the *security dilemma* though for example, collective security measures or a dissolution of the nation-state⁴⁹. „The first concern of states is to maintain their positions in the system“ Preserving one's relative position, however, is neither survival nor domination⁵⁰. It does not comply with domination and may require risking survival. The risk of survival will be even greater if, as Mearsheimer argues, states „aim to maximize their relative power position over other states“⁵¹. Waltz claims that states seek wealth, advantage and flourishing, peaceful coexistence; peace and prosperity, meaning that they want to protect their sovereignty, autonomy and independence; they act out of pride and the feeling of being put upon⁵². Predicted behavior, however, will vary dramatically among states seeking to survive; they maintain their relative position, improve their welfare or achieve universal domination.

That is why realists' recourse to the rational actor: to act rationally is to act realistically, and the one encourages the other⁵³. It is the place where German realists, attempting to solve the tension between their pessimistic prophecies and their

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Harnisch, S. (2001). Change and Continuity on Post – Unification German Foreign Policy. – *German Politics*, 2001, vol.10, part 1, pp.35 – 60.

⁴⁹ The term was coined by John Herz and it refers to a situation wherein two or more states are drawn into conflict, possibly even war over security concerns. The dilemma occurs when two or more states each feel insecure vis-à-vis other states. None of the states involved want relations to deteriorate, let alone for war to be declared, but as each state acts militarily or diplomatically to make itself more secure, the other states interpret its actions as threatening.

Security dilemma. -Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security dilemma](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_dilemma). (04.08.2007).

⁵⁰ Waltz quoted in Donnelly, J. (2001). Realism. In.: *Theories of International Relations*.

⁵¹ Mearsheimer, J. (1994/5). The False Promise of International Institutions. – *International Security*, vol.19, no 3, pp.5-49.

⁵² Waltz quoted in Donnelly, J. (2001) Realism. In.: *Theory of International Relations*.

⁵³ Bach, J. (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*.

commitment to creating a peaceful world, apply morality into an amoral worldview⁵⁴. The values of the “Atlantic” or “Western” Civilization (self-reliance, patriotism etc.) are the values that mitigate the *security dilemma* while being retained as the theoretical centerpiece⁵⁵. In post-unification Germany, these “realist values” result in a vocabulary shift from the amoral term “power” to the moral term “responsibility” through the following narrative: the best way of controlling the risks of a realist world is to actively project one’s values which allow for the recognition of an enlightened self-interest which can mitigate *security dilemma*⁵⁶. The more power a country has, the greater its ability to assuage the negative, but natural effects of realism. This denotes an “evolution“ from a war of all against all to an awareness of our plight as self-interested persons, where the awareness of our common interest enables us to control, though not fundamentally change, our worst properties⁵⁷. This control leads us from a state of nature to a realm where it is rational to be moral. Thus, it is moral and rational for state to strive to create the best possible environment where its own self-preservation is secure⁵⁸. Gregor Schöllgen articulates best the realist view of responsibility:

*Overnight the Federal Republic has once again been catapulted into the role of a continental great power with global significance. This situation requires the Germans to cope with their new power, and thus calls for a special responsibility. The pre-requisite is a realistic, sober, and above all, fully aware recognition that German foreign, security and economic policy, even its policy on asylum-seekers, is power policy (Machtpolitik)*⁵⁹.

On the other hand, John Mearsheimer believes that states are not satisfied with a given amount of power, but seek hegemony for security. Mearsheimer summed this view up in the *Tragedy of Great Power Politics*⁶⁰. In this world there is no such thing as a status quo power, since according to Mearsheimer, a “great power” that has a marked

⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 68.

⁵⁵ Ibid, pp.68 – 69.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Bach, J. (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*, p.69.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Schöllgen, G. (1994). National Interest and International Responsibility: Germany’s Role in World Affairs. In.: *Germany’s New Position in Europe: Problems and Perspectives*, edited by A.Baring.

⁶⁰ Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The Tragedy of the Great Power Politics*.

power advantage over its rivals is likely to behave more aggressively because it has the capability as well as the incentive to do so⁶¹. In this light, taking Germany's increased powerbase into account, the objective of German foreign policy should have been to conduct aggressive foreign policy. In reality, Germany has taken its changed environment into account aiming at producing more security to its neighborhood (it became advocate of the Central and East European states in adhering to the EU and NATO). Thus, Germany has been an influential hegemon that uses its preponderance wisely, at the same time pragmatically. Although Mearsheimer does not believe that it is possible for a state to become a global hegemon, he believes states seek regional hegemony⁶². Germany in this sense has strived becoming regional hegemon in Central Europe.

To sum up, the desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other resulting in a "balance-of-power" which shapes international relations. There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external balancing⁶³. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances. Waltz argues that states in anarchy can choose between two choices: either balancing or bandwagoning and definitely they always prefer balancing to bandwagoning⁶⁴.

As concerns Germany, a range of developments may be interpreted in terms favorable to neorealist predictions about German strategies since 1989. Significant aspects of Germany's behavior point to the emergence of a more aggressively unilateral position in international institutions. Signs of incompatibilities of interest between a united Germany and the USA, as well as Germany's European partners⁶⁵ can be noticed. This also manifests itself in the unification process, Germany's growing military role in out-of-area missions, and the issue of German influence over Eastern Europe. These signs therefore support neorealist analysis of a united Germany's role in the international

⁶¹ Donnelly, J. (2001). Realism. In.: *Theories of International Relations*.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Bach, J. (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ Harrisson, E.(2004). Post- Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions and Reflexivity, p.57.

system after the Cold War.

1.2 Discourse analytical approach

1.2.1 The notion of discourse and the discourse analytical approach

The notion “discourse” is a widely used term in the humanities and social sciences. Michel Foucault who has had a decisive influence upon this field treats the notion as follows:

I believe I have in fact added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements⁶⁶.

Generally speaking, the term “discourse” in the social sciences, is considered to be an institutionalized way of thinking, a social boundary defining what can be said about a specific topic⁶⁷. Norman Fairclough in his book „Textual Analysis for Social Research“ defines „discourse“ as ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and structures of the material world, the „mental world“ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth⁶⁸. According to his treatment of the notion, „discourses“ not only represent the world as it is (or rather is seen to be), they are projective, imaginaries, representing possible worlds which are different from the actual world, and they are associated with the different relations people have to the world, which in turn depend on their positions in the world, their social and personal identities, and the social relationships in which they stand to other people⁶⁹.

Discourse organizes knowledge systematically and thus delimits what can and

⁶⁶ Foucault quoted in Fairclough, N. (2003). Textual Analysis for Social Research.

⁶⁷ The social conception of discourse. – Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] http://en.wikipedia/wiki/social_conception_of_discourse (04. August 2007).

⁶⁸ Fairclough, N. (2003). *Textual Analysis for Social Research*, p.124.

⁶⁹ Ibid, p.124.

cannot be meaningfully said⁷⁰. Therefore doing discourse analysis means tracing the development of a few key concepts (nodal points), their historical origins, their transformation, and especially their relationship to other concepts. The strategy is basically to look for key concepts and their mutual relationship. The investigator examines who the text argues, not what it says⁷¹. For instance, in a debate on Bosnia in the Bundestag, the interesting question is not who takes what position regarding what intervention, but how they argue their case. What are the powerful categories on which the argument rests, how are they related, are some concepts presented by necessity, are some presented as self-evident opposites (e.g Balkan and peace and Europe)? More interesting than the arguments presented are the assumptions not stated, but necessary for the argument to be meaningful⁷².

Norman Fairclough, in his discourse approach analysis has combined the notion of discourse as social practice on the one hand and interaction with the notion of discourse as a social construction of reality on the other hand⁷³. Discourse is seen as a form of social practice. The functioning of discourse – discursive practice – is a social practice that shapes the social world. The concept of “social practice” views actions in terms of a dual perspective: on the one hand, actions are concrete, individual and context bound; but, on the other hand, they are also institutionalized and socially embedded⁷⁴. Discursive practice is viewed as one dimension or moment of every social practice in a dialectical relationship with the other moments of social practice. That means that some aspects of the social world function according to different logics from discourses and should be studied with tools other than those of discourse analysis. Discursive practice reproduces or changes other dimensions of social practice just as other social dimensions shape the discursive dimension. Together, the discursive dimension and the other dimensions of social practice constitute the world⁷⁵.

⁷⁰ Foucault, M. (1980). *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977*.

⁷¹ Waever, O. (2004). *European Integration and Security: Analyzing French and German Discourses on State, Nation, and Europe*. In.: *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Politics, Identity and Governance*, edited by D.Howarth and J.Torring.

⁷² Ibid.

⁷³ Fairclough, N. (1992). *Discourse and Social Change*.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

Discourse analysis while applied to foreign policy, focuses on the individual state and tries to explain its options and actions. Based on public texts, it highlights the thoughts and motives of the actors, their hidden intentions. Especially for the study of foreign policy where much is hidden, it becomes methodologically advantageous to employ discourse⁷⁶. Foreign policy discourse conditions future moves. The customary image of political speech is replaced with a view of politics as a constant and relatively tight loop; where political argumentation about a specific issue is, on the one hand, strongly dependent on the basic conceptual logic available in society and on the other hand, reproduces or modifies this conceptual code, thereby setting the conditions for the next political struggle⁷⁷.

Using discourse analysis in examining the process of normalization in German foreign and security policy after the post-unification enables to study how this process was spoken about in society and whether there were certain things that were not spoken about at all, but that were only alluded to. Therefore, the theoretical and methodological foundations of the present study are situated in the critical discourse analysis of Norman Fairclough. The critical discourse analysis has been chosen for the reason that normalization process is about huge transformations in the thinking of the foreign policy elite that also includes social change. In this respect, the critical discourse analysis of Norman Fairclough seems to be the best choice

To sum up, discourse analysis is a perspective on social life that contains both methodological and conceptual elements. It involves ways of thinking about discourse (theoretical and metatheoretical elements) and ways of treating discourse as data (methodological elements)⁷⁸. Thus, discourse analysis from this perspective is not simply alternative to conventional methodologies; it is alternative to the perspectives in which those methodologies are embedded. Discourse analysis entails more than a shift in methodology from a general, abstracted, quantitative to a particularized, detailed,

⁷⁶Ibid, p.35.

⁷⁷ Petersen quoted in Howarth, D, and Torfing, J. (2005). *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Politics, Identity and Governance*, p.35.

⁷⁸ Wood, L., Kroger, R. (2000). *Doing Discourse Analysis: Methods of Studying Action in Talk and Text*.

qualitative approach⁷⁹.

1.2.2 Critical discourse analysis

Similarly to discourse analysis, critical discourse analysis (CDA) is not a homogenous method within discourse analysis⁸⁰. The theoretical framework is derived from Louis Althusser's theories of ideology, Mikhail Bakhtin's genre theory, and the philosophical traditions of Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School⁸¹. Bakhtin stresses the dialogue properties of texts – their “intertextuality” as it is termed by Julia Kristeva in that every text is viewed as part of a series of texts to which it reacts and refers, and which it modifies⁸².

Norman Fairclough and Ruth Wodak imply that “a version of CDA is based on eight principles of theory or method”, including the ideas that power relations are discursive, that discourse constitutes society and culture, that discourse does ideological work and that the link between text and society is mediated (e.g. by orders of discourse)⁸³. They also highlighted eight theoretical approaches with regard to critical discourse analysis⁸⁴.

CDA is “critical” in two senses: one sense is based on the ideas of the Frankfurt School (in particular the work of Jürgen Habermas) and the other on a shared tradition with so-called critical linguists. According to Habermas, a critical science has to be self-reflective – it has to reflect the interests on which it is based – and it must take into account of the historical contexts of interactions⁸⁵. According to van Dijk, this approach of discourse analysis is critical in the sense that it is quite explicitly directed at revealing how language is used for the exercise of socio-political control:

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Van Dijk, T. (1997). *Discourse as Social interaction. Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Approach*.

⁸¹ Titscher et al. (2000). *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*, p.144.

⁸² Quoted in Titscher, S., Meyer, M., Wodak, R., and Vetter, E. (2000). *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ These approaches include French discourse analysis; critical linguistics; social semiotics; socio-cultural change and change in discourse; sociocognitive studies; discourse historical method; reading analysis; and the Duisburg School. The list is not exhaustive. See Fairclough, N and Wodak, R. (1997). *Critical Discourse Analysis*. In: T.A. van Dijk (Ed.), *Discourse Studies: A Multidisciplinary Introduction: Vol.2. Discourse as Social Interaction*, pp. 258-284.

⁸⁵ Titscher et al. (2000). *Methods of Text and Discourse Analysis*, p.144.

*Critical Discourse Analysis is a type of discourse analytical research that primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context. With such dissident research, critical discourse analysts take explicit position, and thus want to understand, expose and ultimately resist social inequality*⁸⁶.

One of the central themes of interest for CDA is intertextuality – the shaping of text’s meaning by other texts. It can also refer to an author’s borrowing and transformation of a prior text or to a reader’s referencing of one text in reading another⁸⁷. The term “intertextuality” has itself been borrowed and transformed many times since it was coined by a poststructuralist Julia Kristeva in 1966. Kristeva understood “intertextuality” as a stylish way of talking about allusion and influence. She attempted to synthesize Ferdinand de Saussure’s structuralist semiotics (his study of how signs derive their meaning within the structure of a text) with Bakhtin’s dialogism (his examination of the multiple meanings in each text).

The empirical foundation of the present study is Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis as it enables to view texts as elements of social events that have causal events, meaning that they bring about changes. Namely, text can bring about changes in our knowledge, our beliefs, our attitudes, values. In sum, texts have causal effects upon and contribute to changes in people (beliefs, attitudes, etc), actions and social relations.

1.3 The problem setting of the study

1.3.1 The objectives of the study

The aim of the present study is to analyze the elaboration of normalcy in German

⁸⁶ Van Dijk, T. (2001). Critical Discourse Analysis. In.: *The Handbook of Discourse Analysis*, edited by D.Tannen, D.Schiffrin and H.Hamilton.

⁸⁷ Intertextuality. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] <http://en.wikipedia/wiki/intertextuality>. (06.08.2007).

foreign and security policy based on the statements of the government, the parliamentary parties' positions delivered by the deputies of the Bundestag in relation to the out-of-area operations in Bosnia – Herzegovina, Macedonia, Afghanistan. The author examines the development of the positions of the German political elite and especially its key speakers (Federal Chancellor, Foreign Minister, Defence Minister and the proponents of the parliamentary parties) in order to follow how they visualize Germany's role on the international scene taking its basic constants of foreign policy (geography, history, preponderance and size) into account. The non-specific nature allows for the transmission of the basic ideas in a concentrated form. Its repetitiveness allow for the discerning of patterns, for underlining the main ideas. It is interesting to see how these official statements create a context which legitimizes certain forms of thinking and leave aside the others⁸⁸.

In addition to the relevant plenary protocols of the Bundestag (Bosnian, Macedonian, and Afghanistan debates) the following newspapers have been used as sources in order to follow how German aspirations to become a normal state are represented both to German and as well to the foreign audience (“Das Parlament”, “Die Zeit”, “Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung”, “Süddeutsche Zeitung”, “The International Herald Tribune”).

In her treatment, the author pays attention to the argumentation used in justifying Germany's more assertive foreign policy, especially the increasing importance of the military component thereof; in addition, arguments are examined which the political elite relies upon in justifying Germany's behavior at domestic as well international level. The study formulates an empirical statement that the positions taken by the foreign policy elite, especially its key proponents follow the neorealist thinking that more power means more responsibility, meaning that Germany due to its objective facts (size and geographical location) is entitled to more actively participate in the out-of-area deployments especially when human rights are violated.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

1.3.2 Hypothesis

Relying upon the abovementioned theoretical and empirical framework, the author observes the German discourse of normalcy (the process of normalization of German foreign and security policy) that manifests itself in the change of thinking among German foreign policy elite with regard to out-of-area operations. Germany that once contributed to the solution of international crisis only financially gradually gives up this strategy and becomes more willing to also contribute militarily to peace. This change in thinking does not take place overnight, but it is formulated in the course of 15 years. As a result, Germany becomes more aware of its increased power status where power is not synonymous with military might, but it is also seen in terms of increasing economic might and preponderance at the international arena.

The author observes the discourse of normalcy from a number of angles:

- How the key persons of German foreign and security policy choose the arguments for explaining the vision of Germany becoming more normal; what importance is attached to the increasing role of military component in German foreign policy;
- Is there any difference between the presentation of the discourse of normalcy to the domestic and the external/international audience?

Taking this into account, the hypothesis of the present thesis is formulated as follows: **increased power situation will not lead to an increase of power politics; instead, more power denotes more responsibility.**

1.4 *The methodology of the study*

As regards the framework of the study, the author has chosen case-study that enables to better understand the stages of the process of normalization. Based on the

statement of Yin⁸⁹, the case study as one of the ways of carrying out social science research is a preferred strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context. In this particular case, a number of “what”, “why”, and “how” questions were posed - some examples are provided: what are arguments in support of a war in Afghanistan and the relevant arguments against military operation in Iraq or which goal/objective is more important for the German government?)⁹⁰. This study focuses on the evolution of normalization of German foreign policy in 1990 -2005 that definitely means that it deals with a contemporary event. Therefore, the criteria for choosing case-study as a research strategy are fulfilled and the use of this research strategy is justified.

The current case study will bring forward different stages of German transformation from skepticism to use force into a normal state that uses force as a last resort or if the situations require doing so in multilateral framework:

- Germany in peacekeeping missions.

This aspect is meant to discuss the role of German participation in the peacekeeping/humanitarian missions under the auspices of the UN or NATO? For what purpose the *Bundeswehr* participate in these missions? What importance is ascribed to participating in these missions?

- The German deployment to Macedonia under the auspices of NATO led operation.

The grounds why Germany committed troops to the NATO led Operation “Essential Harvest”. What kind of mandate is used and how it is justified. What other elements does this mission include? What are the main differences with this deployment with the other deployments that Germany has committed to the territory of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)?

- The German response to the Americans “War on terror” in Afghanistan and in Iraq

How does German foreign policy respond to the security problem of international

⁸⁹ Yin, K., R. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, p.3.

⁹⁰ See more detailed questions on the present page.

terrorism in relation to September 11, 2001? What are arguments in support of a war in Afghanistan and the relevant arguments against military operation in Iraq? How can the German positions be explained?

In order to examine the normalization process of German foreign and security policy, the author uses discourse analysis for a number of grounds. Firstly, this method enables to examine how this process is spoken about in German society, whether there are certain topics that are not spoken about at all, but to which only allusions are made. Secondly, discourse analysis allows the reader to grasp some future moves of foreign policy that have become apparent through the examination of texts (plenary protocols of the Bundestag and the speeches and interviews delivered by key persons of German foreign policy elite or political elite in general.

Placed in the German context that the present study focuses, it can be stated that the discursive struggles in the 1990s created worries about German orientation – notably the possibility of sending German troops abroad. On the one hand, the distinction can be made between semi-pacifist Greens and some social democrats who preferred a continuation of total abstention and on the other hand, the Kohl government (at that time), which also emphasized integration as a rationale for Germany, but was interested in gradually taking on more “normal tasks”. The strongest expression of this restless search for new ideas is a lively debate on “normality”. It is striking how the metaphor of “normality” and even of “growing up” has been present in German debates. The debate about moving the capital from Bonn to Berlin brought this out very clearly.

Normalization has been articulated most markedly at a more philosophical level; the process of normalization that covers not only foreign policy, but the other field of policy is about rehabilitating the state. The conservatives have a solid basis for articulating a complete political self-conception for the Germans. Although they lost the so-called *Historikerstreit*, they in turn won a number of post unification debates (on GDR literature and so forth), which broke the moral-political hegemony of the Holocaust

nation⁹¹. This logic is embodied in official policy and particularly through the person of Gerhard Schröder who has adopted terminology and metaphors related to sovereignty, normalization and “growing up”: “Our Germany is a self-assured country.... We do not therefore have to hide our national interests. This is our German way”⁹².

Politicians more or less everywhere deny an interest in “power” and prefer “responsibility”, but this might be of genuine significance in Germany⁹³. To foreign minister Joschka Fischer, Germany is becoming more “self-conscious” that suggests more actively promoting its Bonn based policy of “civilian power”⁹⁴. Chancellor Schröder in contrast, has put more emphasis on the German right to push through its national interests (“just like others do”). His “German Way” is about giving up the “cheque-book diplomacy” of Kohl and Genscher, which implies willingness to send troops instead. However, the most provocative German action so far was the decision made to refuse to send troops to Iraq in 2003. Thus, the key is a right to have its own views, in contrast with previously following automatically the wishes of key allies (USA in NATO and France in the EU). However, these German interests are thoroughly defined in terms of a European vision. Germany is a better European partner where more normal⁹⁵.

Still, it can be appropriate to warn against uncritically pursuing normality. This threatens to legitimize the view that all “normal” great power behavior is good.

1.4.1 The choice of method and the description of the sample

In order to study the normalcy discourse in the framework of the out-of-area debate that overwhelms the deployment of the Bundeswehr troops to Bosnia –

⁹¹ Germans carry the burden of their darkened history; especially the shadow of Auschwitz and a part of the solution became what Bernhard Giesen (1993) has called the “Holocaust nation”. Nazi Germany’s unspeakable crimes must be acknowledged and taken upon oneself by the Germans.

⁹² Schröder, G. (2002). *Meine Vision von Deutschland*. –*Bild Zeitung*, 08 August.

⁹³ Howarth, D, and Torfing, J. (2005). *Discourse Theory in European Politics: Politics, Identity and Governance*.

⁹⁴ Fischer, J. (2000). *Vom Staatenverbund zur Föderation – Gedanken über die Finalität der europäischen Integration*, speech on 12 May, at the Humboldt University, Berlin.

⁹⁵ „Wir sind europäisch sozialisiert und gross geworden. Wir sind davon überzeugt, dass Deutschland Teil Europas sein muss” ,Schröder, G. (1998).-*Der Spiegel*, 9 March.

Herzegovina, Macedonia and Afghanistan during the timeperiod of 1990 – 2005, the author has analyzed the most important deliberations of the fractions of the parliamentary parties, the government positions and the speeches of foremostly of the Federal Chancellor, Ministers of the Foreign Affairs and of Defense. The main stress was laid on the evolution in German foreign policy thinking what does it mean to be a „normal nation“, that is why the importance of the military component of foreign policy is taken onto the forefront that also includes German participation in out-of-area operations.

The analysis of the construction of the vision of Germany's role in world affairs of the German foreign policy elite is important in this respect that based on the institutional context, the Federal Chancellor, Foreign and Defence Ministers represent German state and in this sense their role in shaping the reputation and image of Germany to the international community is of vital importance.

The sample has been compiled as based on the criteria of thematic relevancy and the importance as related to the theme of the study. The author has focused her attention upon 46 more important German foreign and security policy related documents and speeches, 7 Bundestag's plenary protocols⁹⁶, 4 speeches from Klaus Kinkel, 3 speeches from Helmut Kohl, 10 speeches and 2 interview from Joschka Fischer, 11 speeches and 2 interviews from Gerhard Schröder, 5 speeches from Karsten Voigt . In total, the sample consists of 46 speeches/texts from the years 1991 – 2005.

The author has followed the principle of diversity in choosing the speeches and texts – it means that in the sampling there are the texts addressed to the domestic as well as foreign auditoriums, some speeches are more academic than the others. It enables the author to follow that different genres are included into analysis.

⁹⁶ Plenary protocols no 13/074, 13/076 from 30 November and 05 December 1995 on “Deutsche Beteiligung an den militärischen Massnahmen zur Absicherung des Friedensvertrages für Bosnien – Herzegovina (6425 C – 6467A; 6631 C – 6673 B)”; no 14/184 from 29 August 2001 on “Beteiligung bewaffneter Deutsche Streitkräfte an dem NATO-geführten Einsatz auf mazedonischem Territorium zum Einsammeln und Zerstören der Waffen, die durch die ethnisch albanischen bewaffneten Gruppen freiwillig abgegeben werden (18177 B – 18210 C)”; no 14/202 from 16 November 2001 on “Einsatz bewaffneter Deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf Terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Art.51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Art.5 des Nordatlantikvertrages sowie der Resolutionene 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen”; no 14/210 from 22 December 2002 on “Beteiligung bewaffneter Deutscher Streitkräfte an dem Einsatz einer Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungsgruppe in Afghanistan auf der Resolutionen 1386 (2001), 1383 (2001) und 1378 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen (20821 A – 20858 D)”; no. 15031 from 13 March 2003 on European Politics “Europapolitik”; no 15092 from 13 February 2004 on “Vereinbarte Debatte zur aktuellen Europapolitik”.

The main reason why the author limited the timeperiod from 1990 – 2005 lies in the fact that the evolution of the normalcy discourse in the framework of out-of-area operations manifests itself in the developments that took place, especially its breaking point is the deployment of the Bundeswehr units to Kosovo. In addition, the author follows the developments in this field during two Chancellors' tenure. Although only 15 years period is covered, it still enables to draw some conclusions that should be further studied in order to cover a longer period enabling to draw more fundamental conclusions about German foreign and security policy.

2 THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON DEPLOYING GERMAN TROOPS TO FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

As German foreign and security policy developed during the 1990s, its main focus was set on out-of-area deployments for the German armed forces (hereinafter the *Bundeswehr*). This turned out to be one of the central security policy issues for the German government to cope with, as the newly unified Germany's international role was adjusted to meet a new context and changed expectations after the end of the Cold War.

Although there have been other debates on sending troops "out- of - area" operations, only two of them have taken place after the constitutional legitimacy of German participation in peacekeeping missions was clarified by the Federal Constitution Court's (the high court in Germany) decision in 1994.

The first of these debates concerned sending the fighter jets of the type of the Electronic Combat Reconnaissance (ECR) Tornados to the existing UN mission in Former Yugoslavia. The second debate was the so-called Dayton debates. The focus of the current chapter is on the latter for a number of grounds. Firstly, while the Tornado debate was the first "out-of-area" debate since the court's decision, the Dayton debates are the first to concentrate on ground troops. The distinction can be made between these out-of-area debates. Secondly, the background for the Tornado debate was not a peace agreement; it concerned enforcement of a no-fly zone over Bosnia. The Dayton debates manifest itself in the first action of this kind to endorse a peace agreement. Therefore, the Dayton debates are not only historic or military in its aspects, but they demonstrate the

capacity of the international community in a post Cold War conflict solution, that turned out to be successful⁹⁷.

This chapter studies the Bundestag debates on deploying 4000 German troops to the Implementation Force (IFOR) with the mission to enforce the Dayton peace agreement in Former Yugoslavia. The debates occurred over two days, November 30, and December 6, 1995. The debate on December 6, 1995 preceded a final vote on this issue, whereas November 30, was a “pre-debate” on the government’s motion in the form of governmental declaration on Germany’s participation in the Implementation Force (IFOR) and various motions from the opposition.

2.1 The background of the Dayton peace agreement

Against the background of the intense NATO bombing and shelling of Bosnian Serb positions, the United States took the diplomatic lead in order to finally put an end to the fighting in the Balkans. Negotiations since the Vance Owen Peace Plan had never really succeeded in generating a plan acceptable for all sides. The Americans understood that all of the former plans, whether elaborated by the EU, the Contact Group or the United Nations would not succeed, unless they took charge of the negotiating process. The Dayton peace process resulted in the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) in Bosnia and Herzegovina⁹⁸.

The Dayton peace agreement finalized the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethnically based states within a wider Bosnian Federation, including the Federation of Muslims and Croats, as well as the Serbian Republic of Bosnia. According to the peace agreement, signed on 21 November 1995, the Bosnian – Serbs obtained 49 % of Bosnia – Herzegovina, while the Federation of the Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats obtained

⁹⁷ See also Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*. Duffield also elaborates the issue, see Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*.

⁹⁸ Ibid.

relevantly 51 %. This agreement included provisions for safe passage of different ethnic groups, for the right of return for those expelled from their homes⁹⁹.

After the conclusion of the Dayton peace agreement the need for the relevant body to implement the peace agreement arose and it was evident that the ethnic groups could not cope with the situation themselves. In order to fulfill the task, a category of the peacekeeping operations - peace support operations - had to be initiated. These are multifaceted missions that combine a robust military force with a significant civilian component¹⁰⁰. Their aim is to transform war-torn societies into liberal democratic societies. For that purpose, peace-support operations typically involve the deployment of an UN-authorized multinational force that has both the means and mandate to respond to breaches of the peace. The purpose of the force is to provide security that involves an extensive expansion of peacekeeping functions to include civilian policing, institution-building, infrastructure reconstruction and national reconciliation¹⁰¹.

In accordance with Dayton peace agreement, NATO ground forces were brought in to secure a peace and to enforce agreements (IFOR). The force formed part of a broader UN mission charged with implementing the agreement. As well as issues of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was mandated to run elections, construct and implement a constitution in order to develop a system of human rights protection, return refugees to their original homes and etc. IFOR itself was authorized by the UN Security Council (Resolution 1031), but commanded by NATO¹⁰². Initially IFOR consisted of 60 000 soldiers including a considerable US component and an important Russian element that also operated under NATO command (in practice it exercised considerable autonomy). Although IFOR was well-equipped and well-funded, significant problems remained. Firstly different national contingents behaved differently even the contingents that were part of NATO¹⁰³. For example, at the beginning of the operation the British and

⁹⁹ See General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (1994). [WWW] <http://www.ohr.int/dpa>. (10.08.2007).

¹⁰⁰ HMSO (1999). Joint Warfare Publication 3-50: Peace Support Operations.

¹⁰¹ Holm, T. and Eide, E. (2000). *Peacebuilding and Police reform*.

¹⁰² See also Lampton, M (2005). *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Germany*.

¹⁰³ Ibid.

the French contingents continued to apply the lessons learned when they had deployed the Rapid Reaction Force in 1995. It combined using force in limited and specific ways with more traditional consent-based approaches to peacekeeping¹⁰⁴. On the other hand, the US contingent stood out because they either declined to use force at all, or when they did, massive amount of force was used. The second problem was that there was very little coordination at the beginning between the different pillars of the peace mission (UN Security Council, OSCE Council, EU Council of Ministers and the North Atlantic Council)¹⁰⁵.

The peace support operation allowed a clearer mission mandate as compared to the earlier UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force) mandate, endorsing a much stronger use of force in self-defense and in reaching mission goals. The NATO force was also much more heavily armed than the earlier UN missions had been.

To sum it up, the general map of Bosnia and the political implementation of the agreements reached in Dayton were to a large extent determined through negotiations. The USA played an indispensable role in bringing the parties together and convincing them that none of them could expect a better outcome. As a result of the peace agreement, several objectives were achieved as necessary pre-conditions for enforcing peace in Bosnia. Firstly, the conflicting parties were separated from one another and the order was restored. Secondly, the fighting and atrocities were stopped with minimum loss of life on all sides¹⁰⁶. A broad-based multinational military force was put in place to create a secure environment in which civilian operations could be carried out.

2.2 German involvement in the Balkans

The Balkans became the first destination of German deployment, although its policy towards this region had acquired a relatively low profile in the course of 1992 and

¹⁰⁴ Murray, R. and Gordon, S (1998). *The Road to Peace: NATO and the International Community in Bosnia*.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Murray, R and Gordon, S. (1998). *The Road to Peace: NATO and the International Community in Bosnia*.

1993. At the same time, France, United Kingdom and the USA were diplomatically more active which could be partly explained by the increased criticism in the West towards Germany, after it had unilaterally recognized the independence of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991. Germany was not willing to participate in military operations and therefore its ability to shape the events remained limited¹⁰⁷.

Nevertheless it became diplomatically more active at the end of 1993 to find a solution to the conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia. Following the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court in 1994¹⁰⁸, it came under pressure from its allies to assume a greater role in the western military operations in the region. Later this year, Germany promised to contribute support units to the NATO force that was assembled to implement the Dayton peace agreement. At the end of 1996, German forces were assigned the full range of duties to be undertaken by the NATO follow-on mission in Bosnia. In spite of these significant steps, German military involvement in the former Yugoslavia remained relatively small in size and limited in nature, ensuring that Bundeswehr would almost certainly never have to “fire shots in anger¹⁰⁹”.

Two other factors affected the German decision to step forward. Firstly, the German leaders had been increasingly disappointed by the failure of their partners to consult with them in advance about important actions in the region. Therefore, they decided to change the tactics and to be more active. Secondly, they were eager to give substance to the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which had entered into effect with the Treaty of the European Union (TEU)¹¹⁰.

¹⁰⁷ Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*.

¹⁰⁸ The ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court, dated from 12 July 1994 prescribed that the Basic Law allowed Germany to participate with armed forces in military operations outside of the NATO area, including those involving mandate to use force, as long as they took place under UN auspices.

The Court’s ruling did not finally resolve the controversy over what military actions the Basic Law allowed. It ascertained that the constitution permitted German participation in the full range of collective actions under UN auspices, but at first the government has to obtain the Bundestag’s consent. The Court also held that the federal government was obliged to obtain the constitutive (enabling) agreement of the Bundestag for each proposed military mission that this agreement must be obtained prior to the deployment. See also Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

¹⁰⁹ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

Germany also played a role in the establishment of the so-called Contact Group, consisting of Germany, United Kingdom, France, Russia and the USA at the beginning of 1994¹¹¹.

In June 1995, Germany participated in the Rapid Reaction Force that was being assembled for the purpose of protecting possible redeployment of the UN forces in Bosnia. Germany understood that in this case it should help in order to prevent a collapse of the UN mission (UNPROFOR), which would lead only to more conflict in the area. It was important to demonstrate Germany's willingness to shoulder more international responsibility and to protect the credibility of the UN and its ability to act. Although, the opposition, especially the Social Democratic Party (SPD) raised objections to the proposed deployment. In particular, the SPD and the Greens' (die Grünen/Bündnis 90') leaders rejected Germany's participation in any military actions that could escalate the conflict. Nevertheless, the Bundestag passed the necessary legislation by a substantial majority (386 – 258) notwithstanding the coalition's slim margin of seats¹¹².

Strong parliamentary support owed much to the sharp restrictions that were placed on the German deployment. No one thought of stationing German combat forces on the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. Instead, the German contribution would be limited to the protection of a UN withdrawal, which enabled government officials to argue that Germany could not refuse to provide for a re-deployment, what it was, prepared to do in the event that the UN troops had to be removed from Bosnia¹¹³.

The level of German military involvement in the Balkans increased in late 1995, when the government agreed to contribute to the NATO led force established to implement the Dayton peace agreement. The government's main arguments centered on the importance of putting an end to the conflict, they also highlighted the expectations of the international community and the need to be a reliable ally and to show solidarity. In this time the number of votes was 656 out of which 543 supported the deployment of the

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Thursday, November 30-th, 1995 13-th electoral period, 74-th session and Wednesday, December 6-th 1995 (13074), 13-th electoral period, 76-th session (13076).

¹¹³ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

German troops to Bosnia-Herzegovina and 107 were against this decision¹¹⁴. The socialists (PDS), some of the deputies of the Greens (die Grünen/Bündnis 90) and the Social Democrats (SPD) did not support the deployment. This can be explained on the grounds that the Social Democrats formerly belonged to the peace movements and favored pacifism, the same applies to the Greens who hold anti-war sentiments. It is evident that at the level of the political elite the politicians understood that Germany could not shy away this time when the human rights of the other ethnic groups were breached.

2.3 Summary of the debate

Germany's commitment to provide the Bundeswehr troops to a peacekeeping operation to Bosnia – Herzegovina carries a symbolic meaning – the aim of the largest Bundeswehr military contribution so far has been to put an end to a war of long duration. The army in question that once conquered other countries is today ready to assume responsibility. This will definitely demonstrates Germany's attempt of becoming a normal country again that despite its historical legacy, especially the Nazi past is able to face with its past and move on after having learned the lessons of the past. Although, the change in thinking is slow to occur, the signs of its emergence are clearly visible. Thus, the deployment of the troops of the Bundeswehr that is sent to the territory of the Former Yugoslavia is definitely different from the Nazi army that conquered Yugoslavia during 1941 – 1945¹¹⁵.

By now Germany has been re-united over 15 years and the questions can be posed what influences geopolitical changes have for Germany itself and for the continent. What kind of responsibility this country in the *Mittellage* position has in view of its history and location and what opportunities it has for shaping its destiny. What role should Germany play tomorrow in this respect? This deployment definitely belongs to the first stage of Germany becoming a normal country again that behaves like any other country including

¹¹⁴ See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Thursday, November 30-th, 1995 13-th electoral period, 74-th session and Wednesday, December 6-th 1995 (13074), 13-th electoral period, 76-th session (13076).

¹¹⁵ The Second World war in Yugoslavia. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second> World War in Yugoslavia. (20.05.2007).

contributing militarily to the solution of international crisis. More and more often the Germans began to see themselves as a reliable ally that also assumes responsibility together with the other states. The normalization process, the signs of which began slowly to emerge, could be best observed through attributing new meanings to 4 basic constants of German foreign policy that in the present case coincide with the nodal points of normalcy discourse of German foreign policy: preponderance and size, history and geography.

2.3.1 Preponderance

In 1990, unified Germany re-emerged at the geographic center of Europe as the continent's weightiest and hence most influential actor in economic and as well as political terms. During the early 1990s Germany was still looking for its new role in a continuously evolving Europe and the world. Thus, it adhered strongly to traditional West German foreign political rhetoric, pointing to unified Germany as a "civilian power"¹¹⁶ and "trading state"¹¹⁷. It took place in the framework of the "culture of restraint" and the full congruence of German and European interests. Foreign political continuity, in line with the West German traditions was embodied in the continuity of the main political actors: Chancellor Helmut Kohl and Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Chancellor Kohl's deep conviction was that Germany remained embedded in the West as well as of being the motor of further European integration¹¹⁸.

In parallel to these political processes that were shaped by Germany, the conflicts in the Gulf and later in the Former Yugoslavia shaped new Germany's military role. The

¹¹⁶ Hanns Maull and Sebastian Harnisch elaborated a concept of "civilian power" where the state foreign policy strategy puts emphasis on multilateral co-operation and trade, relies on negotiations, rule of law and prefers non – military means to achieve its national interests. It resorts to arms only with international legitimation and only as a part of an international framework. This concept is defined by Maull, H. (1990/1991). Germany and Japan: The new Civilian Powers. – *Foreign Affairs*, Winter,, vol. 39, Issue 5, pp.91 – 106. See also Harnisch, S and Maull, H. (2001). *Germany as a Civilian Power? The Foreign Policy of the Berlin Republic*.

¹¹⁷ According to Richard Rosecrance the states must choose between being "trading states" concerned with promoting wealth through commerce, and "territorial states" obsessed with military expansion. See also Rosecrance, R. (1986). *The Rising of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*. – *Journal of Sociology*, vol. 92, no.3, pp.709 – 711.

¹¹⁸ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

crisis in the Persian Gulf began on August 1990 with the Iraq invasion of Kuwait. It represented the first serious foreign policy challenge for Germany, to mention some of the operations like *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm*. Although Chancellor Helmut Kohl from the Christian – Democratic Union (CDU) and Foreign Minister Hans – Dietrich Genscher from the Free Democratic Party (FDP) “agreed that their country had significant interests in the region that were threatened by the Iraqi invasion and regional instability including vital access to oil¹¹⁹”. The antimilitarist position of both Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher was obvious during the debate that preceded the beginning of Operation *Desert Storm* in 1991. The German leadership at that time (Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher) perceived other resources than military to be useful. They spoke of the “danger of escalation” and the potential costs of military conflict. The risks of using military force seemed to outweigh whatever potential benefits might be gained¹²⁰. The main goal of Kohl and Genscher was to control risks by avoiding escalation. In addition, they ascribed a strong faith to the efficiency of diplomacy and “they insisted that every possible means of achieving a peaceful resolution to the crisis, including negotiations, should be exhausted before any military action would even be considered”¹²¹. Therefore, the *Bundeswehr* remained out of the conflict.

The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia that took place in the years from 1992 up to 1996 presented Germany with a new dilemma; besides Yugoslavia was located not very far from Germany. This region was characterized by a great number of conflicts in the past (for example, the Balkan wars in 1912 – 13, the attendant to the ruler of Austria – Hungary, Franz Ferdinand, the event that released the trigger of the World War I in Sarajevo). The proximity of this region would definitely not leave Germany unaffected. Despite the proximity of the danger, the German government exercised considerable restraint on this issue.

Like in the previous crises, all three German leaders (Chancellor Helmut Kohl, Foreign Ministers: Hans–Dietrich Genscher and since May 1992 Klaus Kinkel) regarded

¹¹⁹See Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2005). Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes. – *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no.3, September.

¹²⁰ Ibid.

¹²¹ See Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2005). Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes. – *Security Dialogue*, vol. 36, no.3, September. The same issue is also dealt with by Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*.

the international security environment more co-operative and thus preferred more multilateral solutions concluded within the international institutions. They still believed in the efficiency of diplomacy and its role as a mediator in case of conflicts¹²². Although minor changes can be already observed, for example, Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel who was also from the FDP, contrary to Kohl and Genscher came to office at a time of new harsh realities. Thus, he did not so much stressed co-operative nature of the international security environment and diplomacy as compared to his predecessors Kohl and Genscher.

Despite increasing violence in the Balkans and the signs that diplomacy in the current stage has become futile, the German position remained constant. The political elite were on the opinion that problems in Bosnia should be resolved at political level. The strategy of the German leadership clearly intended to delay escalatory actions whenever possible and thus until 1994 “immersed itself in a lengthy and self-indulgent debate on the constitutionality of committing German troops even to peacekeeping operations”. After four years of military inaction and after increasing criticism and international pressure, the German leadership finally decided that German pilots would fly support missions for NATO air strikes in 1995. Additionally Chancellor Kohl approved the deployment of 1800 and then 2200 more soldiers to the former Yugoslavia¹²³.

In connection with the events in the Former Yugoslavia, Germany should demonstrate itself in a new role. In this case it is Germany’s duty to give assistance in implementing the peace. Wolfgang Gerhardt’ statement strikingly touches upon the German predicament “at present they have a chance to bring hope to the country, although their presence once in that country was no hope at all”¹²⁴.

Foreign policy can be uncomfortable, but Germany cannot shy away if the core issues of the international responsibility are in question. The core issue in the current debate is whether Germany remains in the Ivory tower and shies away from its

¹²² See *ibid.*

¹²³ See Duffield, J. (1998).). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification.*

¹²⁴ „.... Auch mit Deutschen Soldaten einem Land einen Funken Hoffnung zu geben, in dem früher einmal deutsche Soldaten waren, die keine Hoffnung für dieses Land waren”, stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Thursday, November 30-th, 1995 13-th electoral period, 74-th session and Wednesday, December 6-th 1995, 13-th electoral period, 76-th session. Gerhardt: 6440.

international obligations or this country has sufficiently grown, to agree to the natural obligations related to the international law, together with the other democratic states 50 years (1995) after the end of the World War II. The answer should be that it could.

2.3.2 Size

Although Germany had a remarkable power base prior to unification, with the reunification of Eastern and Western Germany, it became larger in the domains of territory, population and economy. Today's political map shows a compact territory west of the Oder and Neisse rivers and the wedge of Bohemia. For example, the territory of the former East Germany (divided into five new Länder in 1990) accounts for almost one-third of united Germany's territory and one-fifth of its population. Germany still faces sensitive special eastern issues, but the country's center lies westward. With the re-establishment of one Germany, the issue of national unity was legally solved, the quest for territorial revision that had characterized German foreign policy from the Treaty of Versailles to German unification in 1990, was replaced by the renunciation of territorial expansion. Bonn accepted de jure the Oder-Neisse line as Germany's eastern border and committed itself to maintaining this new status quo.

It implies that as concerns territory Germany was again a great power¹²⁵. A question can be posed whether these new transformed geopolitical circumstances somehow have impact upon German foreign policy behavior.

In 1967 Federal Chancellor Kurt Georg Kiesinger summarized the dilemma of a reunited Germany as follows: it would have a "critical size..... too big to play a part in the balance of forces and too small to keep the forces around it in balance by itself¹²⁶". Taking this into account, in these transformed geopolitical circumstances Germany is playing some kind of regional role as a "middle power". This also manifests itself in the fact that in the time-period in question (1990 – 2005) Germany has emerged as a consistent advocate of the interests of the countries seeking to accede to NATO and the EU. It has also been sympathetic towards those countries that were expected to remain

¹²⁵ Ash, T. (1994). Germany's Choice. –*Foreign Affairs*, July/August, pp.65 – 81.

¹²⁶ See *ibid.*

“outside” of the integrated structures for a long time to come. These countries addressed to Germany for a number of reasons as to their utmost supportive, influential partner in Europe. Thus, the German Question is still valid because Germany is too small to dominate, but too large to be led, only at present German policymakers have found a new role to play as a regional power in Central Europe

At present, Germany is the most powerful country in Europe, although it is not in the superpower status. It possesses assets in three main dimensions of power: the military, the economic and the social. At the same time it has certain restraints in these three dimensions¹²⁷.

Militarily, Germany has some of the largest and the best armed forces in Europe. At present it is not in the highest league as concerns military power. It is still unthinkable that a German government would use force or the threat of force to achieve a national goal, except the defense of its territory.

Economically, Germany is in the highest league, and this power has been actively deployed in two distinct ways. First, economic instruments and incentives have been used to achieve its foreign policy goals. Second, the Bundesbank’s single-minded pursuit of domestic monetary and fiscal policy objectives has had a direct impact on the economies of Germany’s neighbors and trading partners.

However, Germany at the beginning of the 1990s was affected by a double economic crisis. The unification brought along the massive cost of incorporating and reconstructing the former East Germany. At the same time, there was obviously the crisis of the old West German “social market economy” that became to show the signs of erosion and lose its competitiveness before unification. Simultaneously it was clear that if Germany were unlikely to use military means as an instrument of foreign policy, neither would it use economic means for this end. All decision, including those made inside the EU would be carefully looked at for their impact on German budgets and competitiveness in European and world markets.

It means that up to the mid 1990s Germany was still looking for its new role, bearing in mind its historic burden that prevented it from exercising assertive foreign

¹²⁷ Ibid.

policy. It was evident that Germany despite its increased powerbase was not inclining to unilateralism, but instead, it was holding a multilateral line.

2.3.3 History

History, as a complex phenomenon in German case, emerges into the foreground in the current debate on the deployment of the Bundeswehr troops to the territory of the Former Yugoslavia. Although the World War II has ended 50 years ago (1995), its implications are still perceivable in the mindset of the Germans. The statement delivered by the SPD deputy Günter Verheugen, illustrates this argument that the civil war in Bosnia awoke the old memories of the Germans, the pictures that Germany experienced in the World War II.¹²⁸ The sufferings of the people in Bosnia reminded the Germans of the atrocities of the war, something that nobody considered possible to happen anymore. Although, the old ideologies, landmaps and ethnic intolerance that were believed to be dead and buried down forever were suddenly animated. Therefore the notion „historical burden“ is introduced here to refer to the atrocities made by the Germans in the past and for many it is directly related to the issue of Holocaust and the killings of the people. For one generation, the name of *Auschwitz* is a symbol of these events. Holocaust¹²⁹ is understood as an intentional and meticulously planned attempt to entirely eradicate the target groups based on ethnicity. It was justified by claiming that the victims were Untermenschen, i.e., 'underlings' or 'subhumans', who were seen as both biologically inferior and (in the case of Jews) a potential challenge to the superiority of the 'Aryans'. Its perpetrators saw it as a form of eugenics—the creation of a better race by eliminating the designated "unfit"—along the same lines as their programs of compulsory sterilization, compulsory euthanasia, and "racial hygiene". This striking analogy can be found in Bosnia, the events

¹²⁸ “Ich rate, sich bei den Debatten, die wir in diesem Zusammenhang zu führen haben, immer die Bilder der Menschen vor Augen zu halten, die in den letzten Jahren unter diesem Krieg so schwer gelitten haben, wie alle diejenigen ermesen können, die in unserem eigenen Land die Schrecken des Krieges noch erlebt haben. Bei allen Gefahren und Risiken, die nicht verschwiegen werden dürfen, sollte dieses Ergebnis nicht für selbstverständlich gehalten werden”, stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Thursday, November 30-th, 1995 13-th electoral period, 74-th session and Wednesday, December 6-th 1995, 13-th electoral period, 76-th session. Verheugen: 6431.

¹²⁹ Holocaust. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Holocaust>. (20.04.2007).

of Srebrenica indicated that nothing has really changed, the old demon had awoken. Based upon the experience gained by the Holocaust, Germany had to learn from the experience with Holocaust how to collaborate with all civilized nations that in future nobody shies away and acts duly in order to avoid the crimes related to ethnical cleansing. At the end of the 20-th century the international community in this respect unfortunately failed.

The role of history in this sense cannot be downplayed. It emphasizes that what happened in the past had to be left in the past, but the lessons learned had to be remembered in order not to repeat the same pattern again. The same applies to the international community and its understanding of the events - it cannot learn not only from Srebrenica, but it should also bear in mind the events of Munich in 1938. This implies that the sooner the aggressor is suppressed, more secure the peace is¹³⁰.

The perception of history has substantially changed, for example in 1991 Helmut Kohl highlighted history and stated that it is impossible for the German soldiers to stay in Yugoslavia¹³¹. The same position was held at the beginning of the outbreak of violence in Yugoslavia in 1992, by Volker Rühle, at that time Federal Minister of Defense, who summarized the position by saying that “for me, the military option in Yugoslavia is out of the question”¹³². As the events in Bosnia indicated, the change in thinking of German political elite slowly took place. At times German leaders have acknowledged, “diplomacy and other non-military instruments will not suffice to settle conflicts or to stop aggression”. Instead, diplomatic efforts must be backed by the threat of force, which may have to be employed if all other means fail”¹³³.

¹³⁰ Stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Thursday, November 30-th, 1995 13-th electoral period, 74-th session and Wednesday, December 6-th 1995, 13-th electoral period, 76-th session. Dr Schäuble: 6640.

¹³¹ „...die Geschichte hat uns einmal mehr eingeholt. Deswegen ist es doch ganz klar – darüber braucht man wirklich nicht zu sprechen; ich habe es immer gesagt, auch die Bundesregierung hat es gesagt -, dass es in Europa – wie man auch über einen Truppeneinsatz in Jugoslawien entscheiden mag – einige gebiete gibt – dazu gehört mit Sicherheit auch Jugoslawien -, bei denen man sich nicht vorstellen kann, dass dort deutsche Soldaten eingesetzt werden”. Bundestag Erklärung am 27 November 1991.

¹³² Rühle, V. (1992). „Eine militärische Option in Jugoslawien kommt für mich nicht in Frage”, 22 Juli.

¹³³ Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*, p. 68.

At the same time, German leaders have stressed that the use of force is risky and must remain a last resort¹³⁴. Force must be preceded by attempts to achieve consensus and on the basis of peaceful norms of conflict solution. It is evident that the culture of reticence – culture of restraint is in the forefront of German decision-making. By 1994, the understanding had changed and the common opinion was that if the minority rights were breached, the intervention was justified.

The issue of morality is directly linked with history in the framework of the present debate. Thus, this concept is dwelled upon in detail as follows. The peacekeeping operation is morally justified as its aim is to enforce peace in Bosnia that hopefully affects the whole region. Is it moral to help the others, protect the others or protect only oneself is a question to be posed? Definitely it is immoral in certain situations to send one's troops to the other country. The history of the last century provides a number of examples. In the situation in the former Yugoslavia, the conflicting parties (Bosnia, Serbia, and Croatia) concluded the Dayton peace agreement and by following this logic, invited NATO to deploy its troops to Bosnia. They sought peace, but they could not manage themselves to put an end to the conflict. Therefore in this context the peacekeeping operation was internationally legitimized. Therefore, not to respond would have been immoral¹³⁵. Saving human lives is morally justified. If human lives are in danger it is out of the question to hold a pacifist position. Even more, Germany has power and means to do it. The Bundeswehr soldiers' presence in Yugoslavia is moral on these grounds and the soldiers are not part of the problem, but instead they are part of the solution to the problems. Ethnic cleansing, mass-murders require different solutions, for example, the events of Srebrenica is the best manifestation what can happen if appropriate response is not taken.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ "Es kann sehr unmoralisch sein, sich dem Unrecht nicht entgegenzustellen durch den Einsatz von Soldaten" nach den Ereignissen in der ersten Hälfte dieses Jahrhunderts – Auschwitz und anders – jemals eine Bedeutung gehabt hat, dann jetzt, wo es einen Friedensvertrag, eine Friedenstruppe und den geschlossenen Internationalen Willen gibt, sich Menschenrechtsverletzungen und Verbrechen entgegenzustellen. Da heist es nicht nur dies politisch zu unterstützen. Alles andere ware unmoralisch. Das muss man deutlich sagen", stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Thursday, November 30-th, 1995 13-th electoral period, 74-th session and Wednesday, December 6-th 1995, 13-th electoral period, 76-th session. Ruhe: 6447, 6450.

Historic memory stands in the foreground of this debate and therefore in order to obtain redemption for catastrophic deeds carried out in the past (Holocaust and massive killings that accompanied the German soldiers during the World War II) Germany had to demonstrate to the other states that it had changed. It is manifested by the statement of the Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl who claimed that Germans had learned from their experience based upon the civil war in Yugoslavia how important was to recognize and respect the protection of minority rights in Europe¹³⁶.

The reason why Bosnia is uncomfortable destination also refers to history: it was Germany that declared war to Yugoslavia in April 1941 and the capitulation of Yugoslavia took place 11 days later. It started on 6 April 1941 with the bombardment of Belgrade and ended on 17 April 1941 with the capitulation of the Yugoslav army in Bosnia¹³⁷. In this case it can be interpreted that the German armed forces at that time were used by the criminal regime and thus were forced to violate international law. At present, Germany is a democratic country and the parts have changed: the present mission under question is meant for enforcing peace in Bosnia, and therefore the situation is the other way round. If in the past the German soldiers were compelled to violate legal norms/law, then in this case their duty was to assist a democratic country in enforcing peace and democracy. It is evident that Germany is unable to deny its history and if this country is requested to participate in the out-of-area deployment, it cannot shy away. Therefore, Bosnia is especially important. It is important to learn from history. By its conduct Germany has proven that it has internalized the lessons of the Holocaust that means that they are conscious of the burden of their history. This in turn means that Germany was in the middle of becoming normal country that is willing to face with its past and ready to assume responsibility.

¹³⁶ „Es ist die wichtigste Lehre aus dem Krieg in ehemaligen Jugoslawien, dass wir dem Grundsatz eines wirksamen Minderheitenschutzes überall in Europa Anerkennung und achtung verschaffen“, stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Thursday, November 30-th, 1995 13-th electoral period, 74-th session and Wednesday, December 6-th 1995, 13-th electoral period, 76-th session. Kohl: 6634.

¹³⁷ The Second World War in Yugoslavia.. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Second> World War in Yugoslavia. (20.05.2007).

2.3.4 Geography

In 1991, a unified Germany – embedded in the West culturally and politically – was once again located at the geographic center of Europe, a Europe considerably transformed. Jochen Thies summarized the essence and implications of this mixture of changes as follows:

History starts to matter again. Germany cannot escape from it, nor can the country run away from the new realities of geography. There is no relief from being positioned in the middle of Europe. Germany has to accept the fact and must act in order to overcome the traumatic memories of the past when the middle position after Bismarck led to great European wars, bringing to an end the history of the German Reich, founded in 1871, after just two generations in 1945¹³⁸.

In the aftermath of the Cold War, Germany was again located as a unified and sovereign great power at the heart of Europe. In contrast to Germany's geographical and political *Mittellage* before 1945, in 1992 Germany was culturally and politically embedded in the west, making its new "old" central position a geographical fact¹³⁹. The post 1990 Germany aimed to combine its Western links with its central European geopolitical location in a new type of policy which can be called "hinge policy". Eager to preserve and reinforce the achievements of postwar integration and reconciliation in the West, Bonn wanted to extend these successes and benefits to a changing and unstable east.

A number of developments, which have their origins in both traditional and new factors, have shifted Germany to a central position in Europe which might be interpreted as an integrated central position, an integrated *Mittellage*¹⁴⁰. It was Germany's desire to

¹³⁸ Thies, J. (1991). Germany and Eastern Europe Between Past and Future.-In *Germany's New Position: Problems and Perspectives*, edited by A.Baring, p.72.

¹³⁹ See Bach, J. (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*.

¹⁴⁰ See Mützelburg, B (2005). Grossmannsucht – oder aufgeklärte Interessenpolitik? – *Internationale Politik*, Oktober 2005, nr 10, 60 Jahr, pp. 34 – 41.

integrate the East–European countries into the EU and NATO because from their point of view it was the best way of stabilizing the region.

Evidently, only a politically and economically stable eastern neighborhood can provide a positive external environment for Germany’s development. Thus, it can be said that the primary strategic goal of post-unification German foreign and security policy has thus been to extend the West European zone of stability to the whole of Europe.

Germany’s eastern neighbors have often been perceived as the source of a series of critical challenges in the field of illegal immigration, transnational criminal organizations and environment degradation. In addition, the social and wage gap in bordering regions raised concerns about the implications for employment at the local level in Germany. Being the most western state of NATO and the EU, Germany realized that its eastern borders represented the dividing line between West and East, prosperity and poverty, stability and instability. Therefore it was Germany’s goal to stabilize its immediate neighbors in East-Central Europe (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) as well as the post-communist states, most importantly Russia, so that they would not threaten European – and German –security.

The western powers, notably the USA perceive Germany as an engine/driving force for the stabilization of and co-operation with the Central and East-European countries. Germany is expected to be an “upholder” of the double enlargement process – which renders Germany a “position of a central power”.

The German government was much concerned with stability and security in Eastern Europe, especially in view of the worsening crisis in the Balkans. The conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the years from 1992 to 1996 presented Germany with a new dilemma due to its geographic proximity with Yugoslavia. This region had been a powder keg in the past and now it again carried the potential for major ruptures in Europe that would not leave Germany unaffected. Despite the proximity of the danger, the German government exercised considerable restraint on the issue. Chancellor Kohl, Foreign Minister Genscher and his successor (after May 1992) Klaus Kinkel perceived the international security environment to be significantly more co-operative. Despite increasing violence in the Balkans and the emergence of the signs that diplomacy would prove futile, the German government “focused on energies on using international

institutions to achieve a peaceful solution to the conflict". The political elite were united and expressed the opinion that the problems in Bosnia could only be solved politically. For example, in July 1991, the German leadership proposed the convening of an EC sponsored peace conference in September¹⁴¹. Other efforts to initiate cease-fire followed within the context of the Western European Union (WEU).

There was less fear of an immediate eastern military threat than of a breakdown of social structures and political disorder, resulting in hords of unwelcome economic refugees or even the possibility of violent crisis directly on Germany's eastern border.

Thus, in contrast to the historical desire to dominate the east, the new German Ostpolitik was focusing on the need to help the east. However, this assistance was based on realpolitik agenda. The vital Ostpolitical interest of Germany was linking its eastern and central European neighbors to western institutional structures. The desire of the Central European states' to join Western institutional structures co-incided with Germany's own security interest. Stability in the Eastern Europe was its first and foremost national interest.

To conclude, the unified Germany is larger, more powerful and more sovereign, and it occupies a more central position than the old Federal Republic. During the current debate certain developments have taken place concerning all nodal points of normalcy discourse in German foreign policy. As concerns geography, due to the reunification, Germany moved back to its normal position – that is the frontier state between East and West and gradually got accustomed to its new role and responsibilities that in its best way manifests itself in the decision of the Bundestag to deploy German troops to the territory of Former Yugoslavia. What concerns history than this deployment to Bosnia implicates that is possible to learn from history and leave behind the traumatic past after having learned some useful lessons for future. Definitely, Germany is becoming more preponderant at the international arena, but it takes time to acquire a middle power status in Europe that complies with Germany's size and weight. The first step has been made in this direction.

¹⁴¹ Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*, pp.187 – 188.

Although, Germany was militarily engaged in Bosnia, the German leadership first tried extensively to work within existing institutional structures in the search for a multilateral solution. That is why the deployment of the first contingent of the Bundeswehr to Bosnia, very uncomfortable destination for the Germans, acquires a symbolic meaning. For example in the present case, Bosnia is important for Germany in many respects. Firstly, in accordance with the Dayton peace agreement Germany was faced with the request to deploy troops to a peacekeeping mission with combat potential. In the historical context Bosnia is uncomfortable destination for the German troops because deploying troops to the territory of the Former Yugoslavia (that Bosnia-Herzegovina was part of) re-awoke the old wounds in the mindset of the Germans. This seemed to be like opening the old wounds that were almost healed and buried down for one generation of Germans. The decision taken by the Bundestag to send troops in support of the Dayton agreement necessitated a debate on the fundamental nature of the German foreign policy.

The Dayton debates that took place on 30 November and 06 December 2005 marked an important date for German foreign policy as the parliament gave its support to the deployment of the Bundeswehr troops to Bosnia (543 – 107). This opened a way for Germany to take the responsibility and behave in accordance with its weight like any normal state.

3 THE BUNDESTAG DEBATE ON DEPLOYING GERMAN TROOPS TO THE NATO LED OPERATION ON THE TERRITORY OF MACEDONIA

The Balkans did not remain peaceful after the Kosovo war, as ethnic Albanians in Macedonia started an uprising to fight for equal rights for the Albanian minority. In the summer of 2001 violence arose between ethnic Albanians and the Macedonian government. Since the Macedonian Albanians were receiving support from the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), fears grew that the KLA wanted to promote a “greater Albania”¹⁴² and that Macedonia might fall into the same kind of spiral of ethnic conflict that had been drifting south from Slovenia since 1991.

This chapter explores the Bundestag debate on sending German troops to Macedonia in the framework of NATO contingent with the mission to collect and destroy the weapons held by the ethnic Albanians and to prevent the outbreak of civil war in Macedonia. The debate took place on 29 August 2001 on the government’s motion in the form of governmental declaration on German participation in the NATO led operation “Essential Harvest” and various motions from the opposition¹⁴³.

The author has chosen to dwell on the present debate about committing *the Bundeswehr* troops to the territory of Macedonia in the framework of NATO led

¹⁴² The concept of “Greater Albania” refers to the hardline nationalists’ wish to unite a future independent Kosovo with Albania and carve off slices of Serbia proper, Montenegro and Macedonia. Although no major Albanian political party in any of these places advocates a 'Greater Albanian' state. This would change only if Albanians felt that their rights were not being served in the countries in which they lived, or if they lost confidence that Kosovo would, one day, be independent. Of equal importance is the fact that the region as a whole will prosper, and that the borders which now divide the Albanians dissolve in the way they have dissolved between European Union states. The concept of “Greater Albania”. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater Albania](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greater_Albania). (20.05.2007). See also Kola, P. (2003). *The Search for Greater Albania*.

¹⁴³ See stenographic report from the German Bundestag for August 29-th, 2001 14-th electoral period, 184-th session (14184).

operation “Essential Harvest for a number of grounds. Firstly, it was the first preventive deployment that attempted to prevent the outbreak of violence between the Albanians as a minority and the Macedonians as a majority. Secondly, on the basis of the Macedonian example it can be stated that the possibility existed to cultivate democracy without violence. At this moment (in 2001) the international community demonstrated its ability to learn from the past (the events in Bosnia – Herzegovina and especially the events of Srebrenica), the mistakes made in the past had to be avoided. Therefore, the goal of international community was to avoid the outbreak of violence in Macedonia. This country is unique in this respect that all its neighbors (Greece, Bulgaria, Albania and Serbia, etc) had pretensions to Macedonia. For these grounds, this country was in a very fragile situation and the outbreak of violence that could lead to the civil war had to be prevented by any means. Thirdly, as the objective of this deployment was to employ preventive measures and due to its timely constraints (it lasted only for 30 days), it implied that a completely new level was reached.

3.1 The background of the debate

Ethnic minority grievances which had broken out on occasion (1995 and 1997), rapidly began to gain political significance in late 2000, leading many in the ethnic Albanian community in Macedonia to question their minority protection under and their participation in the government¹⁴⁴. Tension erupted into open hostilities in Macedonia in February 2001, when a group of ethnic Albanians near the Kosovo border carried out an armed provocation that soon escalated into an insurgency. In order to fight for greater civil rights for ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, the group seized territory and launched attacks against government forces. The insurgency spread through northern and western Macedonia during the first half of 2001. Under international mediation, a cease-fire was concluded in July 2001 and the government coalition was expanded in July 2001 to include the major opposition parties¹⁴⁵.

¹⁴⁴ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*. See also Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

The international community having taking the lessons learned in Bosnia into account, decided to act this time right away before the atrocities started. For this purpose the diplomats of the USA and the European Union member states started negotiations with the parties involved. This resulted in signing the Ohrid Framework Agreement in August 2001, which brought an end to the fighting. The agreement called for implementation of constitutional and legislative changes, which lay the foundation for improved civil rights for minority groups¹⁴⁶.

Crucial issue for the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement was to increase awareness within the majority of the population in Macedonia. The conditionality for fulfilling this objective on behalf of the political elite/leadership in Macedonia was to propagate this agreement to the population and make them understand that there were no other alternatives for peace. The main duty of the international community, including Germany, thus lay in the political arena. The implementation of the agreement also required that a military component was included¹⁴⁷. Thus, the NATO led operation “Essential Harvest” in Macedonia played an essential part in the implementation of the Ohrid Framework Agreement. It focused on conflict prevention and confidence building.

According to the decision made by the North Atlantic Council (NAC), Germany was obliged to commit troops in the composition of the French battalion in the framework of the operation “Essential Harvest” and hereby some of the grounds for participation in this operation are outlined here¹⁴⁸. Firstly, this operation formed a part of

¹⁴⁶ On the basis of the Ohrid Agreement, the major changes included the right to veto of the Albanians in the Parliament, the decentralization of the government, the use of the Albanian language as the second official language in the country and the proportional participation of the ethnic communities in the governmental bodies and public administration. In addition, it provided that the parliamentary debates should also be carried out in the Albanian language; the weight of the Albanian police officers will increase from 6 % up to 25 – 30 %. See Ohrid Agreement. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ohrid_Agreement. (20.04.2007).

¹⁴⁷ The NATO operation “Essential Harvest” was about implementing the Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia. This operation differentiated from the earlier military operations in the aspect that contrary to the missions of Bosnia and Kosovo where NATO had to militarily intervene in order to put an end to civil war, the task of NATO in Macedonia was to prevent a civil war. In this case, democratically elected Macedonian government and the president, as well the representatives of the Albanian rebels’ groups proposed NATO to disarm the UCK. Therefore, the staying of NATO contingent in Macedonia was legitimized by the international law that manifested itself in the declaration of the UN Security Council and the Secretary General of the UN, Mr. Kofi Annan.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid.

general strategy aimed at avoiding civil war in Macedonia. The provisions of the Ohrid Agreement on disarmament and the ratification of the constitutional amendments inseparably affected each other. It was possible to prevent one side from achieving advantages against the other if contribution was rendered to both these duties. A possibility for establishing peace in Macedonia existed if these two duties were parallel fulfilled. Therefore, if the collection of weapons failed, then the achieved political compromise would collapse. The main conditionalities for Germany and other partners in the contingent were finding a political solution in the format of the negotiations on the Constitution, unanimity on the ceasefire in connection with amnesty and obligation on behalf of the National Liberation Army (NLA) to voluntarily disarm.

3.2 Germany's involvement in the Balkans

In 1999 the Balkan wars spread to Kosovo which had been an area of conflict for a long time. By the outbreak of the conflict this region was inhabited mostly by ethnic Albanians. Kosovo avoided armed conflict until 1997, as the ethnic Albanians were poorly armed and the Serb government gave minor concessions in order not to upset the EU. When the Albanian government fell apart in 1997, leading to short-term anarchy and a raid on government armories, many Albanians sent or sold weapons across the border to Kosovar Albanians who were forming the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)¹⁴⁹. This formation began a violent revolt against the Serbs, engaging in terrorist acts and attempts to ethnically cleanse Kosovo of Serbs in order to gain independence.

The Yugoslavs reacted with brutal policies that caused the international community to act. Remembering the shame of allowing atrocities to go on so long in Bosnia, the USA and NATO did not want to wait until the atrocities had taken place to get involved with Kosovo. On January 17, 1999, Serbs massacred 45 ethnic Albanians in the Kosovar village of Recak. The massacre brought back images of Srebrenica to the minds of many in the West who believed that this time they could not stand aside while

¹⁴⁹ Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*.

atrocities took place¹⁵⁰. Under threat of NATO action, the parties were brought together in Rambouillet, France where they had to reach an agreement to end the fighting and avoid bloodshed. Unfortunately, the parties involved were incapable of accomplishing the task due to different goals: on one hand, the KLA wanted independence, and on the other hand, the Serbs considered Kosovo to be an eternal part of Serbia.

NATO decided that this time it would be better to act quickly, believing that diplomacy plus a willingness to use air power would bring the Serbs into line. However, Bosnia was not Kosovo. On March 24, 1999; NATO launched an air offensive against Yugoslavia to try to force the government of Slobodan Milosević to sign the Rambouillet agreement limiting Serb control in Kosovo. In response, the Serbs instituted a plan of ethnic cleansing and sent 900 000 Kosovar Albanians across the border into Albania and Macedonia.

As the air war lasted longer than it was expected, accompanied by bombing errors and an unanticipated refugee crisis, German political leadership (Foreign Minister Fischer and Chancellor Schröder) maintained their commitment to NATO. When the air war succeeded in forcing Milosević to sign an agreement to leave Kosovo, the Germans contributed front-line peacekeeping troops to the operation where they were even assigned their own sector to control¹⁵¹. The Bundeswehr presence in Kosovo after June 1999 reached 5 000 (the Bundestag approved up to 8500) in a mission that continued into the new century. Ten years after the fall of the Berlin wall, Germany was participating as an equal in NATO military actions. Definitely, Kosovo was a breakthrough point for Germany returning to normalcy.

As concerns the foreign political values of two Chancellors (Kohl and Schröder) than in this regard no changes have taken place - Schröder government emphasized the same issues as the CDU had eight and half years earlier: loyalty to the alliance, support for the West as a democratic alliance united by western values, and the need to intervene to stop the terrorization of a people¹⁵². As regards the Kosovo conflict, Schröder stressed

¹⁵⁰ Erb, S. (2003). German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era. See also Lampton, M. (2005). *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Germany*.

¹⁵¹ Ibid.

¹⁵² Bannas, G. (1999) Früher als andere sprach Scharping von einem Völkermord im Kosovo.- *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 10 April, p.3.

that this was not just a German use of military force, but German participation in NATO and OSCE operations¹⁵³.

Though the politicians expressed a view about the use of force that reflected the CDU position at the start of the Gulf War, the shift was evident to the others. In the press, for example it was noted that the admonition that war be a means of achieving political results appeared dead:

In our society the result of decades of peace development has created a common sense that war can no longer be seen as a continuation of politics by other means. Now we find ourselves in a dilemma that the NATO forces and with them the German federal army, under orders from elected parliaments and governments, are now using war to promote political goals, and to end the massacre in Kosovo
154.

Germans had gone through a transformation since 1991, attributing the change to the Bosnian atrocities and especially the massacre in Srebrenica. The Germans, comparing it to the Holocaust in their minds, muted the pacifist arguments. The public at the start of the war were opposed to the conflict¹⁵⁵, but at the end, provided its support.

As the Kosovo conflict solidified the new consensus the same tendency spilled over afterwards to Macedonia¹⁵⁶. Since the independence of Macedonia in 1991, Europe, Germany and the USA have actively contributed to the conflict prevention. It carried a double challenge: the neighboring countries (Greece, Bulgaria) had put the existence of Macedonia into question that this state on the one hand, had to externally justify its existence to the outward community and on the other hand, avoid being drawn into the Balkan wars. The international community had supported Macedonia via a numerous

¹⁵³ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

¹⁵⁴ Kister, K. (1999). Deutschland und der Krieg.- *Die Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 31 March, p.4.

¹⁵⁵ See Ramet and Coffin (2000). *German Foreign Policy towards the Yugoslav Successor States, 1991 – 1999* who provided information about a poll taken on March 26 – 27, 1999 in Germany, pp 57 – 59. According to the poll, 61, 6 percent of the population was against the war, with only 21, 5 percent supported it in the East.

¹⁵⁶ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

measures with the aim to attempt peace – for example, the UN mission- United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) and the international economic assistance provided by the OSCE and the Stability Pact. As a result, Macedonia was in 2001, a functioning democracy. It had obtained international respect and concluded the Stability and Association Agreement (SAA) that gave this state in the region besides Slovenia a concrete perspective as regards the European Union.

At national level, it is about fair and equal participation of both national groups in state power. Germany has always supported the extension of rights and appropriate representation of the Albanian minority in the Macedonian state, taking the territorial integrity and the multiethnic character of this state into account. It is more difficult to achieve this domestic/national balance than to stabilize the country externally¹⁵⁷.

By the beginning of the Macedonian debate, in August 2001, even this republic stood on the outbreak of war, therefore it was crucial to avoid civil war. A great number of refugees from Kosovo in Macedonia also complicated the matter and at the same time indicated how fragile the situation really was. It was evident that without external assistance, the contingent committed by the international community would not give any chance for peace in Macedonia. Therefore, the possibility for peace in this Former Republic of Yugoslavia depended greatly on Germany as well on other European countries. The international community had no choice, but to react in Macedonia in order to avoid the conflict.

A war in Macedonia would not only have been catastrophe for the population of this state, but it also would have brought about political earthquake in the neighborhood, this in turn would have destroyed the success of the international peace attempts carried out in the last decade. Civil war would have had unimaginable impact upon the whole region, as well upon Kosovo and Albania, the Yugoslav Republic and Bosnia – Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey. In general, NATO and EU would also have been affected.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

3.3 *The summary of the debate*

After the Albanian insurgency threatened to bring Macedonia to civil war in August 2001, NATO helped to reach a peace deal on 13 August 2001 that included broader rights for the Albanians. Part of the deal was the deployment of around 4500 NATO troops to the country for 30 days, 600 of which were German soldiers. Under the British leadership, the mission of the NATO's Task Force ("Essential Harvest") was to collect weapons surrendered by insurgent ethnic Albanians.

For the first time there was significant CDU/CSU opposition to the use of German troops in Macedonia in support of a NATO mission, with Chancellor Schröder arguing that Germany must be part of any peacekeeping force¹⁵⁸. Although the CDU argued that the party would not go along with the use of German troops in Macedonia unless the NATO mandate was strengthened to allow for more than just collecting voluntarily surrendered arms within a 30 days time-period. It was unlikely that the CDU seriously wanted to torpedo German involvement in Macedonia, taking into account its strong pro NATO and pro-USA positions¹⁵⁹. Most likely there is ground to believe that its aim was to criticize the SPD in the 2002 elections campaign should the Macedonia operation not go as planned. The Bundestag approved German participation by the margin of 497 to 130 with 8 abstentions. 25 of the negative votes came from the government opposition, 19 of those relevantly from the SPD itself¹⁶⁰. This indicated that given, small majority of the Red - Green coalition, Schröder had relied on the votes from the opposition to approve his plan. Operation Essential Harvest proved successful, though it was evident that one month was not enough time to stabilize Macedonia. Especially it took a long time from the (Macedonian) government to enact the constitutional reforms demanded by the agreement with the ethnic Albanians.

After the commencement of the mission, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 targeted to the USA, fundamentally changed the political landscape. A follow-on

¹⁵⁸ Schröder; G. (2001). "Nach Mazedonien auch ohne Union", *Der Tagesspiegel*, 10 July..

See also Monath, H. (2001). "Frontenwechsel", *Der Tagesspiegel*, 07 July.

¹⁵⁹ Duffield, J. (1998).). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*. See also Lampton, M. (2005). *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Germany*.

¹⁶⁰ See stenographic report from the German Bundestag for August 29, 2001, 14-th electoral period, 184-th session (14184).

NATO mission was unanimously approved by the UN Security Council and it was carried out to protect 120 civilian EU and OSCE peace monitors. On 27 September 2001, the Bundestag agreed to deploy forces for Task Force “Amber Fox”, which replaced the “Essential Harvest”. Germany proposed to become the lead state in the second phase of engagement in Macedonia, NATO and the Macedonian government endorsed this proposal. The duration of the operation was not specified and the Germans had contributed the lion’s share of troops: 586 out of the 750 – 1000 strong force¹⁶¹. In response to the request from the Macedonian President, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) agreed in February 2002 to extend the Fox mission until 26 June 2002. The mission remained the same and after some hesitation, Germany decided to continue its leadership role until June the same year. The Bundestag approved the three months extension in March 2002. The large majority of the Bundestag and a significant portion of the Red-Green coalition endorsed the extension: 470 voted for the extension, 34 against. These results as regards the votes were similar to those achieved in the first extension vote three months earlier. It was a contrast for the Schröder government when compared the bare majority received in September 2001 for the initial mandate.

This mission in Macedonia is an interesting example of Germany’s emerging commitment and leadership inclination in peacekeeping operations (PKO). It is definitely a sign of becoming a normal country that taking its preponderance and size into account behaves responsively. It is also a playground for muted discord between NATO and the EU. The mission in Macedonia conforms neatly to the EU’s Headline Goals¹⁶² commitments and it has been successfully carried out so far. Crisis prevention and assisting in the democraticization process are at the center of both the Macedonian operations and the Headline Goals. In discussing the extension of Germany’s leadership role, Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer noted that the mission in question in Macedonia represented “a successful example of conflict prevention”.

¹⁶¹ For more detailed information see Lampton, M (2005). *The Politics of Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold war Era: Germany*. pp. 42 – 43.

¹⁶²The objective of the EU Headline Goals is to develop the necessary military capabilities to be able to deploy, within 60 days, a force of up to 60,000 troops for humanitarian and rescue missions, peacekeeping, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking, and to sustain that force in the field for at least a year. The Headline Goals are meant to ensure that the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy has substance (<http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2002/issue3/english/art4.html> (08.05.2007)).

It is not sufficiently evident that the deployment to Macedonia under NATO flag was essentially different from the other NATO operations, for example, than in Bosnia or in Kosovo. In Macedonia, the objective of NATO troops was not to put an end to the civil war, but to avoid the outbreak of violence by using preventive measures for this purpose. In Macedonia, the main mission was not enforcing peace, but the prevention of any conflict that could escalate further and lead to the outbreak of violence. It was about the German responsibility for peace and stability on the Balkan Peninsula and about the solidarity of German main partners in the EU and in the transatlantic relation. Therefore the reunified Germany could not stay away from this responsibility.

3.3.1 Preponderance

Since 1998 Gerhard Schröder as Federal Chancellor has offered a more relaxed view on Germany's past and nation related issues when compared with the Kohl era and even the earlier period. This new rhetoric was particularly apparent in the domain of foreign policy. Schröder's speeches and interviews revealed a markedly different approach to Germany's foreign policy ambitions and style¹⁶³.

The international situation after the Cold War, Germany's acquisition of full sovereignty and demands from their allies and partners to take a greater responsibility for security and stability in the world necessitated a certain re-adjustment of Berlins/Bonn Republic's foreign and security policy. The evolution of attitudes to the use of military force has been the most visible of example of how German elites responded to these changes. Prior to 1998 Chancellor Helmut Kohl had never gone so far as to openly strive for a more prominent role for Germany in world politics or to stress German national interests as a category for defining German foreign policy goals¹⁶⁴. Since 1998, these ideas have been repeatedly raised by Chancellor Schröder, most strikingly notions of national interests and Germany as a normal nation appeared. For example, in a speech at

¹⁶³ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*. See also Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions, and German Security Policy After Unification*.

¹⁶⁴ Longhurst, K. (2005). Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda. In *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda*, edited by K. Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

the German Council on Foreign Policy (DGAP) in September 1999 Schröder emphasized that, “Like all of our neighbors, the Germans have their national interests”. “Since foreign policy is a policy of interests”, Germany should not deny its own interests, it should rather pronounce openly what Schröder called “*aufgeklärtes Eigeninteresse*” (enlightened self-interests)¹⁶⁵.

The ambition to raise Germany’s position in international politics seems to have been a result both of a rational consideration of Schröder’s team and the political dynamics set off by the war in Kosovo. One of frequently addressed issues in Schröder’s statements has been emphasis on German sovereignty after 1990s as opposed to the period before the unification:

*Vor 30 Jahren war Deutschland ein durch den Eisernen Vorhang geteiltes Land mit nur eingeschränkter Souveränität. Heute ist Deutschland eine souveräne Nation, eine zivile Macht im Herzen Europas.*¹⁶⁶

Schröder clearly likes the idea of the German *Mittelmacht* (middle power) and tends to use this argument to support his foreign policy decisions. This way of thinking is also represented by leading German foreign policy thinkers like Egon Bahr and Gregor Schöllgen¹⁶⁷. Egon Bahr, a former adviser to Willy Brandt and still an influential expert in the SPD, urged German diplomacy to think about foreign policy more in terms of power and influence¹⁶⁸.

It was the Kosovo war when the deployment of German troops to combat capacity marked a real turning point in German foreign policy. In the Kosovo conflict the need to

¹⁶⁵ Rede von Bundeskanzler Gerhard Schröder zur offiziellen Eröffnung des Sitzes der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik – “Aussenpolitische Verantwortung Deutschlands in der Welt”, 02. September 1999, www.bundeskanzler.de.

¹⁶⁶ “30 years ago [when Germany joined the UN] Germany was divided by the Iron Curtain with limited sovereignty. Today Germany is a sovereign nation, a civilian power in the heart of Europe’ Bundeskanzler Schröder vor der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen, 24.09.2003, www.bundesregierung.de.

¹⁶⁷ Schöllgen, G. (2003). *Der Auftritt. Deutschlands Rückkehr auf die Weltbühne*.

¹⁶⁸ Bahr, E. (1998). *Deutsche Interessen. Streitschrift zur Macht, Sicherheit und Aussenpolitik*.

be part of NATO brought two former peace activists – Schröder and Fischer to lead Germany to use its armed forces firstly in a non-defensive war fought without a UN mandate. It was something that would have been inconceivable 20 years earlier. For Schröder who experienced difficulties in gaining support for this decision within his own party (SPD), it was not just a break with the tradition of military reticence. According to Chancellor, participation in Kosovo paved a way for a new German foreign policy role after unification¹⁶⁹. Germany raised its international standing and became an equal partner of other European powers. According to Schröder, by demonstrating responsibility through engaging in the war, Germany widened its diplomatic room for manoeuvre¹⁷⁰.

After Kosovo the change in the thinking of politicians as regards German participation in the out-of-area operations has changed. In the deliberation of the parliamentary parties one tendency is obvious: no one questioned the possibility of deploying the Bundeswehr troops to Macedonia, the discussion concerned mostly the lack of UN mandate for such a deployment. At present, the political parties understood the imperative to intervene in Macedonia with the purpose to avoid the outbreak of the civil war. The events of the Srebrenica had to be avoided. Macedonia was different, Germany has formerly intervened in the conflicts in the successive states of the former Yugoslavia in the past when it concerned the civil wars that brought along sufferings to the people in the Balkan (Bosnia and etc), but in this case, it was about the opportunity to prevent the outbreak of the civil war with the purpose to bring peace. With the deployment of Bundeswehr's troops to Macedonia Germany takes responsibility not only for people in Macedonia, but in the whole Balkan region as a whole¹⁷¹.

Germany's role in foreign and security policy becomes more prominent, this idea is supported by the statement of Gerhard Schröder who summarized the present day role of Germany in the changed circumstances as follows:

¹⁶⁹ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

¹⁷⁰ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

¹⁷¹ „Wir übernehmen mit diesem Einsatz aber auch und vor allem Verantwortung für die Menschen in Mazedonien und in der Balkanregion insgesamt“ stenographic reports, from the German Bundestag for Wednesday, August 29, 2001 14-th electoral period, 184-th session. Müller: 18195

What is required from Germany in European policy is to be the engine of the European integration not only in the economical, social and ecological fields, but also in foreign- and security policy domains, therefore it carries consequences what can be done in the framework of one's national responsibility¹⁷².

3.3.2 Size

As no changes have taken place in the field of the territory and population of Germany, the main accent is paid on its economic and military size under the current chapter. Ten years after the reunification of the country located in the *Mittellage*, some signs were noticeable that Germany was gradually recovering from the economic burden in relation to the reunification. More than ten years after the unification of the two German states, great progress has been made in raising the standard of living in eastern Germany, introducing a market economy and improving infrastructure there. At the same time, the process of convergence between East and West is taking longer than originally expected and, on some measures, has stagnated since the mid-1990s. Eastern economic growth rates have been slower than in the West in recent years, unemployment is twice as high, prompting many skilled easterners to seek work in the West, and productivity continues to lag.

In this respect it was thought that moving the capital more eastwards would appease the situation if the „Easterners“ (the inhabitants of the East-Germany) would feel that they are not the second class citizens. Berlin, lying in the eastern part of Germany implied that the interests of Germany, including economic interests would definitely shift to eastwards. In reality this does not seem tenable given the already existing ties between Germany and Eastern Europe. It was likely that economic relations with Eastern Europe would increase in the future. However, this seemed to be a factor of the opening up of these economies rather than any changes within Germany. Although east was associated

¹⁷² „Motor europäischer Integration nicht nur auf ökonomischem, sozialem und ökologischem, sondern auch auf aussen- und verteidigungspolitischen Gebiet zu sein, dann hat das Konsequenzen für das, was man in eigener nationaler Verantwortung noch tun und wollen darf“, stenographic report from the German Bundestag, August 29, 2001 14-th electoral period, 184-th session. Schröder: 18203.

with major problems like high rate of unemployment in the understanding of the Westerners. It became clear that the fusion of two Germanies will take more time.

3.3.3 History

In 1999, the Bundestag's move to Berlin meant the beginning of a new era in German politics. The journalist Johannes Gross¹⁷³ coined the notion "the Berlin Republic" to denote the changing nature of Germany after unification. "The Berlin Republic" is identical with the Bonn Republic in terms of constitutional law, but not in terms of society, politics and culture" stated Johannes Gross¹⁷⁴. His argument gave rise to a wide ranging debate among intellectual and political elites about German nationhood, the past, as well as contemporary political culture. Such debates definitely had a great impact for German external policies and provided new impulses and ideas for foreign and security thinking.

Three particular issues stood out in the context and illustrated the competition of ideas as regards the Berlin Republic¹⁷⁵. First, the controversy over the memory of the Nazi past, including the "Walser – Bubis debate, indicated that some aspects of German history were being reappraised and a new chapter in Germany's "*Vergangenheitsbewältigung*" (coming in terms with the past) was opened. Second, the "*Opferdebatte* (debate on victims) marked an important watershed in German historical debates by raising the question of the Germans as victims in the World War II¹⁷⁶. This chapter deals thoroughly with the Walser-Bubis-debate and the *Opferdebatte* is relevantly dealt with in the next chapter. Both these debates clearly demonstrate change in Germans attitude towards history after 1998.

¹⁷³ Gross, J. (1995). Die Gründung der Berliner Republik., p.8.

¹⁷⁴ Ibid.

¹⁷⁵ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid.

The Nazi past was the center of the West – German political culture. President Weizsäcker¹⁷⁷ in this speech about postwar German policy introduced the notion of memory as the German *raison d'état*, as well as the concept of the May 8, 1945, as the date of liberation from Hitler (rather than defeat in war) – these two notions became the pillars of West German understanding. The politicians and intellectuals of the West Germany denied the nation-state as legitimate form of German statehood. Definitely the events of 1989 – 1990 became a new turning point in German history. The creation of the German nation-state provided a possibility to take the so far suppressed questions about national identity and historical traditions into the forefront. It brought about the emergence of the new elite and new generation who did not remember the Nazi past and thus it opened a debate about the form and functions of the collective memory¹⁷⁸.

Auschwitz to the understanding of the Germans is associated with a metaphor for national socialists' race-hatred or planned and cold-blooded murder of millions, foremost Jewish, but also the Gypsies, homosexuals, handicapped and the prisoners of war. Based upon the lessons learned in the past, the duty of the Germans is not only to think about the victims, but the main focus is to avoid such barbarious deed to happen in future. It is most important to ensure that „never again“ such places like Auschwitz and Birkenau are created where about one million people were murdered during the period of March 1942 up to November 1944. The public discussion about the controversies of German history has shown that it is impossible to draw a final line to German history and call it closed, the majority of the Germans will not want it either¹⁷⁹. Instead, Germany has to view its history critically, expressing tolerance, peaceful conflict solution and respect for all nations. The fact that Holocaust was possible in this part of the „civilized world“ demonstrates that the enlightened, free and peaceful – tolerant society cannot be taken for granted.

¹⁷⁷ Weizsäcker, R. (1985). Speech at the Bundestag during the Ceremony commemorating 40-th Anniversary of the End of the War in Europe and of the National Socialist Tyrannies (<http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/TCEH/Weizsacker.html>). (08.05.2007).

¹⁷⁸ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

¹⁷⁹ Schröder, G. (2000). *Einen Schlussstrich unter die deutsche Geschichte kann niemand ziehen, und die überwältigende Mehrheit der Deutschen will das auch nicht*, opening speech at the Holocaust international Forum, 26 January.

However, the transfer of the capital to Berlin¹⁸⁰, and the ongoing debates on historical memory demonstrated a deeper transformation of the intellectual and political atmosphere in the country in the late 1990s. It is striking that most of these processes became evident after 1998 federal elections which marked an end to Helmut Kohl's long tenure as chancellor. In 1998, a new generation of the German politicians came to power. The new politicians, to mention some, Gerhard Schröder, Oskar Lafontaine and Joschka Fischer had not experienced the WW II, but they were involved in the leftist student movements of the late 1960-s (the so-called generation of the sixty – eight). It was a generation that grew up in opposition to the Bonn Republic, and then made its peace with it and therefore they faced the prospect of Germany's unification with rather mixed feelings¹⁸¹. It was along with the transfer of the capital to Berlin in 1999, the electoral success of the Red – Green coalition, and Germany's participation in the Kosovo war that alluded that new dynamics had emerged in German politics.

The rise of a power of a new generation of politicians added intensity to these debates. The move from the Kohl era to the Schröder government was significant in many ways. It was the first change of government in the Federal Republic's history which occurred through a federal vote and it represented a generational shift. The Red – Green government led by chancellor Gerhard Schröder (SPD) was the first German government the members of which had not served the army of the Third Reich¹⁸². Almost none of them had served in the Bundeswehr either. As regards the political weight of Germany's historical burden, it was clear that chancellor Kohl stressed “learning from history”, whereas Schröder spoke of Germany's new unhibitedness¹⁸³ and pointed to the “democratic normality ... [of a nation] that confronts its history and its responsibility, but despite its willingness to do so, also looks to the future¹⁸⁴. Kohl's thinking indicated that each generation of political elites conducted policies based upon their past experience.

¹⁸⁰ The decision was taken by the Bundestag in June 1991. The federal authorities moved to Berlin in 1999.

¹⁸¹ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)/ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ See Paterson, W. (1999). Between the Bonn and the Berlin Republics”, *University of Birmingham, Discussion Papers in German Studies* no. IGS99/5, p.15.

¹⁸⁴ See “Regierungserklärung – Parlamentsrede des Bundeskanzlers vom 10.11.1998 zum Programm der rot - grünen Bundesregierung”, www.welt.de/extra/dokumentation/regierung/9811_erklärung.htm.

Therefore, a shift in German policy was expected under a new chancellor born in the postwar world. It was clear that the Nazi legacy still continued to affect German politics.

In reality, the new government during its two first years was faced with the Nazi legacy to a greater extent than one could have expected. There was at first the debate about the Holocaust memorial, to which the Schröder government initially objected, however after the heated debates the Bundestag finally ended a 10 years controversy on 25 June 1999 by voting in favor of this proposal. It was evident that Germany's ongoing "normalization process" that the government publicly promoted, was closely related to Germany's continued self-confrontation with its past.

Walser – Bubis debate¹⁸⁵ becomes an important milestone for historical debates in many regards. According to Jan – Werner Müller¹⁸⁶, unlike earlier historical debates in Germany:

*the Walser debate was not about historical arguments at all, but about appropriate forms of commemoration..... In short, at issue were above all the representations of previous representations of the Holocaust, the very history and future of its public memory, rather than the event itself*¹⁸⁷

Among the many historical debates after unification¹⁸⁸, the controversy that emerged over the prominent novelist Martin Walser, who was awarded the Peace Prize of the German Book Fair in 1998, reflected vividly the spirit of the Berliner Republic. Walser was not only recognized for his literal activity, but also for „talking about Germany”. In 1998, the recognition of Walser coincided with Helmut Kohl's departure from politics. Both Walser and the new German Chancellor Schröder openly talked about the „normalcy” of the German nation-state that Helmut Kohl would have never done. In his speech on 11 October 1998, Martin Walzer criticized what he called „the

¹⁸⁵ This debate is known as Walser – Bubis debate because Bubis was the main opponent to Martin Walser.

¹⁸⁶ Müller, J.W. (2000). *Another Country. German Intellectuals, Unification and National Identity*, p.250.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ See Sabrow, M., Jessen, R., Knacht, K. (2003). *Zeitgeschichte als Streitgeschichte: Grosse Kontroversen seit 1945*.

instrumentalization of Auschwitz”¹⁸⁹. For many Germans Auschwitz was the embodiment of German historical guilt: “a moral stick” used to beat the German people and that Auschwitz symbolized a “permanent exhibition of [the Germans’] shame”¹⁹⁰.

Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski in the book „Old Europe, New Europe and the Transatlantic Security Agenda” regard Walser’s speech as a provocation aimed at challenging the rituals of collective memory, and not the memory as such, which were ingrained in the political culture of Germany¹⁹¹. „What Walser called for was a certain privatisation of memory to be liberated from its public role. However, in the German context this kind of reasoning carried further consequences”. For many observers according to Longhurst, if fully applied it may have constituted a blow to the central tenets of German political culture¹⁹². For example, the President of the Jewish Community in Germany, Ignatz Bubis, attacked Walser for the public legitimization of turning away from Auschwitz¹⁹³. Bubis also became the main opponent of Walser in the subsequent debate.

At the core of the disagreement was the question to what extent private memory can substitute for collective memory. The demand to restrict the public use of history which was the central argument of Walser’s speech seemed to jeopardize the traditional German consensus of the Nazi past.

The impact of Walser’s speech would not have been so high had it not entered into the German discourse on historical memory introduced by Gerhard Schröder¹⁹⁴. Schröder elaborated on the notion of the “ripeness” of the German nation in his electoral campaign and referred to the notion of normalcy. In a fierce debate on the Holocaust memorial he appeared to be in favor of a monument which would be “visited with

¹⁸⁹ See Conard, C. R. (1999). Eye on Germany: The New Morality and the Politics of Memory. *Debatte*, vol. 7, no.2, p.177.

¹⁹⁰ Schirmmayer, F. (1999). *Die Walser- Bubis Debatte: Eine Dokumentation*, pp. 7 – 29, especially pp. 12 – 13.

¹⁹¹ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

¹⁹² Ibid.

¹⁹³ Longhurst, K. (2005). Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda. – *In Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda*, edited by Kerry Longhurst and Marcin Zaborowski, pp. 34 -36.

¹⁹⁴ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy. Navigating New Era*.

pleasure” by people¹⁹⁵. This contrasted sharply with the initial idea behind the concept of the memorial which was supposed to be a source of reflection.

The significance of the Walser debate lay in two interrelated points. Firstly, it showed that German collective memory no longer remained completely intact and was under immense pressure from the political upheaval caused by unification as well as generational change. Second, there was the need for a re-appraisal of the national dimension of German politics. These two issues were developed further in the *Opferdebatte* and in the Schröder’s statements on the foreign policy of the Berlin Republic.

The twentieth century has left the Germans with a national history that is as complex and traumatic as to guarantee controversy and suspicion. The statement delivered by the state Secretary Wolfgang Ischinger in 1999 supports this argument:

*We cannot be a normal country and we will not be even in the foreseeable future. We have to remain conscious about the fact that our neighbors and partners will not look us as a normal country due to our particular German history. It is simply so*¹⁹⁶.

Germany’s attempt to become a normal country again is expressed by their participation in the out-of-area operation in Macedonia with the purpose to avoid the outbreak of civil war. The answer to the question why they are still in the Balkans that due to their history is uncomfortable destination sounds that it is in Germany’s national interest to have stability in this region. Schröder’s arguments focused on ethnical concerns and the fact that he faced with the meaning of German history, supports this argument even more by saying that: “Especially because we Germans have been guilty in the past we cannot simply stand back and accept massive human rights violations with the contended excuse that our abstinence has something to do with our history”¹⁹⁷.

¹⁹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁹⁶ See Staatssekretär des Auswärtigen Amtes Wolfgang Ischinger in der Zeitschrift Deutschland (Juli/August 1999) zu den Konturen einer neuen Aussenpolitik”, 2 Aug. 1999, www.auswaertiges-amt.e/6_archiv7Index.htm.

¹⁹⁷ “Interview mit Gerhard Schröder,” *Der Spiegel*, June 7, 1999, p.33.

3.3.4 Geography

The vote on 20 June 1991 of the Bundestag on moving the capital from Bonn to Berlin implied a shift in German understanding in geographic terms. It did not only denote a move from the capital of Bonn Republic to the capital of the *Berliner Republik* (although in practice the move and the use of the term would only occur under the government of Gerhard Schröder). It definitely referred to adjusting Germany to its new role in the international arena. In the post Cold War period and prior to the EU enlargement in 2004, Germany has become the advocate of the Central and Eastern Europe. It has also been said that Berlin is the “capital of Central Europe” not only to itself but also by Poland, Hungary, and others. In this regard Germany has geographically moved to its right place where it really belonged - to the East, being a frontier state between the East and the West. The movement of the capital from Bonn to Berlin moved it three hundred and fifty miles east and closer to the Polish capital of Warsaw as compared to its to the French capital of Paris. The main question was whether the geopolitical position of the two cities would alter what countries Germany dealt with. That is why many of Germany’s western allies have had concerns that this geographical shift of power would be accompanied by a similar shift of policy. German political elite has maintained that Germany is a western state and will not shirk from its role in western institutions. Indeed, the push it has made to include East and Central European nations in both the security organization of NATO and the economic institution of the European Union support both its continued participation in western institutions and a broadening of its interests eastward. Former President Richard von Weizsacker also supported this perspective by stating that Berlin will become the “crossroads of the new Europe: „It will become the human melting pot of the continent, with Poles, Czechs and other Easterners

blending their ideas and energy with [those of] western Europeans. Berlin can become the showcase of how we should build a common future¹⁹⁸.”

The origin of Germany's role between East and West lies in its history and its geographic position. Moving the capital closer to Germany's eastern neighbors would make Berlin act as a “hub connecting East and West.”¹⁹⁹ During the Cold war, Berlin remained a symbol of the division between East and West. According to Gerhard Schröder a move to the “heart of Europe” is not as a return to German domination of Central Europe²⁰⁰. The move of the capital is an adjustment in the geostrategic location of the unified Germany in the new European political context. It is a continuation of the policy specified by Brandt in 1972 when he said, “We want to be good neighbors, internally as well as externally.” Berlin as a capital will provide “a new continental equilibrium” by acting as a bridge for the new Eastern democracies to the west. By this effort Germany connects these countries to the West and thus sustains a more stable atmosphere in Central Europe. Looking at its geographic position in Central Europe, it is clear that this is an evident role that Berlin should play in the evolving situation in this region. According to Schröder, moving the German capital to Berlin is “a healthy move not a worrisome one.” Schröder stated that although the German center of power has shifted eastward geographically, “nothing should or will change in Germany's Western ties, in our firm anchoring in the Atlantic alliance and the EU²⁰¹.” He justified the movement of the capital eastwards as an attempt to appease a cleavage between east and west, particularly on unification issues. Although the East Germans had been allocated seats in the Bundestag by the creation of 138 new seats as well as incorporation into other institutions of the German federal system, they still believed that they were being perceived as second rate German citizens whose needs were not receiving the deserved attention of the unified German state. „It is important, not only for the eastern Germans that the Government and Parliament are no longer far away on the Rhine, but relatively

¹⁹⁸ Quoted in Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

¹⁹⁹ Parkinson, E. (2000). The German Capital: Bonn or Berlin. *Modus Vivendi*, vol. 6, Spring .

²⁰⁰ Ibid.

²⁰¹ Quoted in Parkinson, E. (2000). The German Capital: Bonn or Berlin. *Modus Vivendi*, vol. 6, Spring.

close here on the Spree²⁰².” Thus, for the stability of the government to continue, the needs in the East must be addressed. This is more likely to occur in a city that embodies both the former division of Germany and its struggles with reunification. It is necessary to create an “inner unity” and eliminate the “walls in people’s minds.” Chancellor Schröder captured the nature of both cities’ roles when he said “Bonn ultimately stands for the west of the Republic, Berlin symbolizes united Germany²⁰³.”

It can be stated that Berlin will be a unifying force between East and West, it is important to first examine the role of Berlin in German history and to show how it has acted as a political force. Berlin’s history as a leader of the German state began even before the German state was officially formed. The development of the city can be attributed to the Hohenzollern dynasty. Frederick the Great used the power of the Prussian state to unite the German people from this city. As a result of this and economic advancement, by 1830, Berlin was well on the way to being known as both the capital and an international city. Berlin became the official capital of Germany with the consolidation of the German state in 1871. Upon the fall of the empire and beginning of the Weimar republic, Berlin was once again questioned as a proper location for the German capital. Many people argued that setting the capital in Weimar, home of Goethe and Schiller, would provide Germany with a fresh start for its first republic. During the 1920s, Berlin became the cultural and political center of Germany with a population of intellectuals, artists, and writers full of political fervor. When Hitler came to power in Germany, Berlin still played an important role as the political center of Germany. Hitler himself realized the importance of this city after the failure of his attempted coup in Munich. In the post-unification period Berlin embodied the end of a divided Germany and marked the place of fall of the Berlin Wall. Thus, it seems impossible to rule out the fact that Berlin is the historical capital of Germany as being a reason why the capital was moved back there from Bonn. In October 1997, Helmut Kohl said that “Berlin is associated with both the division and unification of Germany.” It is where the wall stood that symbolized the division of the country but it is also where the wall fell and the countries were physically reunited. Kohl also suggested that Berlin be viewed as a

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Ibid.

“microcosm of the progress which is being made by internal German unity²⁰⁴.” It was the first place where East and West confronted one another and were faced with their differences. It continues to be the only city which has had to merge two distinctive societies into one.

Putting history aside, Berlin is also the only German city that has the international prestige of other major European powers. While the more provincial Bonn served the Federal Republic well, Berlin stands on the same level as London and Paris. Its prestige and geopolitical position put the city in a better position to be a more prominent diplomatic leader than Bonn has been. The city is also more representative of Germany as a whole than Bonn is and the German capital was switched to Berlin in order to maintain and strengthen economic, political, and security ties with Eastern Europe.

Germany is a major European power and has the legacy of being a swing state between East and West, other European states notice and react to any significant changes made. The movement of the capital from Bonn to Berlin is seen by many as a shift eastward of German interests. When one looks at the role Berlin has played from being the first German capital under Frederick the Great to the role it played in the reunification of Germany, it is evident that no other German city has played such a significant part of the country’s history so consistently over time. Without Berlin, Germany would be a very different state today.

To sum up, the debate around Germany’s involvement in Macedonia was interesting in this respect that for the first time there was a significant CDU/CSU’s opposition to the use of German troops in support of a NATO mission, with Gerhard Schröder forcefully arguing that Germany must be a part of any peacekeeping force²⁰⁵. Former defense minister Volker Rühle, speaking for the CDU argued that his party would not go along with the use of German troops in Macedonia unless the NATO mandate was strengthened to allow for more than just collecting voluntarily surrendered arms

²⁰⁴ Quoted in Parkinson, E. (2000). The German Capital: Bonn or Berlin. *Modus Vivendi*, vol. 6, Spring.

²⁰⁴ Ibid.

²⁰⁵ Schröder, G. (2001, 10 July). Nach Mazedonien auch ohne Union. - *Der Tagesspiegel*.

within a 30 days time period and unless more money was given to the Bundeswehr²⁰⁶. The German domestic debate caused friction inside the NATO, as the rest of the NATO members supported Operation Essential Harvest to disarm the ethnic Albanian fighters after the Ohrid agreement between the Albanians and the Macedonian government.

Macedonia is important for Germany and the present debate highlighted the significance of the European Union in demonstrating its capability for military action in this South-East European country. Gerhard Schröder summarized the significance of Macedonia for Germany by stating that “It was in Macedonia that we succeeded, together with our partners, in containing a smoldering conflict and in preventing a looming civil war from even breaking out²⁰⁷. Macedonia stands for a European security policy which includes military means in its range of instruments of preventing wars. We will continue to pursue this course”.

The Bundestag approved German participation by a margin of 497 to 130, with eight abstentions. 25 of the negative votes came from the government coalition, 19 of those from the SPD itself. This meant that given the small majority of the Red – Green coalition, Schröder had relied on votes from the opposition to approve his plan.

When the operation Essential Harvest expired, the opposition to its successor operation Amber Fox was muted. This was a UN operation (while the Essential Harvest had been praised by the UN Security Council, it had not been an official UN operation). In the subsequent operation Amber Fox, Germany was becoming the leader, supplying 600 members of the force that could reach 1000 members, commanding a UN force protecting 300 EU and OSCE observers. This won Bundestag approval with only PDS and 5 CDU in opposition. Though world attention was shifted to Afghanistan, German involvement in Macedonia by the start of 2002 was considered a success, although the mission, originally three month long, was extended as reforms in Macedonia moved slowly, if steadily.

²⁰⁶ Rühle, V (2001). Beschädigt nicht die NATO Autorität. - *Die Welt*, 01 August.

²⁰⁷ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

4 THE GERMAN RESPONSE TO THE AMERICAN “WAR OF TERROR” IN AFGHANISTAN AND IN IRAQ

Since reunification Germany has been living in peaceful environment surrounded by friends and partners for the first time in centuries. This has definitely blinded Germany to the new risks. As September 11, 2001 exposed, these new risks did not emanate from its immediate neighbors and yet, these risks threaten Germany's security whether directly or indirectly. The challenges, security and defense policy today is faced with, are not new; many of them have been suppressed or been of secondary importance during the Cold War. However, they have taken on new aspects; for example, geographical distance to a crisis has become less important. It manifests itself in the statement of the German Minister of Defense at that time, Peter Struck who concluded that present day Germany's defense begins on Hindu Kush²⁰⁸.

The events related to 9/11 brought about new fundamental changes in German foreign and security policy. It is more important that the majority of the SPD and the Green Party abandoned their pacifist stance during their time in government. This made the changes all the more fundamental. For example, the involvement of the Bundeswehr troops in Afghanistan indicates that German military engagement in Kosovo was not an exception, but as a normal conduct in the transformed circumstances. This can mostly be contributed to the normalization process that takes place in German foreign policy and it indicates that Germany has finally become a normal state and the deployment to Afghanistan indicates that the process continues.

The present chapter explores the debates related to the commitment of German troops to Afghanistan in connection with the Operation Enduring Freedom under an

²⁰⁸ See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for November 16, 2001, 14-th electoral period, 202-th session and December 22, 2001, 14th electoral period, 210th session. See also Voigt, K. (2003). „Common Roots – a Common Future? Transatlantic Partnership in the Twenty – First Century“, speech by Coordinator of German – American Cooperation at the World Bank, Washington, 29 January.

American flag in 2002 (the debate at the Bundestag took place on November 16, 2001) and the UN mission with the purpose to secure the transition administration in Kabul and in its surroundings (the debate at the Bundestag took place on December 22, 2001). Germany's decision not to participate in the coalition of the willing under an American flag in Iraq is explored only in the sense to demonstrate the grounds why Germany participated in one intervention, but stayed out in the other, though both of them were conducted by the USA for the purpose of fighting against terrorism. Therefore, the nature of the Iraq debate is provided. This chapter focuses on the Afghanistan debates for a number of grounds. Firstly, in the Afghanistan debate (Operation Enduring Freedom), the Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder tied the decision to commit troops to Afghanistan with the vote of confidence (*Vertrauensfrage*) that is a quite rare occasion in German politics²⁰⁹. Therefore, it emphasized the importance of military contribution for German foreign policy. Secondly, Germany was not united domestically over the issue of sending troops to Afghanistan. Although Schröder was successful, this occasion revealed a number of important factors which continued to shape German security policy behavior. Thirdly, the Afghanistan debate demonstrates the emergence of gaps in the transatlantic relations, but the fundamental divergence becomes evident on the intervention to Iraq. Therefore, the Afghanistan debates demonstrate the capacity of the international community in a post September 11 environment to confront the new threats. Fourthly, the Afghanistan debates (on committing troops to the UN mission) contemplate upon the use of force by the German troops in Afghanistan as it is based on Chapter VII²¹⁰ of the Charter of the UN that authorizes the use of force on certain occasions.

The first Afghanistan debate concerned sending about 3900 German troops to the international force (IFOR) with the mission to enforce peace in Afghanistan (the Operation Enduring Freedom). The second debate concerned deploying 1200 troops to Afghanistan in the framework of the UN mission. These two debates are outlined in this

²⁰⁹ See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*. See also Buras, P and Longhurst, K. (2005). The Berlin Republic, Iraq and the Use of Force. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda*. / Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski, pp. 47 – 48.

²¹⁰ Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations focuses on the action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. For more detailed information see Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations (<http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/contents.htm>) (30.04.2007)

chapter in order to focus on the changes that have taken place in German foreign policy thinking. These changes are directly connected with re-adaptation to the new environment and Germany is not an exception to the rule. In order to cope with all risks and challenges of the interdependence, it is necessary to first adapt to the changes that have taken place in the context.

4.1 The background of the debate

From a German perspective, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of the end of a long-standing framework and the foundations of security policy. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks to the USA, the German approach to international military operations has varied. It contributed a significant number of troops to the war against Al Qaeda and to the peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. Afterwards, Germany decided not to contribute militarily to Iraq. Although German foreign and security policy has undergone a period of significant transformation over a previous decade, much of the pre-1990 policy remained the same. Definitely, *Bundeswehr* had become more of a feature in Germany's security policy tools over the course of the 1990s. It is clear to Germany that the use of force in international security remained a function of the last resort and crucially it could be used in a multilateral framework and for the purpose of securing humanitarian objectives.

Prior to September 11, 2001 this German *modus vivendi* was compatible with the international environment and the expectations of Germany's allies and partners. Germany's initial response to the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC on September 11, 2001 showed "unlimited solidarity" with the USA, a response which contrasted sharply with Germany's position in the Gulf war in 1991²¹¹. It was clear that a German military deployment might be required. Schröder's early declaration of solidarity was backed by firm cross-party support at home, except from the PDS. Germany also

²¹¹ Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2005). Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes. – *Security Dialogue*, vol.36, no.3 See also Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*, p.147 and Brunstetter, S. (2005). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst, pp. 25 – 28.

supported the US invocation of NATO's article 5²¹², collective defense mechanism. Moreover, Germany was one of the first nations to call the US and pledge its desire to become involved, even with military forces²¹³. Unlimited solidarity however did not translate into unconditional support for an immediate US military response towards the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks. Crucially at both, elite and societal levels, reticence towards the use of force and fear of US unilateralism dominated in the German debate.

Domestic reticence in Germany towards a war in Afghanistan was focused on the fear that the USA may overreact and respond unilaterally that will lead to the escalation of conflict in the wider Middle – East²¹⁴. Germany pursued its traditional preferences for multilateral approach aimed at tackling the roots of terrorism via political means. This is evident in Schröder and Fischer's international diplomacy short after September 2001²¹⁵. In this early phase, Germany played an important role in the consolidation of an international alliance against terrorism. The Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer in particular worked at forging a common EU diplomatic response to the attacks on the USA and sought to embolden the role of the UNO.

September 11, 2001 and the subsequent US response demonstrated that role for the use of force in international relations would increase. The US emphasis on pre-emptive strikes indicated that the Bush administration had effectively abandoned a wide consensus that put deterrence and containment at the centre of transatlantic – foreign policy. While Germany endorsed the US both politically and materially in Afghanistan to root out the Taliban regime, the Americans' growing emphasis upon the use of pre-emptive strikes, its disregard for multilateralism and consultation gave rise to serious

²¹² Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (also known as the Washington Treaty) provides the basis of a fundamental principle of the NATO. It stipulates that if a NATO Ally is the victim of an armed attack, each and every other member of the Alliance will consider this act of violence as an armed attack against all members and will take the actions it deems necessary to assist the Ally attacked. This is the principle of collective defense (<http://www.nato.int/docu/basic/txt/treaty.htm>, 09.05.2007).

²¹³ Quoted in Lansford and Tashev (2005).

²¹⁴ See Buras, P and Longhurst, K. (2005). The Berlin Republic, Iraq and the Use of Force. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski, pp. 45 – 46.

²¹⁵ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

gaps between the US and German perspective²¹⁶.

It was in the context that Schröder's pledge of solidarity with the US was tested when in November president George Bush made a formal request for a Germany's military contribution. On November 6, 2001 Schröder announced that in response to the US request 3900 Bundeswehr troops would be made available for action in the campaign against terror²¹⁷. In order to gather support around the contribution, the proponents of the deployment pointed to Germany's international responsibility, its role as a transatlantic partner and the general credibility of German foreign policy. They also pointed to UN resolution 1368, passed after September 11, condemning terrorism and recognizing the right of nations to self-defense²¹⁸. Those opposed to the deployment, underlined continued restraint, greater multilateralism and argued that vital political and social measures need to be integrated into Operation Enduring Freedom²¹⁹. Whilst the cabinet approved Schröder's plan for the Bundeswehr' deployment, which also had broad approval from the CDU/CSU and the FDP, support was far from forthcoming from substantial elements of the governing coalition. As the members of the SPD faction in the Bundestag and that of the Greens members were against the Chancellor's plans, the stability of the coalition was under stress. As a means to save the coalition and to get the Bundeswehr deployment bill passed, the Federal Chancellor posed a vote of confidence (*Vertrauensfrage*)²²⁰, a measure used only twice before in the Federal Republic's history. In addition, the nature of international security in the period 2001 – 2003 virtually shattered one of the central tenets of German security policy, the multilateralism based on values. Both NATO and the United Nations Organization (UNO) failed to play any significant role in the war against terrorism and were thus sidelined. NATO as a

²¹⁶ See Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2005). Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes. – *Security Dialogue*, vol.36, no. 3.

²¹⁷ See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*, p.194. See also *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)/ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²¹⁸ See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for November 16, 2001, 14-th electoral period, 202-th session and December 22, 2001, 14th electoral period, 210th session.

²¹⁹ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

²²⁰ The basis for a vote of confidence is provided in the article 68 (1) of the German Basic Law. This article states that if a motion of the Federal Chancellor for a vote of no confidence is not assented to by the majority of the members of the Bundestag, the Federal President may, upon the proposal of the Federal Chancellor; dissolve the Bundestag within twenty-one days. The right to dissolve lapses as soon as the Bundestag by the majority of its members elects another Federal Chancellor. See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*, p.196.

collective entity was absent, although the Operation Enduring Freedom was carried out almost exclusively by the USA and the military operation in Iraq was carried out under an American flag with a number of its close allies²²¹. The UN legitimized the war against Al-Quaeda in Afghanistan, but its role did not go beyond this. Paralyzed by conflict in the Security Council, the UN was ultimately disregarded by the US in favor of a unilateralist approach²²².

Thus, from a German perspective, the situation after September 11 was characterized by rising tensions between the main principles of its foreign and security policy and a greatly changed international environment. Tensions in the transatlantic relationship were not entirely new for Germany; the German leaders had re-focused the German security policy for the post-Cold War context in the previous decade. The prohibitive approach to the use of *Bundeswehr* had been largely overcome by the mid-1990s, with Germany's combat role in Kosovo in 1999 that demonstrated the extent of this transformation.

4.2 Germany and the use of force in the context of Afghanistan and Iraq

Germany's reaction to the events of September 11 vividly demonstrated the closeness of their bonds with the USA. No nation has expressed more eloquently their horror and grief at what happened and their sympathy for the Americans. Chancellor Schröder pledged solidarity with the US in the global fight against terrorism²²³. Since then the support has acquired real political and military substance, backed up also by German police and intelligence services. When Chancellor Schröder decided to commit troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and participate in the military campaign in Afghanistan in November 2001, the Federal Chancellor even placed his political future on the line (*Vertrauensfrage*²²⁴). In November 2002 the Bundestag decided to renew Germany's commitment to the operation Enduring Freedom with overwhelming majority.

²²¹ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²²⁴ See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*, p.196.

Germany's commitment to Afghanistan, where it assumed joint command of ISAF together with the Netherlands was equally strong.²²⁵

The security environment after September 11 challenged many of the central tenets of Germany's long – standing norms and principles about the use of force that in case of Iraq brought the discrepancy between the Germany and the USA into the focus. Although Chancellor Schröder declared Germany's "unlimited solidarity" with the US, he also committed that he would not let Germany participate in any "adventures" and that prior to coming to the aid of its allies, Germany would need to be fully consulted before the initiation of any military force²²⁶.

Denouncing the US' "military adventurism", Chancellor Schröder also emphasized that a US-led war to oust Saddam Hussein would actually distract from the war against terrorism and would endanger the relations with the West and the Islamic world. Schröder delivered a speech at a SPD party rally on 05 August 2002 proclaiming a "German Way" that rejected participation in any "adventures", He promised that Germany would not support a possible war against Iraq with either money or soldiers. "German Way" (*Deutscher Weg*) in the interpretation of the Federal Chancellor denotes a specific German approach to international affairs; it also demonstrates that Germany's objectives and priorities would determine its attitude towards Iraq²²⁷. Schröder's vehement opposition to war demonstrated that there were some other factors in play²²⁸. There has been a substantial shift within German politics which has had a defining influence upon the way Germany conducted its security policies after 9/11. The main indicator of this change relates to the notion of normalization and is about Germany articulating and pursuing its own interests and gaining self – confidence in international relations.

The position of the Federal Government to stay out of the coalition of the willing and its emphasis upon the need to use force only as a last resort can be explained by using

²²⁵ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy. Navigating New Era*.

²²⁶ Ibid. See also *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²²⁷ Schröder, G. (2002). Rede von Bundeskanzler Schröder zum Wahlkampfauftakt, 05 August. <http://www.spd.de/servlet/PB/show/1019519/Schröder%20Rede%20WahlkampfauftaktHannover.pdf> (10.08.2007).

²²⁸ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

domestic grounds. The federal elections were approaching and Germany's economic situation was far from the best, therefore the Federal Chancellor used only one card – pressing on the pacifist tendencies among the Germans' on account of their history²²⁹.

During the Red – Green coalition's term in office, Schröder himself changed, at the beginning of his term as a Federal Chancellor he showed little interest towards foreign policy as his election agenda centered on domestic reform issues in 1998, but in 2002 Schröder had become a leader who mobilized anti-war sentiment. Weakened by a poor economic record and facing a strong challenge from the CDU/CSU leader, Edmund Stoiber, Schröder seemed to lose the elections in 2002. He seized the initiative and took advantage of the anti-war sentiment in Germany by opposing to a war with Iraq, even if there would be a UN mandate and he promised to keep Germany out of the conflict²³⁰.

Schröder's approach turned out to be successful and his party (the SPD) won the elections which enabled Schröder to continue in office. The resolute stance taken by Schröder left little room for any adaptation, modification or flexibility, Germany lost any real leverage that might still have existed to exact pressure upon Bush to pursue a more restrained approach towards Iraq.

On January 20, 2003 Germany and France initiated a debate about terrorism including the issue of Iraq in the UN Security Council. The Franco-German initiative also unleashed a wave of indignation across both eastern and western parts of Europe causing intra – European discord about “who speaks for Europe?”²³¹

While the Franco - German proposal at the UN attempted to claim to be done in Europe' s name, contrary voices proposed an alternative European discourse, which appeared in the form of a letter (letter of the “8”) on January 30, 2003²³². This letter was signed by the leaders of Spain, Portugal, Italy, the UK, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Denmark and testified the central importance of transatlantic solidarity after September 11, 2001 and the underlying values of the relationship. This letter was an overt support for US policy towards Iraq. It was followed by the declaration of kinship for the

²²⁹ See Erb, S. (2003). *German foreign Policy. Navigating New Era.*

²³⁰ See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era.* See also Brunstetter, S. (2005). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era.*

²³¹ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy. Navigating New Era.*

²³² See Europe and America Must Stand United. (2003). – *The Wall Street Journal*, 30 January.

use of force in Iraq in a similar letter form (the so-called “Vilnius Ten”) representing a group of Central and South East European states²³³.

The decision to go to the “German way” over Iraq can only be fully understood when this aspect is taken into account. To be sure, the Federal Chancellor’s stance on the war resulted from both a strategic cultural reluctance to use military force and electoral constraints. Tensions between increased German foreign policy aspirations, as seen in Schröder’s concept of normalization and the difficulties to ease them are not new. For example, after the unification in 1871 Germany was a big European power, but had weak role in world politics. On a certain level the same dilemma has occurred in recent years. Today, however, it is being dealt with in a completely different, institutional, political and cultural framework which for a number of reasons does not allow the *Deutscher Weg* to transform into a *Sonderweg*²³⁴.

However, Schröder’s approach was equally determined by the lessons drawn from Germany’s participation in Kosovo and Afghanistan which demonstrated to him Germany’s return to world politics as a major player. Germany’s decision not to support the war against Iraq in March 2003 was not an absolute rejection of its international responsibility, nor was it an indication of a change conception of responsibility. Germany did not only retreat to isolation during the crisis; instead it became an active and confident participant. Speeches from German leaders often recognized the necessity of confronting Iraq, yet hesitated on the issue of military force²³⁵. At the peak of the crisis, Schröder spoke of Germany’s “responsibility for peace”²³⁶. In German term it meant

²³³ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski. See also Brunstetter, S. (2005). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst, pp. 30 - 31.

²³⁴ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²³⁵ Brunstetter, S. (2005). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst, pp. 32 – 33.

²³⁶ Schröder, G. (2003). Unsere Verantwortung für den Frieden. Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zur aktuellen internationalen Lage am 13.Februar, <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Reden-Interviews/Regierungserklaerungen> -, 11638.466959/regierungserklaerung/Unsere-Verantwortung-fuer-den-htm. (11.07.2007).

pushing diplomacy and giving UN inspections more time before entertaining the possibility of invading Iraq.

The central feature of this approach was to demonstrate that foreign policy decisions “are taken” in Berlin and not anywhere else. This also explained why Germany decided to send troops to Kosovo and refused to do so in case of Iraq. From this perspective, Germany’s decision not to contribute militarily in Iraq can be regarded as entirely normal conduct of any state that sometimes pursuing its national interests decides not to participate in the deployment. This is an indication of Germany’s return to normalcy.

4.3 The summary of the debates

The first debate on 16 November 2001 in the Bundestag was about two important issues: on one hand, it concerned committing 3900 Bundeswehr troops to participate in the out-of-area operation. On the other hand, it focused on the issue whether the SPD coalition should remain in government. Schröder outlined the reasons why the *Vertrauensfrage* was being used, together with the reasons why he believed that Germany should send troops to Afghanistan²³⁷. Faced with public scepticism towards out – of – area operations, the government was reluctant to assume sole responsibility for a decision that might cost German soldiers their lives. Therefore, broad support was essentially important for Schröder’s government which had to live with the constant danger of defection from its own left wing in the out – of – area votes. The *Vertrauensfrage* was legitimate, Schröder argued, as the deployment was of fundamental importance²³⁸. On the one hand, broad support was required since Germany had to show both at international as well at domestic level that the governing coalition was able and willing to endorse the deployment, given that it was such a vital issue. On the other hand, Chancellor Schröder stressed the need for German foreign and security policy to be seen

²³⁷ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

²³⁸ See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for November 16, 2001, 14-th electoral period, 202-th session and December 22, 2001, 14th electoral period, 210th session.

as consistent and in line with multilateralism. Equally important was to show Germany as a reliable ally, able and willing to make contributions to international security. Schröder also emphasized that the purpose of the Bundeswehr deployment was as part of a broader effort to bring peace to Afghanistan and thus, it was not a war of aggression²³⁹. According to Gerhard Schröder, military contribution was only one part of a broader political and humanitarian efforts to re-build Afghanistan and (to) re-instate civic society²⁴⁰.

As concerns the *Vertrauensfrage*, it was applied for a number of reasons. Firstly, it concerned the reliability of German policy among its citizens, allies in Europe and its international partners. Partly it was due to the international situation where the Bundeswehr troops were needed for combat out-of-area missions in the framework of the declaration of war to terrorism. Faced with such a vital decision, it was important for the Chancellor and the government to have the majority behind them. Solidarity with the USA neither allowed Germany to stay out of this fight nor did it express any wish to do so. Germany has concretized its solidarity with the USA by showing readiness to deploy troops to Afghanistan. This meant that by sending troops, Germany had fulfilled the expectations of its partners²⁴¹. By fulfilling these expectations, the unified and sovereign Germany kept up with its increased responsibility at the world arena. This also meant that Germany had achieved its full sovereignty after the epochal changes since 1989. Full sovereignty also denoted taking over the obligations related to the alliance. Germany had to understand that after the epochal changes it had become the partner in the international community. For foreign policy matters and international grounds, it was significant that the “no-vote” on behalf of the opposition parties in the *Vertrauensfrage* did not mean “no” in deploying troops. It was essential that even opposition parties formed their opinion in such an important decision. Although support for the Chancellor was eventually forthcoming, Schröder was berated from all sides for linking the deployment issue to a vote of confidence²⁴². The CDU charged Schröder with playing politics with an issue which while they fully supported it, should not have been attached to a vote of

²³⁹ Ibid.

²⁴⁰ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²⁴¹ Ibid.

²⁴² See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

confidence in his government. Some pacifists in the Green party, as many SPD deputies felt affronted that they had been forced to forego their fundamental principles and support the decision about going to war as a means to save the government. Finally, the vote of confidence was supported by 336 to 326 votes in favor. Schröder was successful in his attempt and Germany committed 3900 Bundeswehr troops to Afghanistan²⁴³.

The second Afghanistan debate concerned deployment of 1200 German troops to Afghanistan in the framework of the UN mission. The mandate issued by the Security Council (SC) was geographically and temporarily limited. Germany committed troops to the UN mission with limited mandate for action in Kabul and its neighborhood in order to secure the interim government for the period of 6 months. Three positive aspects of the UN mandate will be mentioned in connection with securing stability in Afghanistan. Firstly, the stationing of the UN contingent supported the transition administration/interim government. This was a pre-condition that the UN mission worked for the common objective in narrow co-operation with the dominant powers in Afghanistan – peaceful and stable order. Secondly, the mandate allowed the soldiers to use their arms for self – defense, it was crucial that the soldiers were entitled to use force in fulfilling the tasks in this dangerous environment. Thirdly, it enabled to make distinction between the UN mission and that of the Operation Enduring Freedom. Different means were employed for achieving different objectives. On the one hand, stabilization and security of the transition administration and on the other hand, the military conduct against Al-Qaida and intercepting those terrorists that had remained in Afghanistan, including the former Taliban fighters. Accepting and legitimizing the UN peacekeeping mission, had given the UN authority as a neutral agent of the international community. Although it should be highlighted that peace and security were not only to be secured in the capital and its surroundings, the problem of security was even more acute in the other regions of the country where the warlords dominated. Therefore, stabilization in the other regions was required. This had not been the case so far due to lack of sufficient military capabilities in the region - the European capabilities in Afghanistan

²⁴³ See stenographic reports of the plenary protocols from the German Bundestag for November 16, 2001, 14-th electoral period, 202 session and December 22, 2001, 14-th electoral period, 210-th session.

formed only a part of the capabilities required in the region (Germany, the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands and Denmark)²⁴⁴.

Taking the events of September 11 into account, it was clear that Europe was not ready to handle the issue – taking decision about war and peace. Germany had to engage into Afghanistan and it was neither only the issue of humanitarian aid nor the responsibility of the UN. It was much more a central political issue in relation to Europe where Germany together with its partners jointly engaged itself. Therefore, it was crucial that the Dutch and the Danish together with the Bundeswehr upon the Bundestag consent participated in this peace mission to Afghanistan in the framework of the UN²⁴⁵.

This peace mission obtained the mandate following Chapter VII of the Charter of the UN as it enabled to clearly define the stabilization of the transition administration. The aim was to implement the Bonn accord²⁴⁶. The presence of the international peacekeeping contingent was also a result of politically decided approach – it was consequence of solidarity. Germany required a robust mandate (according to Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations Organizations) that enabled to use force for maintaining or restoring international peace and security.

4.3.1 Preponderance

On 6 November 2001, in the middle of some of the hardest fighting in Afghanistan, Germany was faced with a difficult decision when Federal Chancellor proposed the deployment of 3900 German troops in support of the Operation Enduring

²⁴⁴ See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²⁴⁵ See Fischer, J. (2002). Speech delivered in the Bundestag during the debate on Operation Enduring Freedom and the deployment of German troops to support the fight against international terrorism, 15 November.

²⁴⁶ Germany organized the Petersberg conference in 2001 that manifested itself in the Bonn accord that clarified the role of the UN at the beginning of the twenty-first century. It laid the foundation of the interim government. The Bonn accord showed a way towards peace, although the conference in itself did not guarantee peace. It depended upon the will of the Afghans to find a common starting point among different population and ethnic groups. Therefore the Bonn accord is an important milestone on the road towards peace. See Bonn accord. (2001). Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bonn_accord. (20.05.2007).

Freedom. Schröder argued that Germany was fulfilling the expectations the others had thereof and doing what was “politically responsible in this situation”:

The contribution we want to make is also an expression of our willingness to take account of the increased German responsibility in the world. This also happens in Germany’s own interest (...) Alliance solidarity is no one-way-street. Therefore it is now important to contribute our share to solidarity which is committed to our common goals our common future in security and freedom²⁴⁷.

Foreign minister Fischer clarified that the engagement in Afghanistan would be necessary to maintain Germany’s goal to promote the policy of “multilateral responsibility” on the international stage, as part of a new global role for Europe:

Germany will have to take on greater international responsibility (...). Even if everybody talks about military responsibility, it is mainly political responsibility. This has nothing to do with German hegemonic ambitions from unhappy memories. We are part of Europe and this Europe as a whole has global interests (...). As part of multilateral structures, we contribute to the existence of a policy of responsibility²⁴⁸.

In framing the reasons of Germany’s participation Schröder referred to the international linkage of this decision. It was about the “dependability of [German] policy”. Thereby, Germany “fulfilled” the “expectations of its partners.” Significantly,

²⁴⁷ *Regierungserklärung des Bundeskanzlers zur Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an der Bekämpfung des internationalen Terrorismus*, 8 November 2001. See also Brunstetter, S. (2005).). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst, p.26.

²⁴⁸ Interview with Joschka Fischer in the *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 18 October 2001.

Schröder implied directly to his country's new responsibility and it denoted that Germany had become a partner in the international community with new responsibilities²⁴⁹.

The events of 9/11 shattered the complacency of the so-called Post Cold War era and placed a new challenge on Germany's international responsibility. The already developed idea of German responsibility with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks stretched to a new level to encompass the new threats that had become clear. Whereas the earlier debate had resulted in out – of – area deployment limited to Europe, the war on terrorism required German troops half way around the world.

Even on 11 September, it was clear to the German leadership that a German military deployment might be required. Several days later Germany supported the invocation of the NATO alliance self – defense clause (Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty) which provided the basis for NATO member states' assistance to the USA.

Within days of the attacks Federal Chancellor Schröder had begun to publicly allude to the possibility of German involvement. In a speech before the Bundestag on 19 September 2001 he noted that Germany's involvement in NATO brought forth expectations, including possible active military support²⁵⁰. On the next weeks, Chancellor's constant rhetoric on the issue of possible military operations remained the same – they could not be ruled out and Germany had a responsibility to contribute. Other government officials similarly continued to speak of this possibility. For example, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer (from the Green Party) often used the rhetoric of responsibility. The prospect of paying (checkbook diplomacy)²⁵¹, as Germany did during the Gulf War, was ruled out.

One month after the September 11, 2001 attacks, Federal Chancellor clarified the new German responsibility, arguing that Germany must be prepared to undertake

²⁴⁹ See Brunnstetter, S. (2005).). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst, p.27.

²⁵⁰ Gerhard Schröder, "Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder vor dem Deutschen Bundestag zu den Anschlägen in den USA," 19 September 2001, http://www.bundesregierung.de/dokumente/Rede/ix_56381.htm, accessed 21 December 2006.

²⁵¹ Germany in Kohl era promoted a checkbook diplomacy, which preferred to contribute to the resolution of any conflict in financial rather than in military terms. See *Britain, Germany and the Future of the European Union* by Christin Schweiger.

responsibilities outside of Europe. Even in the middle of the Iraq crisis, Schröder still spoke of a “responsibility for peace”; noting Germany continue deployment of troops in support of the war against international terrorism, while at the same time aiming for a peaceful solution in the Gulf²⁵².

The chance of German soldiers participating in the USA led war against Al Qaeda, the “Operation Enduring Freedom” brought forth the likelihood of a difficult decision for Germany. Its history of warfare made any decision to take part in a war difficult. Participating in active combat operations outside the context of humanitarian operations, as had been the case in Kosovo, would be a new step forward in Germany’s use of military. The CDU/CSU faction leader Friedrich Merz noted in a Bundestag on 19 September 2001 that Germany must now be prepared to go “new and possibly uncomfortable” ways. Joschka Fischer expressed similar sentiments on 26 September 2001, believing the talk of solidarity with the USA would lead to some very difficult decisions for Germany²⁵³.

The crisis with Iraq however evoked a different reaction from German leaders, as well as the public. Without a distinct shock to react, such as a genocide or terrorist attacks, the feeling of urgency faded. Germany has never viewed Iraq with sense of urgency, similar to the USA. After 9/11 the gap in threat perceptions widened even more. Moreover, while German leaders were able to overcome some minor public approval of German deployment in the war against terrorism, the overwhelming public disdain for any war in Iraq, let alone German participation limited the options of the government.

²⁵² Bach, J. (2001). *Between Sovereignty and Integration*. See also Brunnstetter, S. (2005). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst, p.27.

²⁵³ “Abmarsch in die Realität,” *Der Spiegel* 46, 12 November 2001, 25; Joschka Fischer, “Rede von Bundesaussenminister Fischer vor dem Deutschen Bundestag am 27.09.2001 zu den international Konsequenzen der terroristischen Angriffen in den USA und ihren Auswirkungen auf die Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,” 26 September 2001, <http://www.auswaeriges-amt.de>, accessed 23 November 2006.

To sum up, Schröder government had opened a new chapter in German foreign policy with German military engagement in Kosovo and especially in Afghanistan, where German ground troops were involved:

Only ten years ago, nobody would have expected from us that Germany should participate in international efforts to secure freedom, justice and stability, other than through something like “secondary aid” (...) This stage o German post-war policy (...) is over for good (...). The readiness to take account of our increased responsibility for international security also means a new self-definition of German foreign policy. To take over international responsibility while avoiding every immediate risk, can and must not be the guideline of German foreign and security policy²⁵⁴.

The military aspect is small, if highly visible and at times just a controversial part of the change that is political at its core. The new world-wide challenges including international terrorism affect German foreign policy. The need for re-evaluation, for greater involvement within and also beyond Europe’s borders cannot be denied and must take the increased weight of Germany and the high expectations of its partners into account. The question is how the united Germany can deal with this increased influence as wisely and responsibly as possible.

4.3.2 Size

German Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has defined Germany not as “great power”, but as “large power” that accepts the responsibilities, appropriate to its weight, role, economic position and military structure²⁵⁵.

²⁵⁴ Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Schröder zur aktuellen Lage nach Beginn der Operation gegen den internationalen Terrorismus, 11 October 2001.

²⁵⁵ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

Based on this it can be stated that one of the nodal points of the normalcy discourse of German foreign policy, size (territory and population), has been considerably static as compared to the other nodal points like geography, history, or preponderance. It is basically due to the fact that after the re-unification of Germany its territory and its population size have remained approximately the same

The same cannot be stated about German economic size, which by the time of the Afghanistan debate began to change. Germany is a status quo power and therefore it is enormously dependent on the current relatively open international economic order. In 2003, for example, the value of total exports has been larger than that of any other country in the world, including that of the USA, whose economy is over three times as large. Germany still has major economic worries, but no one disputes that they would be much worse if Germany's export performance deteriorated further. Thus, any German initiatives to promote a positive change in the wider world – and such initiatives emanate from all German parties – must be reconciled with a strong economic interest in system stability. Even though the end of the Cold War (and the return of full German sovereignty) arguably gave German foreign policy more room for manoeuvre, it has been notably cautious in trying to exercise that room. Due to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the subsequent fight against international terrorism provided the USA government to apply cynicism and pragmatism in human rights that had both motive and the opportunity to go on the offensive. US dynamism in turn created new tensions that threatened Germany's room for manoeuvre which had grown since the Cold War's end. Germany's significant fiscal difficulties only compound this dilemma because they make Germany somewhat less able to pacify the USA by supporting expensive foreign missions.

As regards military structure the debates at the Bundestag on the deployment to Afghanistan have accentuated the need to carry out Bundeswehr reforms. The new missions dictated new answers that in turn required resources. It has also outlined the need to set out the tasks and procedures for co-operation of the institutions responsible for security within a comprehensive national system of preventive security. Germany also needed a new concept of the protection of its land. New threats and risks emerged after the terrorist attacks of 9/11 that have to be taken into account. The attacks in Europe (Madrid 2005) have also shown that no one can state that it will never happen on their

doorstep. The Bundeswehr is an army of deployment, it means that it is not only limited to Afghanistan, but it should also look at the direction of the Horn of Africa. It denotes that the German troops should transform themselves or re-structure whenever it is necessary.

4.3.3 History

Interest in German history demonstrates the Germans' wish to put together the jigsaw of German history. Therefore it is comprehensible that a number of debates related to history have taken place. The *Opferdebatte* and the notion of the “*self-confident nation*” are the keywords. The novelty of the *Opferdebatte* laid in the fact that the Germans were not only identified as the executioners (*Täter*), but also as victims of the Second World War²⁵⁶. The *Opferdebatte* claimed a form of normalization through introducing Germans as victims into collective memory, the claim “We want the whole history of our country”²⁵⁷ (as opposite to the history focused only on the crimes committed by the Germans) captured the central idea of the debate.

A real debate started with the publication of a book by Joerg Friedrich²⁵⁸, “*Der Brand*” in 2002 in which he blamed the Western allies for war crimes, he even equaled them with those committed by the Nazis. A separate chapter of the *Opferdebatte* was opened and it is related to the question of the expulsion of Germans from the former German territories in the East which had been incorporated into Poland and Czechoslovakia after World War II. Several aspects of the history of the World War II became the subject of the *Opferdebatte* and turned public attention to the issues that had been neglected for political reasons in earlier debates²⁵⁹. Firstly, studies on the history of

²⁵⁶ See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski, pp.37 – 39.

²⁵⁷ Büscher, W. (2002, 22 February). Wir wollen unsere ganze Geschichte. – *Die Welt*.

²⁵⁸ Jörg, F. (2001). *Der Brand – Deutschland im Bombkrieg*.

²⁵⁹ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

the GDR after 1989 revealed the atrocities committed by the Soviet Army in the East German occupation zone and the terror to which the German population was subjected. Numerous publications on the history of the Soviet occupation raised long suppressed questions of the sufferings of the individuals and especially of German women violated by Red Army soldiers. Secondly, the tragedy of the bombardments of German cities like Dresden and Hamburg by the allies during World War II began to play an important part in public debates in Germany²⁶⁰.

The problem of expulsions indicates how changes in collective memory affect foreign policy. The debate on the expulsion and its place in German collective memory broke out mainly as a result of the publication in 2002 of the novel, *Im Krebsgang*, by Günther Grass which described the tragedy of the ship “Wilhelm Gustloff” which sank with 9000 refugees from East Prussia after being attacked by a Russian U boat. Although the memory of the German losses in World War II was indeed present in the consciousness of the Germans in the West up to the 1960s²⁶¹, it was clearly marginalized by the 1968 generation and the Left who negated the notion of Germans as victims. Grass’ book and the subsequent debate indicated that this taboo had been broken. Some years earlier the Union of Expellees (BdV) submitted a project proposal to build a Center Against Expulsions in Berlin. It was meant to commemorate European expulsions in the 20-th century, with the expulsion of German after World War II.

Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer whose German family left Hungary with the collapse of the Nazi occupation has been the most vocal within the German leadership acknowledging the ambiguities of the rise of an increasingly aggressive body of self-declared German victims of World War II. Like most of the left wing parties, Fischer maintains that “the fall of Nazism was liberation – for Germany too, precisely²⁶²”. Yet when the issue of a Center Against Expulsion first came up two years earlier, Fischer opposed its becoming a national project.

²⁶⁰ Ibid.

²⁶¹ The old Federal Republic was established as a “community of victims”. See Franzen, E. (2003). In der neuen Mitte der Erinnerung, - *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft*, 1, p.49.

²⁶² See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

If it were built on German soil, he said then, “You’ve got the reasonable suspicion that a rewriting of history is resulting from it, with a victim – oppressor reversal in roles”. Fischer linked the destruction of Jewish culture with what he called the self – destruction of German culture, old German cities and German minorities in the World War II²⁶³. The debate about the expelled Germans “as victims” was missing, he said, in the sense that in the public mind in Germany, it generally began only with the German retreat and the advance of the Red Army.

The resurgence of the question of the expulsions as a subject of the public debate coincided with the election campaign of 2002 and the final stages of EU enlargement. The forced migration of more than 10 million German from Poland and Czechoslovakia at the end of the World War II added an entirely new dimension to the German Question. Despite the rhetoric of the expellee organizations and their opponents inside and outside of Germany, German society as a whole has never fully acknowledged the suffering of the expellees. Nor has it been able to embrace the history and cultural traditions of former and extant German minorities as part of a German cultural identity. These expulsions²⁶⁴ have to be seen in the context of the World War II. In Central and Eastern Europe, German occupation policy had been particularly vicious; many members of ethnic German minorities in the countries affected, had played an active role in the oppression of their (former) co-citizens. For example, in both Poland and Czechoslovakia were made for those who had actively fought against the Nazis. At the end of World War II (November 1943) in terms of ideology, rhetoric and organizational incorporation, the aim of expulsion of the ethnic Germans was to get rid of as many as possible and by all means necessary. The first mass incarcerations of ethnic Germans took place in February 1945. The Poles took over the German concentration camp system and filled the camps with ethnic Germans. As regards the *Volksdeutsche*²⁶⁵ and who were collectively excused

²⁶³ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

²⁶⁴ History of Germany. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/expulsions>. (20.05.2007).

²⁶⁵ *Volksdeutsche* is a historical term which arose in the early 20-th century. This is in contrast to Imperial Germans (*Reichdeutsche*), German citizens living within Germany. In a stricter sense, *Volksdeutsche* came to mean ethnic Germans living abroad, but without German citizenship. The juxtaposition with *Reichdeutsche* was sharpened to denote difference in citizenship as well as residence. During the Nazi times the term „*Volksdeutsche*” referred to foreign born Germans living in countries occupied by Germany who applied for German citizenship. See the notions *Volksdeutsche*, *Reichdeutsche* in <http://wikipedia.com>

of treason, the *Volksliste*²⁶⁶ introduced by the Germans was turned on its head. As regards the large numbers of *Reichsdeutsche* who now found themselves under Polish rule, immediate mass deportation as opposed to mass incarceration followed by deportation was the rule. In both cases, all the Potsdam Communiqué sanctioned ex-post facto Germany's territorial losses and the mass deportation of Germans to German territories under Allied control.

The failure to acknowledge history for what it is something that cannot be reversed, but needs to be appreciated in order to prevent its repetition – has extended beyond Germany into Central and Eastern Europe where the issue of the postwar expulsions impinged upon the EU accession negotiations. The conservative CSU and the Union of Expellees sought to take advantage of the changing atmosphere in the country to pressure the Czech Republic into withdrawing the Benes decrees imposed in 1945²⁶⁷. Using this issue in the election campaign led to considerable tensions in bilateral relations. Second, in spite of the fact that German government distanced itself from the concept of the Center Against Expulsions; it brought about a new mistrust of Germany in Poland. Polish public opinion was opposed to the prospect of raising a monument in the German capital which would promote a vision of World War II in which the Germans were victims of an expulsion organized by the Polish government.

A profound disagreement with regards to the Center Against Expulsions between Poland and that part of German public opinion which claimed the right for forms of commemoration for its own victims' provided a good example of how collective memory in the Berlin Republic was evolving. Through the *Opferdebatte* German self-

²⁶⁶ After the Germans occupied Poland in September 1939, they established a central registration bureau, called the German People's List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL), where they registered Polish citizens of German origin as Volksdeutsche. Poles were greatly encouraged to register themselves, and were sometimes compelled to do so. Those who joined this group were given benefits, including better food, and were accorded a special status.

²⁶⁷ The Benes decrees in 1945 form the political – legal foundations of the current Czech Republic. They also dealt with the confiscation of German (and Hungarian) property in Czechoslovakia and citizenship issues in relation to members of the two ethnic groups. In recent years, the issue has re-surfaced at a number of occasions, some of which have been exploited by expellee activists. In 1999, a resolution was passed by the EP in which its members called “ on the Czech Government to repeal the surviving laws and decrees from 1945 and 1946, insofar as they concern the expulsion of individual ethnic groups in the former Czechoslovakia”.

understanding acquired new dimensions. German identity would no longer be based solely on the memory of the Nazi past. New sources and impulses for a more self – confident or normal Germany had begun to transpire²⁶⁸.

The inability of German society post-war and post-unification to deal with the expulsions from the perspective of their impact (or lack thereof) on German identity has also meant that some of the expellees and their descendants persist in their own selective view of history²⁶⁹. They choose the expulsions as the starting point, thus almost denying the contextual significance of any events predating the expulsions. The expulsions and their aftermath constitute an almost classic example of the multidimensionality of the German question. It is evident that the expulsions did not solve the German question, and perhaps did not even contribute to this process. In fact, they create a small, and perhaps decreasing, but nevertheless vocal political group in Germany that lets no opportunity pass to call for a return to the Federal Republic of the former *Deutsche Ostgebiete*. A larger segment continues to demand the collective right of return to their ancestral homelands from which they were expelled after the World War II. The problem is how many people support these demands and what kind of perception they created and create in Poland and Czech Republic. These claims can be interpreted as a “proof of German revisionism” by nationalists and Eurosceptics alike. From this perspective the German Question has not lost any of its domestic bilateral relevance.

4.3.4 Geography

Frank Umbach, a military analyst for German Council on Foreign relations, strikingly summed up the changed environment for Germany after the Cold War by saying that this country found itself in a new strategic landscape, where the borders of instability had moved eastward and southward. In this regard the old threat from the East had disappeared, the collapse of the Soviet Union had brought along new uncertainties: a potentially alarming risks of ecological disaster, proliferation of conventional arms and

²⁶⁸ *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski, pp.34 – 37.

²⁶⁹ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

weapons of mass destruction, political turmoil and forced mass migration²⁷⁰. Germany found itself particularly exposed to those new risks and uncertainties: its neighbors to the East were states with a yet fragile democracies and economies facing huge challenges of transformation. Some of these problems even existed inside Germany in the new *Länder* in the Eastern parts. Taking all these factors into consideration, it is evident that Germany's security is particularly precarious, not only in military terms.

In this changed situation it is not enough to defend Germany's interests, including stability, at home, but instead more comprehensive concept of security should be applied. Taking stability its primary goal, Germany has deployed its troops to a number of hotspots during the last 15 years, e.g Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia to mention some of the deployments of the Bundeswehr. German security policy including military intervention and the role of the Bundeswehr has considerably changed. It manifests itself in the statement delivered by German Defense Minister, Peter Struck in December 2002, "Our security must also be defended on the Hindu Kush²⁷¹". He clarified the German position by saying that "we must face up to threats where they arise". According to Karsten Voigt, the German Foreign Ministry's co-coordinator for German – American co-operation, Struck would have committed political suicide if he had said that a few years before²⁷². Voigt argued that "we are now defining our security outside our boundaries, and I think the German people will have to accept it". It was no longer a debate about morality, which it used to be previously. It is now about Germany's interests. Germany has new distractions and new priorities, especially the effort to build an integrated Europe. Thus, on these grounds German participation in Afghanistan is justified²⁷³. Definitely these

²⁷⁰ Quoted in *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

²⁷¹ See stenographic report from the German Bundestag for November 16, 2002 14 Wahlperiode 202.Sitzung, den 16 November Plenarprotokoll 14/202, Tagesordnungspunkt 3: Einsatz bewaffneter Deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Art. 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Art 5. des Nordatlantikvertrages sowie der Resolutionen 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen: 19855 B - 19892 B: [Online] Parfors Bundestag (15.04.2007).

²⁷² Voigt, K. (2003). Putting the relations to the test? Germany and the US following 11 September – speech by Coordinator of German – American Cooperation, to the Centre for International Relations in Warsaw on 3 March. [www] http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=4167 (22.06.2007).

²⁷³ Ibid.

changes have given rise to re-thinking the concept of geographical distance and its importance for German foreign and security policy, particularly in the context of defending German interests.

Geographical distance is not so important any more; earlier it would have been unthinkable to dispatch the troops of Bundeswehr to Afghanistan that is located about 6000 kilometers from Germany. The German deployment in Afghanistan is needed as the Bundeswehr troops in this way guarantee German and European security. The security situation in geographically far away state directly impacts Germany. The spiral of military violence will denote the abundance of terrorist attacks that could also take place on the territory of Germany. Despite the fact that those attacks have not touched German territory so far does not mean that there are some grounds to hope that it will never take place. In addition, to the Operation Enduring Freedom carried out in Afghanistan, it is in German interests to be present in the Horn of Africa. In case, the international community of states is not vigilant enough, Somalia can quickly turn another Afghanistan, a country that harbors terrorists'. Afghanistan in this respect can be considered as a "lesson learned" and more attention should be paid to the situation in some geographically far away states. Although these states are located geographically very far from Germany; it is in German interest to control the situation and not to experience another Afghanistan in future. For example, the pirates use the same means of transport as the terrorists. Sea transport is mostly preferred for carrying the smuggled weapons and weapons of mass destruction. In this respect it is in German interests to hold the situation in the Horn of Africa under control, otherwise it can directly affect German security in future (e.g immigrants' pressure on Germany and the danger of terrorist attacks carried out on German soil). In this light geography and the understanding of geographical distance in relation to security has entered a new dimension.

To sum up, the commitment of almost 4000 German troops including elite units to the USA military campaign against the Afghan Taliban regime was disputed on similar grounds: it was argued that a resort to war was not warranted; targeted commando raids should instead have been used to apprehend the perpetrators of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA. Eventually Chancellor Schröder coupled the vote on Afghanistan with a vote

of confidence in order to pass the decision. In the end, the German contribution passed the Bundestag by only a very narrow margin²⁷⁴.

The deployment in Afghanistan also approached the limit what the German working consensus could sustain, placing it left flank under pressure. While the German centre – right wing deliberated on the question whether Germany in this case should stand by its long-time ally- the USA, the leader of the centre – left did not hesitate. Already in the summer of 2002, Chancellor Schröder was the first leader to say unconditional “no” to any German participation in a potential war against Iraq. According to Schröder, a war against Iraq would distract from the efforts to combat international terrorism and might lead to uncontrollable escalation and mass casualties and further estrangement between the Arab world and the West would follow. Containment, not confrontation, Schröder argued, was the right strategy when dealing with Saddam Hussein – a strategy that since 1991 had been successful in preventing renewed aggression by Iraq against its neighbors²⁷⁵.

Domestically, the move was triumph. The Chancellor was facing general elections in September 2002 and had consistently trailed his Conservative challenger, Edmund Stoiber in the polls. The Chancellor’s anti-war stance indulged the SPD’s disgruntled left wing and stopped the flight of votes from the SPD and Green Party (die Grünen/Bündnis 90) to the unreconstructed pacifist party – the ex- communist Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS). It also tapped into widespread unease among the CDU/CSU’s Christian voters – traditionally committed to avoiding the use of force and to a demilitarization of international affairs – with the new US line.

Iraq also did not herald a German reversion to the earlier policy of reticence and abstinence in military affairs. It manifests itself in the fact that four months after the launch of Operation Iraqi Freedom, when the Bundestag voted 441 to 30 in support of a German contribution to the EU Operation Artemis in Congo²⁷⁶. The SPD/Green

²⁷⁴ See the German Bundestag’s plenary protocol for November 16, 2001, 14-th electoral period, 202, <http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp/20017index.html>. (18.07.2007).

²⁷⁵ See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

²⁷⁶ The French – led Operation Artemis was the first EU – initiated and EU conducted international military operation. The previous missions carried out under the European Security and Defense Policy – operations in Macedonia and Bosnia – all began life as either UN or NATO missions that were at a later stage taken over by the EU. Considering the strong pro – European strand of German strategic culture, it could be argued that Europeanism was an intervening factor, facilitating German support for the Congo deployment.

government invoked the humanitarian need in Congo, the fact that civilians were being killed and forced from their homes, Germany's international responsibility and the multinational nature of the intervention²⁷⁷.

In sum, by 2003 the German willingness to engage the Bundeswehr in out – of – area operations had become so rooted that the original proponent of expanding Germany's international military engagement – the Conservative Party – while supporting the Congo deployment, now cautioned the left wing that it needed to say “no”.

The German stance on Congo leaves no doubt that the Iraq War did not herald an end to the German willingness to engage in international military operations. For example, while other countries were preparing for war in Iraq, Germany stepped up its military engagement in Afghanistan and in February the same year took over the lead of the International Security and Assistance Force, ISAF, in Kabul.

Germany's contribution in Congo and ISAF demonstrates how Iraq did not indicate that Germany had come full circle and reverted to a pacifist stance. Instead, Iraq highlighted that domestic support materializes when it comes to engaging the Bundeswehr alongside the armed forces of major allies as a last resort in managing crises that entail large-scale ethnic violence or abuse of human rights. On the other hand, Germany's working consensus proved shaky when military means were introduced before a variety of political, diplomatic and economic strategies had been given a chance, or if military intervention did not serve to de-escalate violence or end a humanitarian crisis²⁷⁸.

The fact that Germany has declined involvement in the 2003 Iraq war was in a number of respects different from the Germany that abstained in 1991. The geostrategic context of the 1990s and the nature of the crises of the era paved a way for an extensive German engagement in international military crisis management. The “no” to Iraq intervention highlighted the fact that the ability to mobilize support for deploying the German troops depends on a number of conditions: military intervention should be a last resort, must be multinational and should meet a humanitarian need or serve to de-escalate violence. In

²⁷⁷ Stenographischer Bericht, (51: 2.9, 15).

²⁷⁸ Dalgaard-Nielsen, A. (2005). Germany, Pacifism and Pre-emptive Strikes. – *Security Dialogue*, vol.36, no. 3.

situations where these conditions are not met, a German contribution cannot be taken for granted.

5 COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN GERMAN PERSPECTIVE

After the end of the Cold War there was no longer a confrontation in the context of the East – West conflict. Yet, it became clear that Europe cannot any longer rely upon the USA. Not without reason the ghosts of Europe's past resurfaced in Yugoslavia. It was first in Yugoslavia where the European Union was first confronted with its strategic dimension. Once again, America had to step in and take care of things. The events of 9/11 definitely left its imprint on the transatlantic relations. The real division of the EU began on 12 September 2001 when the European nations acted according to their old national positions, not as united²⁷⁹. The EU was evidently not yet built to handle this strategic dimension of war and peace at the time. After the terrorist attack on America, everyone in Europe immediately sensed the same thing that this date would change the world. Although, the Europeans did not get immediately together after the attack on their most important partner. They were not capable of dialogue when the conflicts erupted - which was definitely the case during the Iraq crisis²⁸⁰.

It is highly symbolic that it was the Iraqi dispute that turned out to be the real test case for the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that came into being with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty at the end of 1993 and which was further elaborated by the Amsterdam and the European Union treaties²⁸¹. The debate about the intervention to Iraq in 2003 definitely exposed the weaknesses of the CFSP and demonstrated that the EU's failure to develop a common policy over Iraq was not an exceptional case. It definitely not only referred to the fact that CFSP mechanism did not function, but it highlighted the fragmented image of the EU as an international actor in the international affairs²⁸². Iraq was after all an issue which involved taking positions on,

²⁷⁹ *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)/Edited by Martin Holland.

²⁸⁰ Ibid.

²⁸¹ Crowe, B. (2004). A Common European Foreign Policy After Iraq? In.: *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*, p.28.

²⁸² Ibid.

the choice between war and peace, the legitimacy of military action, democratic control and nature of the transatlantic relationship. In comparing Iraq with Yugoslavia, it can be seen that at that time, the USA definitely backed off and left things for Europe to solve. In Iraq, the intervention was led by the USA who invited the other states to participate in its coalition of the willing. East and Central European countries that joined the EU on 1 May 2004 as concerned CFSP and ESDP, tried to avoid facing the difficult choice between their Atlantic and European loyalties²⁸³. This has proved impossible in the case of Iraq crisis of 2003, when the adhering states, without exception, supported the Atlanticist line and upset some of the opponents of the USA – UK position. In this context, given essentially civilian nature of Europe's foreign policy capacity of the last decade, the challenges the CFSP confronted were virtually insurmountable²⁸⁴.

From German perspective, the understanding of the changes in German foreign and security policy, which is also, at least in part due to participation in the CFSP, has improved. The change that emerged towards the end of the 1990s in Germany's security behavior was possible and considered legitimate because it was justified with reference to human rights. As a state whose tradition since the end of the World War II has been commitment to multilateralism, peaceful conflict resolution and emphasis on non-military means – in particular, economic means in security policy, Germany adapted itself to the new security environment. However, the „normalization” of Germany meant facing difficult choices about the degree of political and military involvement in international affairs. This became traumatic both for political elites and the citizens of Germany²⁸⁵. The argument used to justify such participation, shifted its focus from concerns about German historical legacy towards a focus on Germany's responsibility, also upholding respect for human rights and democracy outside its own borders.

The current chapter explores the deliberation about the Common Foreign and Security Policy that took place in the framework of the European policy debates at the Bundestag on 13 March 2003 and on 13 February 2004. As German foreign policy attaches great emphasis to the completion of European integration as one of the main

²⁸³ *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*. (2004)./ Edited by Martin Holland, pp. 29-31.

²⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁸⁵ See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K. Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

goals of German foreign policy, the evolution of the understanding of the CFSP is viewed in this context. Therefore the European Convention is regarded as a domain for further elaborating the Common Foreign and Security Policy.

The European debate was chosen by the author for a number of reasons. Firstly, CFSP provides the framework for understanding the evolution of German foreign and security policy, particularly the issue of the out – of – area operations from Bosnia till Afghanistan. Secondly, taking the problems of the Iraqi dispute into account, it became obvious that new thinking, particularly internal reforms were necessary to carry out effective CFSP in the enlarged Union. The "Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe" in this respect represented a major step ahead, in particular in the area of foreign and security policy²⁸⁶. The European Foreign Minister, supported by a European External Service, seemed to be a very important innovation. The "Foreign Minister" was also responsible for the entire area of crisis management, whereas the EU Military Staff were to be as much part of his responsibilities as the Defence Agency. The unification of all relevant tasks under the responsibility of one person represented a quantum leap for the Union's capacity to act quickly, effectively and in a more coherent fashion²⁸⁷.

5.1 The background of the debate

The stresses and strains within the CFSP were especially exposed over the Iraqi war. The reasons why the EU's failure to develop a common policy has never before captured attention is related to the fact that the issue was never brought forward within the EU, either at ambassadorial level (Committee of Permanent Representatives, Political and Security Committee) or at ministerial (Council of Ministers) level²⁸⁸. The CFSP has failed to answer the essential question for European foreign policy: whether to accept the USA leadership which has been the mainstay of the postwar world and work with it, or rather develop an independent line.

A number of factors made it possible for the CFSP to arrive at common policies in fraught situations and to sustain them through difficult challenges. The decision between

²⁸⁶ Euroopa Põhiseaduse lepingu eelnõu . (2004). Euroopa Konvent.

²⁸⁷ Ibid, lk 173-183.

²⁸⁸ See *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)./Edited by Martin Holland.

war and peace was definitely one. It was assumably the interaction of European and USA interests and objectives over Iraq that proved a test for the CFSP.

The question arises whether in such circumstances the EU should even try to have a CFSP. Definitely Europe, that is able to act of one accord, will carry more weight, whether with the USA or others, than a Europe composed of individual states acting independently²⁸⁹. It is to a great extent an illusion to think that individual European countries can influence the big issues by representing only themselves.

It remains to be seen whether the EU will pick itself up from the Iraq debacle and whether improvement of the CFSP will take place as a consequence of the Convention on the Future of Europe. The Laeken declaration²⁹⁰ outlined the mandate for the Convention on Future of Europe. The debate in the second half of 2002 and early 2003 took place against the background of major developments within the union, including the successful introduction of the Euro and the conclusion of the enlargement negotiations with 10 countries from Central and Southern Europe. At the international level, the security has been transformed following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the USA and preparations for war against Iraq. The EU had demonstrated solidarity after the attacks, but divisions emerged during 2002 on how to deal with Iraq. On the one hand, Germany expressed opposition to any military intervention in Iraq; on the other hand, the United Kingdom offered almost unconditional support for the USA policy of regime change²⁹¹. These disputes reached the highest peak in the early weeks of 2003 with rival statements by France and Germany on one side (22 January 2003), representing a cautious line, and the “gang of the eight” on the other side (30 January 2003), offering the USA unconditional support²⁹². The “Gang of eight” included Britain, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Denmark, plus three accession countries, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. A few days later a group of Central European countries (the Vilnius Ten) produced a further declaration

²⁸⁹ Ibid.

²⁹⁰ The European Council, meeting in Laeken, adopted a Declaration on the Future of the European Union, or Laeken Declaration, on 15 December 2001, committing the Union to becoming more democratic, transparent and effective (<http://www.european-convention.eu.int/pdf/LKNEN.pdf>, 10.05.2007).

²⁹¹ See *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)./Edited by Martin Holland.

²⁹² See Erb, S.(2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*. See also *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

supporting the USA.

5.2 *The summary of the debate*

Prior to the eastward enlargement it became evident that further enlargement was not possible without a fundamental reform of the Treaties and the European Constitution. Furthermore, it became reality that the enlargement process would not stop at 25 member – states. Thus, the process of drawing up European Constitution was indispensable. From German perspective, the Treaty of Nice was a failure. The statement of German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer supports the argument by stating that the Convention was essential for bridging emerging breaks and rifts in the enlarged Union and avoiding the formation of an “avant-garde” among the member-states²⁹³. The question is whether the concept of a "core Europe" outside the Constitution could still be viable in today's Europe. The idea of a centre of gravity or an avant-garde group has been incorporated into the Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe in the form of structured cooperation and enhanced cooperation. That doesn't mean that the idea of a centre of gravity has to be shelved²⁹⁴. The concept of enhanced cooperation will hardly ever involve a core Europe anymore because most of the member states will invariably want to participate. Although not all of them will be able to, and a very few will not want to. It will almost always be majorities that are involved, not small groups of states²⁹⁵.

This new Constitution was even more important against the background of the international political challenges Europe was faced with. Germany was more interested to take further – reaching steps, although it became clear that in the end, compromise had to be reached based on national positions. An enlarged Union definitely required strong, integrative institutions, otherwise effective functioning thereof was not ensured. It was in

²⁹³ „Fischer on among other things, the enlargement of the European Union and the question of military intervention in Iraq (excerpts)“ (13 March 2003) at the German Bundestag.

²⁹⁴ See *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)./Edited by Martin Holland.

²⁹⁵ Ibid.

the interests of all member-states to have a functioning Union. German position represented on the one hand, the interests of the large member – state, on the other hand, those of the old member – states²⁹⁶. In addition, the interests of the new Länder had to be taken into account. Therefore, in this context they endorsed a permanent Chairmanship of the European Council as it de facto meant strengthening of the Council. Thus, it was justified to confer the right to the European Parliament to elect the President of the Commission. The size of the European Commission, based upon the Treaty of Nice, 25 Commissioners was too large and required a strictly defined internal structure. The alternative choice, the rotation model was disadvantageous for the large member-states who had already given up one Commissioner. Even if the rotation model were to function on the basis of a long cycle – there were and always are, large, medium and small member – states, therefore, from this perspective there were always a phase in which a large member – state would not be presented²⁹⁷.

Besides, the watershed ran through the interests of large and small states. In an enlarged Union of 25 states, the smaller states were to constitute the majority of states, whilst the six largest members - states together were to represent over 70 per cent of the population. This created a serious problem of balance, not only as far as the European Council is concerned, but on nearly all levels. It would be difficult to achieve such a balance. A solution can be found if a compromise is reached that takes the different interests into account. The same problem existed between the new and the old member – states. The Germans were especially sensitive in this respect because they were experiencing the difficulties of growing together as regards the old and the new Länder²⁹⁸.

At this background the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy over the course of the past five - six years has been dynamic. Not only has cooperation between the EU and NATO improved, the same also holds for the concertation processes. On account of the division of the EU over the Iraq conflict, at present there are entirely different concertation processes. Co-operation within the framework of the Common Foreign Policy seems to be successful. Even though Europe is still quite far away from a

²⁹⁶ See *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)./Edited by Martin Holland.

²⁹⁷ Ibid.

²⁹⁸ Ibid.

situation where political objectives are realized with a Union Minister for Foreign Affairs at the top of a pyramid²⁹⁹.

5.3 Common Foreign and Security Policy in German context

Almost nowhere is the need for common action so clear and as controversial as in foreign policy. Europe in response to globalization has to re-define its place in a changing world. At the start of the 21 century, the challenges and priorities for German and European policy have drastically changed. Parallel to this turning point in Europe, however, new threats and dangers have emerged, creating new challenges for Europe. The events of 9/11 indicated that neither USA nor Europa can afford to close eyes to „failing states” and „black holes” within the political and social systems³⁰⁰. The zero hour of the 9/11 paved the way for Europe to enter a new era of global cooperation and multilateralism. Overcoming these global challenges must increasingly become the priority for European policy³⁰¹. An enhanced concept of security and a comprehensive strategy aimed at dealing with the causes of conflicts are required focusing on prevention and not on repression. For these grounds, the foreign policy of the EU will never have as strong military orientation as that of the USA. German experience of history indicates that centuries of bloody wars and civil wars in very small areas are very different to those of the USA and they will continue to determine its thinking. Therefore, both European and German policy will continue to be characterized by a greater reticence towards military action³⁰². Foremost, Germany will look first for a political solution, but without excluding the use of force as a last resort. This was the case with Kosovo, with Macedonia and with Afghanistan. In the changed environment greater importance is attached to security policy. It does not mean that the other policy areas have become

²⁹⁹ *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)./Edited by Martin Holland.

³⁰⁰ Fischer, J. (2002).“European Challenges between integration and enlargement an Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe” – speech by Federal Foreign Minister at the “Weimar Lectures on Germany” on 10 April.

³⁰¹ See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for March 13, 2003, 15-th electoral period, 31 session on “Europapolitik”, February 13, 2004, 15-th electoral period, 92 session on “Vereinbarte Debatte zur aktuellen Europapolitik”.

³⁰² See Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*. See also *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

unimportant. Foreign policy requires a comprehensive approach, embracing security as well, meaning that Europe needs sufficient diplomatic, police, intelligence and military capabilities at its disposal³⁰³. Those are precisely the capabilities – European capabilities – that the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) is intended to provide. More viable strategies are needed that address the tensions in Central Asia, the Near and Middle East – the strategies tackling a multitude of problems ranging from shaping globalization to allocating scarce water resources³⁰⁴. In German perspective, equipping Europe to act more effectively does not mean making „Europe puissance” – a counterweight to the USA, it means making this „Europe puissance” a better partner. The EU has decided to give itself its own security and defense capability. This fits the logic of a CFSP. It is evident that Europe will never be able to want to rival the USA militarily, but alongside a civilian crisis management capability it must also possess its own self-sufficient, independent military capabilities, if it wants to be in a position to practise effective conflict prevention and to secure or even enforce peace alone if necessary³⁰⁵. Javier Solana, the High representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the Union compared the progress of CFSP, which encompasses also the European Security and Defense Policy, to the speed of light. He referred to the „birth” of European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the Cologne European Council in June 1999, to the political and military crisis management capabilities of the European Union, and to the EU’s initial experiences in missions. For Germans, the EU should remain a regional power and leave global tasks to the US³⁰⁶.

The dispute over Iraq in the framework of the CFSP highlights the fact that as a nation, Germans feel generally torn about matters of war and peace. Given their traumatic memories of the World War II, most people are highly reluctant to see German troops sent to war. The foreign policy, Germany has pursued with great success over the past forty years is multilateral in approach and that will remain its preferred option for solving problems.

³⁰³ Voigt, K. (2002). „Franco – German Relations and the New geopolitics” – speech given by coordinator of German – American Cooperation, Federal Foreign Office, at a Franco – German seminar held on 5 July.

³⁰⁴ Voigt, K. (2002). „EU – USA: Transatlantic relations under strain?” – Speech by Coordinator of German – American Cooperation, to the Institute for European Policy, 04 June.

³⁰⁵ Voigt, K. (2002). „Transatlantic Relations in the aftermath of September 11”, Coordinator for German – North – American Cooperation, Federal Foreign Office, speech at the Goethe institute Toronto, April 25.

³⁰⁶ Ibid.

5.3.1 Preponderance

By virtue of its size, centrality and influence in the Euro – Atlantic security community, Germany is determined to pay a “pivotal” role in the reshaping of European order. At the start of the 21-st century there is still a “German problem”. There are many questions about Germany, the nature and extent of German power, its attitudes towards past, its role in Europe. There is no “German problem” in its traditional meaning. In considering the role of a united Germany in Europe, there are two main dangers. On the one hand, German power and its ability to determine development beyond its borders are overestimated. On the other hand, it is believed that unification did not have any considerable impact on Germany and that it is just one state in Europe among many others³⁰⁷. In 1991, Richard von Weizsäcker, German President described the Germans as “pretty normal people, just like everyone else”. On the other hand, Germany is a considerable power that is capable of shaping developments in Central and Eastern Europe, particularly, in the historic heartland of “*Mittleuropa*”. Understanding Germany’s role in the new Europe, thus involves assessing how history and geography will affect Germany as a nation – state³⁰⁸.

It is in this context that the dual enlargement process assumed such historic importance both for Germany and Europe as a whole. The eastern enlargement process was in the vital interests of Germany. The risks and temptations inherent in its size and central situation can only be overcome through the enlargement. The united Germany owes its unity not least to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, but it also had a historic, moral responsibility for the realization of eastern enlargement. The process of European integration in German perspective was the opportunity to repeat the same process in the east that Germany achieved in the west after 1945³⁰⁹.

The eastern enlargement has also affected the Franco – German axis, one of the pillars of German foreign policy. In parallel to German situation, French interests in the

³⁰⁷ Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

³⁰⁸ Quoted in Bach 2001.

³⁰⁹ Handl, V., Price – Hide, A. (2001). Germany and Visegrad Countries. –*Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, Spring, pp. 56 – 70.

eastern enlargement were closely linked to historical reasons and can be understood against the background of the end of the Cold War. At the same time the eastern enlargement affected significantly both Franco – German leadership in the EU and the French strategy “to bind in Germany” which in the past had given France the upper hand in Franco – German relations. The German push towards the east and the shift in the EU gravity towards “*Mittleuropa*” has worried France at two levels. On the one hand, it concerned the continued influence of the France – German axis on European events and on the other hand, it feared that the new balance of power in Europe relegated France to the fringes of Europe. It was not in the interests of France to leave Germany in a position of control. Germany benefited from the eastern enlargement, and not France. In this respect, it challenged the geo-political Franco – German power symmetry in Europe³¹⁰.

By integrating the transition countries of the Central and Eastern Europe into the structures of Europe that had maintained peace in Europe since 1945, the effect of eastern enlargement was further reinforced. The decision to advocate a selective opening up of a NATO to new members from East and Central Europe was taken, following an institutional struggle between the Defense and Foreign ministries. The decision to enlarge NATO represented good understanding and co-operation between German Defense Minister Dr Volker R  he and his USA counterpart³¹¹.

Rudolf Scharping, German Defense Minister in 1998, summarized the significance of NATO and German perspective in this respect by declaring that

The North Atlantic Alliance remains the backbone for peace and stability in Europe. It will be more than ever the core and motor of a new European peace order. The alliance is directing itself in spirit and in structure towards the new demands of today and tomorrow – crisis prevention and crisis resolution, projecting stability and co-operation with new partners...

The re-orientation of NATO and the re-orientation of the Bundeswehr are two sides of the same coin. Both processes must be closely associated. The mission and the structure of

³¹⁰ See *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)/Edited by Martin Holland.

³¹¹ See Brunnstetter, S. (2005). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst.

*the Bundeswehr must be brought into harmony with the new peace order in Europe*³¹².

The debate about the increased international responsibility of the larger Germany had already started during Iraq's invasion into Kuwait in 1990. Although West Germany had already supported the United States logistically in the Mediterranean sea during the 1980s and had also contributed to an international police in Namibia in 1989, the German foreign policy consensus in the early 1990 attached to the principles of *Genscherism*³¹³ Germany's post unification status did not enable Germany to cultivate its pacifist stance any more. The tragic events in Kosovo urged the unified Germany to become a normal European state with obvious national interests and its reluctance to take on full burden sharing. Germany was forced to adapt to its increased international weight and it did not want to be treated exceptionally any longer. Therefore, it was ready to shoulder the full burden of its post-unification status. Kosovo had prepared Germany for even stronger challenge of the events that were to follow the terrorists' attacks in New York on 9/11. This time the German soldiers did not actively engage in combat, but would have to defend themselves in case of an attack which made the engagement controversial at home. Chancellor Schröder stressed that this policy was in line with the new German willingness to take on international responsibility, which would also suit German interests³¹⁴. He also added that with military engagement in Kosovo and especially in Afghanistan, Germany had opened a new chapter in German foreign policy – Germany had become a normal partner in Europe³¹⁵. Fears about a possible re-nationalization of German European policy were unfounded as the new generation of German leaders had no ambitions as related to the use of Germany's increased weight and its return to the nationalistic power politics of the past. On the contrary, German society was committed to the principles of multilateral co-operation and peaceful co-existence with its neighbors in Europe. German Chancellor Schröder's words from November 1999 clearly illustrate the overriding centrality of *Europapolitik* to German foreign policy. "The first goal of

³¹² Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

³¹³ Attitude preferred by a long-standing FRG Foreign Minister Hans – Dietrich Genscher principle of non-military, civilian conflict resolution. See also Duffield, J. (1998). *World Power Forsaken. Political Culture, International Institutions and German Security Policy after Unification*.

³¹⁴ Quoted in Erb, S. (2003). *German Foreign Policy: Navigating New Era*.

³¹⁵ Quoted in *ibid*.

German foreign policy”, Schröder declared, is to strengthen peace, security and a stable environment upon which in the last instance our prosperity depends”. This involves above all the strengthening and further development of the structure of European integration³¹⁶.

Joschka Fischer, German Foreign Minister, highlighted the main tenets of this new foreign policy by saying that “the responsibility and weight of a geographically enlarged and united Germany is best at home in Europe. Solo efforts should never again be an option for Germany. The completion of European integration of nation states is therefore the most important goal of German foreign policy so far, as German values and interest are best looked after in this way. To put it differently, “Europe is our most important national interest”³¹⁷”. Germany, on account of its history is not in a position to make independent initiatives or to play its pro-active world politics. The signs indicate that in the future Germany will be called upon more frequently when massive human rights violations occur and when peace and security are endangered. Military assistance can be called upon from Germany as a last resort.

Thus, since reunification Germany’s importance has considerably increased. The question remains how the united Germany can deal with this increased influence as wisely as possible and responsibly as possible. Germany has still not completely found its role in the emerging new Europe, but it is in the process of redefining its position and adapting to the changes.

5.3.2 Size

Germany is the European Union’s most populous and most economically powerful member – state. It also plays a role as one of the world’s major powers.

No significant changes have taken place in the territorial size, but due to good geopolitical location in *Mitteleuropa* German influence especially in economical affairs has increased.

³¹⁶ Ibid.

³¹⁷ Fischer, J (2002). „European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe” at the Weimar Lectures on Germany“, 10 April, (<http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/041002.html> 10.05.2007).

In military area, the transformation of the Bundeswehr has been pressing ahead mostly due to the changes in the security conditions. National defense force in its traditional sense is not needed any more because Germany is surrounded by friends. With regard to German economic potential, its size and position in Europe, Germany has international responsibilities to fulfill³¹⁸. It means adjustment politically and as well militarily. At present Germany is the second largest country in the world besides the USA that has the greatest number of troops deployed on peacekeeping missions around the world. Currently the German military has about 1 180 troops stationed in Bosnia – Herzegovina 2650 soldiers are serving in Kosovo, and 3900 troop are assisting the US anti-terrorism operation called Enduring Freedom off the Horn of Africa. In Afghanistan 4500 troops currently make up the largest contingent of the NATO led ISAF force³¹⁹. Unfortunately the defense spending equals about 1,2 % of the German GDP as compared to the NATO average of 2,3 % and the USA more than 4 %. Many critics argue that the current budget (in 2006 24,4 billions EUR) is too small to finance the necessary transformation of the Bundeswehr into a well – equipped force ready for NATO and UN led missions abroad. The opponents also highlight that the transformation from a manpower based army securing the eastern border to a modernized force with fewer soldiers on the payroll is duly reflected in a lower budget³²⁰.

In demographic scale, the worldwide collapse of the much reputed New Economy put an end to what proved to be exaggerated expectations of growth in the 90s and also rendered redundant the German recipe for success. In fact, Germany has a whole series of problems to solve in order to be able in the long term to keep pace with competition from other EU states. These problems include demographic changes which threaten to make pensions and the health system unaffordable. The baby boomer generation has itself produced few children but is now approaching retirement age. This demographic shift creates problems, particularly in relation to the funding of pensions. Even if the next generation produces more children, there would still, for a number of decades, be too few

³¹⁸ See Sarotte, M. (2001). *German Military Reform and European Security*. Adelphi paper no.340, p.9.

³¹⁹ Voigt, K. (2003). „Common Roots – a Common Future? Transatlantic Partnership in the Twenty-first Century“, speech by Coordinator of German – American Cooperation at the World Bank, Washington, 29 January.

³²⁰ See Sarotte, M. (2001). *German Military Reform and European Security*. Adelphi paper no.340.

people of working age providing the contributions to fund the pensions of the relatively high percentage of older people with their considerably increased life expectancy.

In economic terms, due to a favorable geopolitical location - sharing borders with 9 countries, including traditional trading partners in Western Europe and the growth markets of Central and Eastern Europe makes Germany European geographic and business hub³²¹. Germany also constitutes to the largest economy and the largest market in the EU. Prior to the eastern enlargement 22 % of the EU's population that lived in Germany, this Mittellage country produced approximately 23 % of the EU's gross national product. Since the eastern enlargement, this proportion has changed in favor of Germany. After the accession of the 10 new EU member states, Germany contributes at the present time (in 2005) only 19 % of the EU population, but produces 24 % of the EU's gross national product (GNP).

Thus, it can be stated that Germany is one of the principal beneficiaries of the EU eastern enlargement. Starting in 2004, the expanded EU became a trade and investment location with 454 million consumers. Germany has traditionally served as a gateway to growth markets of Central and Eastern Europe.

5.3.3 History

In June 2004, for the first time, a German Chancellor attended ceremonies in Normandy to mark the anniversary of D-Day³²². The ceremonies in Normandy were meant to honor the Americans, British and Canadians who stormed the beaches on 6 June 1944, dying by the thousands to liberate France and the rest of Europe from the Nazi soldiers. Gerhard Schröder's presence at the ceremonies honoring those who fought and died in the invasion of Normandy beaches on June 6, 1944 to end the Nazi grip on Europe has stirred controversy. Schröder stressed that Germany accepted its responsibility in unleashing the conflict in which millions died:

³²¹ See von Pierer, H. (2004, 18 May). Speech at the „Business Dialogue” in Shanghai.

³²² D-Day in military terminology denotes the day in which a combat attack or operation is to be initiated. The best known D-day is June 6, 1944, the day on which the Battle of Normandy started, contributing to the Western Allied effort to liberate mainland Europe from Nazi occupation during the Second World War See D-Day. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/D-Day>. (06.07.2007).

*The Allied victory was not a victory over Germany but a victory for Germany. It was a victory over the barbarism of the SS units, which on their march to the French coast callously massacred almost the whole population of Oradour. It was a victory over an inhuman regime that murdered six million Jews - and hundreds of thousands of opponents, members of minorities and anyone judged "unfit to live". It was a victory over a regime that had made killing an industry. And it was a victory for those courageous men and women who on 20 July 1944 had sought, albeit vainly, to put an end to Hitlerism*³²³.

In his momentous speech of 8 May 1985 Federal President Richard von Weizsäcker sent a clear message to the whole world: “For us Germans the end of the Second World War was a day of liberation, not defeat³²⁴”. According to Schröder, “.today Germany has regained its unity, in the wider world we are a respected partner. We have assumed responsibility - and we do so where necessary, as in Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan, also through the use of armed force³²⁵”. Here lies the difference, whereas Hitler regime used armed forces to impose its rule, today German soldiers risk life and limb to bring people safety and protection. It is a country that is fully aware of the crimes in its past - and it has learnt from that legacy. Precisely for that reason Germany can make an immense contribution to building a peaceful world in the 21st century that Germany has learned from its traumatic legacy of the past³²⁶.

On the one hand, German Chancellor’s presence indicates that Europe has put its last great war behind and that the Germans are an integral part of Europe. On the other hand, ten years ago, Helmut Kohl said that “There is no point for a German chancellor to celebrate an event in which thousands of German soldiers were miserably killed³²⁷”. The invitation to Schröder was issued by President Jacques Chirac of France and it was

³²³ See Schröder, G. (2004). Why a Free Germany is today commemorating with the Allies the landings in Normandy. – *Bild am Sonntag*, 06 June.

³²⁴ Weizsäcker, R. (1985). Speech at the Bundestag during the Ceremony commemorating 40-th Anniversary of the End of the War in Europe and of the National Socialist Tyrannies.

³²⁵ Schröder, G. (2004). Why a Free Germany is today commemorating with the Allies the landings in Normandy. – *Bild am Sonntag*, 06 June.

³²⁶ Ibid.

³²⁷ Quoted in Schröder goes to Normandy. (2004). – *International Herald Tribune*, 06 June 2004. See also Vinokur, J. (2004). Schröder’s Analysis of D-Day has a different ring in the east.- *International Herald Tribune*, 06 June.

widely perceived as a sort of culminating gesture, after three major wars in less than century, of the long process of French – German reconciliation. In this respect a huge transformation especially in the mental map has taken place. In joining with leaders of World War II victorious allies in their commemoration of D-Day, Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has referred to Germany's presence on the Normandy invasion as marking "the final end" to the postwar period and the completion of "Germany's journey to the West"³²⁸. On 6 June 2004 Schröder stood alongside the USA President George W. Bush and other world leaders in Normandy and became the first German Chancellor to attend festivities celebrating the D-Day landings of the World War II. Schröder himself viewed this event not as the celebration of a German defeat, but of liberation for all of Europe, including Germany. "For me, D-day was the beginning of the liberation of Europe from National Socialism," he said, referring to the 12 years' reign of Hitler and the Nazis³²⁹.

This invitation also reminds Germany of its Nazi past. A few nations in history have been able to sincerely and deeply look into the dark episodes of their history. Germany therefore deserves to be full and equal partner of Europe without being made to feel that it is somehow permanently tainted. France and Germany have found common ground in a number of issues from the refusal to intervene to Iraq to the future of the European Union.

Nevertheless, the shadow of the World War II still hangs over all European activities, e.g the statement of the Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi when he referred to a German heckler as a concentration camp guard, and when Poland reacted angrily to Germany's objections to the size of Poland's vote in the European Union³³⁰.

Germany's relationship in 2004 with the country's two major neighbors to the east seemed to be difficult. Politically powerful groups of expellees from former German territories in the Czech Republic and Poland are mounting newly aggressive campaigns to regain their old properties and memorialize themselves as World War II victims. Historical shadow has always been present in Germany's relationships with its two

³²⁸ Schröder, G. (2004). Why a Free Germany is today commemorating with the Allies the landings in Normandy. – *Bild am Sonntag*, 06 June.

³²⁹ Ibid.

³³⁰ Schröder goes to Normandy. (2004). –*International Herald Tribune*, 06 June 2004.

neighbors in the east: Czech Republic and the Republic of Poland. For Czechs, the adjusted reading of history accompanies an attempt to revive the issue of ownership of seized property based on a new legal front that the expellees opened with the entry of the two former Nazi occupied countries into the EU on 1 May 2004.

While Schröder was saying that D-Day signaled “the starting point for today’s new Europe” and maintained that the EU was “the best guarantor of peace” in Europe³³¹. Stoiber was arguing that this wider EU, now taking in the countries of the former Soviet orbit, must be on the side of the German claimants. “Will the EU remain silent over this?” he asked. “Europe must ask itself such questions now – and we are going to ask them. With backing from mainstream conservative and Social Democrats, politically powerful groups of expellees from former German territories in the Czech Republic and Poland were mounting newly aggressive campaigns to regain their old properties and memorialize themselves as World War II victims.

On 1 August 2004 Schröder also participated in the ceremony dedicated to the 60-th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising and presented his apology to Poland for "the immeasurable suffering" its people faced. In his speech, Gerhard Schröder paid respect to the heroism of those that participated in the Warsaw Uprising (*Powstanie Warszawskie*) and to the contribution they made in liberating Europe from the Nazis³³².

This uprising was an armed struggle during the World War II by the Polish Home Army (*Armia Krajowa*) to liberate Warsaw from German occupation and Nazi rule³³³. It started on August 1, 1944, as part of a nationwide uprising, Operation Tempest. The Home Army’s troops were charged with the task of protecting population from possible German excesses and forced evacuation during the German retreat .By taking Warsaw, the Home Army was to clear ground for the final decisive confrontation with Stalin, the outcome of which was to determine who would govern Poland – the London Poles³³⁴ or

³³¹ See Schröder, G. (2004, 06. June). Why a Free Germany is today commemorating with the Allies the landings in Normandy. – *Bild am Sonntag*.

³³² Schröder, G. (2004). Speech at the Franco-German Ceremony Commemorating the 60-th Anniversary of D-Day in Caen.

³³³ Warsaw Uprising. Wikipedia Encyclopedia. [WWW] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Uprising (09.08.2007).

³³⁴ The Home Army owed allegiance to the Polish constitutional government in London and in order to avoid Warsaw from getting into the hands of Stalin, initiated the Warsaw Uprising in 1944.

the Polish Communists. It was believed that the Muscovites would exploit the fact that the German troops were badly shaken and that the Russians would enter Warsaw not to help the Poles, but to further their own tactical interests. The conduct of the Red Army was also controversial. The Red Army had waited for two months inert on the eastern bank of the river Vistula in the summer of 1944 within sight of the fighting, while 225 000 civilians died and much of the city was destroyed. In addition, the Warsaw Uprising caused controversial feelings in Poland. The Polish Communists in particular represented the Red Army's entrance to the city and the suppression of the Warsaw Uprising as a triumph, whereas in the minds of the Poles, the Red Army was associated with treachery. The Uprising failed and the losses on the Polish side amounted to 18,000 soldiers killed, 250,000 civilians killed, mostly in mass executions conducted by advancing German troops³³⁵.

These two gestures by Gerhard Schröder clearly indicate that Germany has accepted its past and left it behind. It also means that Germany has become a normal country. For instance, when Gerhard Schröder stood in Warsaw in August 2004 he recalled "how the image of Willy Brandt's kneeling in Warsaw before the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising in 1943³³⁶ had become a symbol". It is a symbol of accepting the past and understanding it as an obligation for reconciliation. "Like so many Germans and Poles, I will never forget this image; it has come to be a reminder and a political credo for entire generations (Facing History and Ourselves)³³⁷.

It is symbolic that Gerhard Schröder paid a visit to two ceremonies related to the historical guilt of Germans: to France, Normandy to celebrate the battle of Normandy and to Poland to memorialize the Warsaw Uprising. It demonstrates that Germany has accepted its past and reconciled with its two neighbors who considerably suffered from the Nazis during the World War II:

³³⁵ Ibid.

³³⁶ In December 1970 the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt during his visit to Poland knelt in Warsaw before the monument to the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising that took place in 1943. According to an historian Jeffrey Herf „it was the first time that a Western German Chancellor publicly acknowledged and expressed remorse and atonement for what the Germans had done to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union during the World War II”.

³³⁷ See *Official Apologies and the Quest for Historical Justice* by Michael R. Marrus in *Controversies in Global Politics and Societies* (Munk Center for International Studies, University of Toronto)

Only those who face up to the past can build the future. No one demands that we feel guilt for the crimes and genocide perpetrated by an unspeakably evil regime. But we bear responsibility for our past, and we bear it for both past and future generations. What that means, above all else, is that never again must we yield to racism, anti-Semitism and tyranny. The world expects of us the same as we ourselves expect: tolerance, civil courage and responsibility, a commitment to human dignity and the common good ³³⁸ .

5.3.4 Geography

The concept *Mittleuropa* received attention from 1989-90, it was used by Friedrich Naumann³³⁹ whose *Mittleuropa* appeared in wartime. By this notion he denoted a confederation of independent nationalities, which the “German nation would naturally dominate” culturally and economically. The notion of *Mittleuropa* has not disappeared from the academic or political circles. It is even at present, a decisive factor affecting German foreign and security policy: it is the location on the eastern border of the transatlantic security community and its proximity to the post – communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe that still matters³⁴⁰. After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the transformation process in Eastern and Central Europe, Germany was interested in becoming an advocate of these countries. For Germany, it seemed to be an existential threat having unstable neighbors in the east. This also explains Germany’s conduct of becoming an advocate of the interests of its eastern neighbors. The central European states were strongly oriented westwards, through overlapping relationships that linked them to Germany, the EU and NATO³⁴¹. Germany, intent on creating a zone of stability to its east, was particularly concerned with the enlargement of NATO. The other European states, mostly France feared that Germany would become even more influential

³³⁸ See Schröder, G. (2004). Why a Free Germany is today commemorating with the Allies the landings in Normandy. - *Bild am Sonntag*, 06 June.

³³⁹ Quoted in Wood, S (2004). History, Identity and Europe’s Political Geography. In *Germany and East – Central Europe*.

³⁴⁰ See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

³⁴¹ Handl, V., Price – Hide, A. (2001). Germany and Visegrad Countries. –*Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs*, Spring, pp. 56 – 70.

after the dual enlargement of the East and Central European states into the structures of the EU and NATO. On the other hand, Germany's position was not clear – cut. While enlargement had significant advantages for the FRG, there were also a number of constraints. The shift of the EU's strategic gravity to the East has made Germany very vulnerable at the eastern edge of the EU and therefore it exposed the country to political and economic instability. Thus, Germany had a pivotal role to play in the new Europe; it was a mediator or bridge between West and East³⁴².

Being the frontier state, between East and West, Germany gained the most from the eastern enlargement: sources of its interest in the expansion of the Union are unique among EU member states deriving from location, traditional economic and political ties and history. It has also been argued that this was a “German led enlargement”³⁴³. There are several reasons for German interest in process: firstly, it made Germany the geographical centre of the EU. Secondly, the inclusion of such a vast area embracing 100 million consumers in economical terms provided a new export market for Germany. Thirdly, the incorporation into the EU of Germany's hinterland also expanded Germany's own security belt.

Klaus Kinkel, former German Foreign Minister described the expansion of the EU as an “historical” obligation and logical continuation of the European integration process. There is no alternative to enlargement.³⁴⁴. Definitely there were no other alternatives as Germany's geopolitical location was quite fragile after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Surrounded by two former communist states and being a frontier state between East and West, it was in German interests to facilitate these countries to join the EU in such a way that Germany no more remained a frontier state. Therefore, eastern enlargement was of historic significance for the entire EU and the Germans. The statement delivered Ludger Volmer³⁴⁵ supported the argument further by saying that “it is not merely an act of historic justice but also a concrete element in European peace and stability policy!”

³⁴² See *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.(2004)./Edited by Martin Holland.

³⁴³ Adenauer to the Bundestag on 12 July 1952 in C.C Schweitzer et al (1995), *Politics and Government in Germany 1944 – 1994, Basic Documents*, p.119

³⁴⁴ Enzenberger,H. (1967), *Deutschland, Deutschland unter anderen Äusserungen zur Politik*, p.9

³⁴⁵ Volmer, L. (2001). „The fundamental principles of the new German foreign policy” speech by Dr Ludger Volmer, Minister of State at the Federal Foreign Office, to the Ruhr Political Forum on 12 November, (http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/archiv_print?archiv_id=2333, (04.05.2007).

To sum up, Europe is answer to German history and geography, completion of European integration is more than just one foreign policy project among many. It is inseparable from the correct response to the “German Question” and therefore has ultimate priority in the larger Germany of the “Berlin Republic”³⁴⁶.

To sum up, from the German perspective the EU importance on the international arena will depend even more in future on the extent to which it succeeds in showing itself politically and making its own contributions towards crisis prevention and crisis management. It is important to proceed from the foundation that was laid long before 9/11. In order to guarantee an appropriate measure of crisis management, the EU is building its own capacities within the framework of the ESDP³⁴⁷. The events related to the debate over Iraq will not enhance the European Union’s image According to Joschka Fischer, it is in the interests of reunited Germany with all its economic and demographic weight, located at the heart of Europe, not to frighten neighbors and friends by striving for dominance or “undertaking unilateral acts of bravo, nor by refusing to play “our role” and standing aloof. The Kosovo crisis, a well the current efforts vis à –vis Macedonia have shown that it is both necessary and possible to provide proof of Europe’s capability to act in issues of relevance to security policy. The question today remains how to organize better CFSP, how to make it more effective³⁴⁸.

The dual enlargement process assumed an historic importance for Germany. By integrating the Central and Eastern countries into the structures of multilateral institutions, Germany had fulfilled its moral obligation before these states, but especially its eastern neighbors. Whereas the Nazi regime had deprived these states of the

³⁴⁶ Fischer, J (2002). „European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe” at the Weimar Lectures on Germany“, 10 April, (<http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/041002.html> 10.05.2007).

³⁴⁷ See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski. See also Crowe, B. (2004). A Common European Foreign Policy After Iraq? In.: *Common Foreign and Security Policy: The First Ten Years*.

³⁴⁸ See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Bundestag for March 13, 2003, 15-th electoral period, 31 session on “Europapolitik”, February 13, 2004, 15-th electoral period, 92 session on “Vereinbarte Debatte zur aktuellen Europapolitik”. See also Fischer, J (2002). „European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe” at the Weimar Lectures on Germany“, 10 April, (<http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/041002.html> 10.05.2007).

possibility of prosperous development in Europe, the Berlin Republic in this respect had fulfilled its moral obligation and assisted these states to join Europe again where they truly belonged. On the other hand, the dual enlargement was foremost in the vital interests of Germany. Seen from German perspective the enlargement provided Germany with a guarantee that the risks and temptations inherent in its size and central situation were significantly mitigated through the dual enlargement³⁴⁹.

As concerns history, several debates related to German history have taken place to publicly speak about history as it was, not to provide the Germans with only one picture. In this regard, Germany in 2004 was fundamentally different from Germany in the 1990s. This country that has brought many sufferings for its neighbors and the other nation in Europe spoke in a loud voice about its historic guilt and responsibility. Gerhard Schröder in his speech dedicated to the 60-th anniversary of the Allied landings in Normandy, Caen in 2004 emphasized that different nations have different memories of the D-Day, from the German perspective; German soldiers fell because they had been sent forth on a murderous campaign to crush Europe. From the perspective of France and its allies, as well as the citizens of the sorely tried city of Caen, memories of 6 June 1944 differed from those of most Germans. For France this historic day marked the beginning of the long awaited end of the occupation. Schröder summarized the German memory by saying that

*For many Germans 6 June symbolized the inevitable military collapse of their country. Other Germans had long since realized that the moral disintegration of Germany had in fact begun with the Nazi tyranny. Many paid for their opposition to the totalitarian regime with their lives in the concentration camps.*³⁵⁰

³⁴⁹ See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

³⁵⁰ See Schröder, G. (2004). Speech at the Franco-German Ceremony Commemorating the 60th Anniversary of D-Day in Caen, France, 06 June, (<http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/060604.html>, (06.05.2007).

Schröder summarized the sufferings of both countries and concluded that „in death all soldiers were united, regardless of the uniform they wore - all were grieved for by parents and wives, brothers and sisters, as well as friends³⁵¹”.

It is important to leave history behind by accepting it , as regards Germany than today it is not the Germany of those dark years, but it has returned to the fold of civilized nations. Although it travelled a long road to become a successful and stable democracy.

Therefore, historical debates in German society since 1998 have underlined the need to be able to learn from the past nevertheless how painful this can be. The best way of expression is to acknowledge that reconciliation with the past is possible. The visits of Gerhard Schröder to France and Poland have underlined this even further:

*Only those who face up to the past can build the future. No one demands that we feel guilt for the crimes and genocide perpetrated by an unspeakably evil regime. But we bear responsibility for our past, and we bear it for both past and future generations...*³⁵²

Thus, contemporary Germany is a country that it is fully aware of the crimes in its past - and has learnt from that legacy. Precisely for that reason it can make an immense contribution to building a peaceful world in the 21st century. Due to its central location in the *Mitteleuropa* and its economic power Germany has to assume more responsibility in international affairs. Kosovo and especially in Afghanistan has opened a new chapter in German foreign policy. It demonstrates that Germans are aware of their past, although it does not mean that they are pacifists. Nor are they ready to take up arms without long and careful reflection. However, where military intervention is necessary, Germany does not shirk its responsibility to safeguard peace and protect human rights. 15 years after reunification the fact that Germany has considerably more responsibility not just solving European, but also global issues. Joschka Fischer reflected upon Germany's increased responsibility in solving European and global issues and confirmed that Germany cannot

³⁵¹ Ibid.

³⁵² See *Old Europe, New Europe and Transatlantic Security Agenda* (2005)./ Edited by K.Longhurst and M. Zaborowski.

no longer „hide behind the broad shoulders of our transatlantic partners and our European friends. The time when Germany radiated terror and fear are over³⁵³”. German military engagement in solving regional conflicts arises disputes not only in the Bundestag, but in intellectual circles as well. This in turn highlights how little German people, its politicians and the German state want to be involved in armed conflicts. This is a positive change which some according to Joschka Fischer, German foreign Minister in 2004 describe as „national character which cannot be overestimated³⁵⁴. However, the lessons learned from German history must not lead us to sit back and watch others shoulder a heavy responsibility. Germany sees itself as a civilian power that has been striving to play a key role in solving problems, at the same time exercising self-restraint and pushing the role of military as far into the background as possible. It will continue not to take decisions on involvement in military missions lightly. There is a strong moral and political obligation to make a reasoned decision on every mission³⁵⁵. This is why it has decided against taking part in some missions in the past. There are cases in which conscious non-participation is an expression of political responsibility.

Germany has expanded the European stability area with the enlargement of the European Union and NATO. On this basis it is committed to assume international responsibility as an important player in Central Europe. This also includes its responsibility to limit or prevent conflicts and threats before their effects reach Germany. Increased responsibility presupposes more active participation in military operations and that not only on the European continent. In order to adapt itself to the changed environment and accept challenges, German armed forces will undergo thorough reform. Its objective is to be able to satisfy the increased demands being placed on the European

³⁵³ See Brunnstetter, S. (2005). A Changing View of Responsibility? German Security Policy in the Post-9/11 World. In.: *Old Europe, New Europe and the US: Renegotiating Transatlantic Security in the Post-9/11 Era*. T.Lansford and K.Longhurst.

³⁵⁴ Fischer, J. (2004). Speech by Federal Foreign Minister on German foreign policy in the German Bundestag, Berlin, on 8 September 2004 (excerpt) [www] http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/ausgabe_archiv?archiv_id=6171 (22.06.2007).

³⁵⁵ See stenographic reports from the German Bundestag for Bundestag for March 13, 2003, 15-th electoral period, 31 session on “Europapolitik”, February 13, 2004, 15-th electoral period, 92 session on “Vereinbarte Debatte zur aktuellen Europapolitik”. See also Fischer, J (2002). „European challenges between integration and enlargement and Germany’s responsibility at the centre of Europe” at the Weimar Lectures on Germany“, 10 April, (<http://www.germany.info/relaunch/politics/speeches/041002.html> 10.05.2007).

Union and NATO. Germany needs to be able to contribute more effectively to the cessation or prevention of conflicts, including by military means, and this anywhere its own and allied interests are threatened³⁵⁶.

³⁵⁶ See Sarotte, M. (2001). *German Military Reform and European Security*. Adelphi paper no.340.

CONCLUSION

Since re-unification in 1990, Germany has gradually regained its position in the family of the European states. Post-unification period indicated that some adjustments had to be made into the existing pattern. Starting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia and particularly at the background of the outbreak of violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the other states asked more often for German military contribution to the solution of international crisis. So far, Germany had cultivated a policy of abstention, meaning that Germany did not intervene using military force and its contribution due to its historic legacy had to be only financial. The changed circumstances brought about a need to be like other states and in this way become a reliably ally and a normal state. Thus, a normalization process was necessary to put these new developments into new perspective.

The author of the present thesis has attempted to observe the normalization process of German foreign policy. The central question of the (normalization) debate became the concern whether Germany should pursue more active and aggressive foreign policy. Does Germany's becoming "normal" means that it behaves similarly to other great powers? How to explain the fact that the new Germany behaves differently from the old one?

The natural bases for German normalcy are laid in Michael Stürmer's concept of 4 G-s: "Gewicht und Grösse" and "Geschichte und Geographie" that also have become the main nodal points of normalcy discourse of its foreign policy.

The normalization debate that was launched in the circles of the intellectuals and academics would not have been so successful if Gerhard Schröder had not taken over its rhetoric and applied to official policy. Since 1998 Gerhard Schröder had not hesitated to offer a more relaxed view on Germany's past and nation related issues when compared with the Kohl era. This new rhetoric was particularly visible in the domain of foreign policy. Schröder's speeches and interviews revealed a significantly different approach to German foreign policy priorities. There are several reasons for this behavior, but one of them definitely is related to the fact that Schröder is a representative of the younger

generation that entered into active politics in 1998. This was a generation that did not have its own personal memories related to the Second World War and therefore could offer a different view of Germany's past. This also explains why he decided to raise Germany's international reputation.

The normalization process that was launched in 1994 got a new boost after the events of 9/11, definitely Germany had changed by that date – it had become more self-confident under the leadership of Federal Chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Germany's new image as a “normal nation” was clearly articulated. It depicted Germany as a great power that had every right to articulate its national interests similarly to other states. Gradually, this country began to see itself as a “grown-up” nation that similarly to the other states could articulate its national interests and implement them even against the will of other states if necessary. This also meant that the military component in German foreign policy received new prominence. This tendency manifested itself in German participation in various assistance and reconstruction programmes in different places all over the world. Germany has become a “normal” ally that participates in out-of-area operations. The intervention in Kosovo conflict became a breakthrough point on the German way of becoming “normal”. At the same time normalcy does not mean that Germany should participate in every out-of-area operations, but the decision whether participate or not depends upon the national interests of the state. Therefore, German decision not to contribute militarily to Iraq this time can also be regarded as entirely normal.

One typical feature of the normalization process was related to the fact that the old notions acquired new meanings due to the changed circumstances. For example, the proponents of German participation in out-of-area operations introduced a new meaning to the term „responsibility“ that soon became one of the centerpieces of the normalization debate. The representatives of the Kohl government argued that the unified Germany was expected by its partners to “take over more responsibility” by contributing to international military operations. The new concept of “responsibility” stood in contrast to old-style power politics (*Machtpolitik*). Instead, it was used to indicate that responsible German foreign policy would be in contrast to the old FRG's privilege of standing by and leaving dangerous missions to its allies. In the light of Srebrenica it was now widely accepted in the German political elite that the legacy of German history should not only

be to call for “No more wars” (“*Nie wieder Krieg!*”), but also for “No more Auschwitz!” (“*Nie wieder Auschwitz!*”). Germany’s historical responsibility made it “imperative” to prevent mass-murder with all necessary means. In this view, Germany had “come of age” as a full member of NATO to assume responsibility as a “normal” ally. It means that the new Germany moves from power to responsibility. New power calls for “special responsibility. In this new context Germany attempts to gain greater economic, geopolitical, demographic and political weight, not more power, but for more responsibility. Special responsibility manifests itself in Germany’s increasing readiness to use force either as a process of “normalization” or “abnormalization”. Thus, in the German political discourse, “taking over responsibility” today means playing the same role militarily as the other western partners. Germany is in the process of “coming of age”, becoming more self-confident and assertive, feeling less inhibited by its pre-second World war legacy.

The author of the present thesis presented a hypothesis: “increased power situation will not lead to an increase of power politics; instead, more power denotes more responsibility. On basis of several debates on the deployment of the Bundeswehr to Bosnia – Herzegovina, Macedonia and Afghanistan at the Bundestag, the author proved that the behavior of Germany is driven by its special responsibility that the new power brought along, it also meant enhancing its intervention as related to the solution of international crises all around the world if it complied with its national interests. Thus, it can be stated that the hypothesis chosen was justified.

In the period of 1990 – 2005, Germany has undergone a significant transformation: from a nation dependent upon the others for its security, it has evolved into a responsible partner in international security. At the time of German unification in October 1990, Germany followed a policy of strict military abstinence in relation to conflicts outside Europe. The notion that the Bundeswehr could be used for other purposes than the defense of Germany was incomprehensible across the political spectrum and therefore, not a single Bundeswehr soldier participated in the Gulf War in 1991.

Over the decade that followed, Germany gradually abandoned the policy of complete abstention in favor of policy of engagement in various different international crisis management operations from former Yugoslavia to Afghanistan. However, 12 years after the first war in the Gulf when the USA initiated the operation Iraqi Freedom to oust the regime of Saddam Hussein, Germany firmly refused to participate in the coalition of the willing. It seemed to be from Iraq to Iraq where the Bundeswehr soldiers were absent again.

The evolution of the out- of –area debate can be divided into three parts: the first phase lasted from the Gulf War in 1991 to the ruling of the German constitutional court in 1994, the second phase lasted through the Kosovo war in 1999 and the third phase is still open in which the conditions of Germany’s gradually increased willingness to deploy military abroad became more numerous.

During the first period between 1990 and 1994, the central issues of the domestic debate focused around the requirements of partnership and the lessons of Germany’ past. On political spectrum the dividing line ran through the centre right and the left whereas the former highlighted the expectations of Germany’s partners and the lessons of the past that called for an extended German military engagement, the latter were on the opposite side and accentuated the principle “*Never again Auschwitz*”. Although the Gulf crisis in 1991 and the crisis in Somalia in 1993 and foremost the breakup of the former Yugoslavia indicated that it was impossible to manage the crisis of the new era through diplomatic channels. The rethinking found external expression as Germany gradually increased its engagement in international crisis management.

The second period was characterized by the lessons of the past and Germany’s historical responsibility. The dividing line no longer ran between the centre – right and the left, but through the left. On the one side, there were those from the left wing who argued that Germany had a historical responsibility to oppose and abstain from the use of military force under all circumstances. The mass killing of Bosnian Muslims in the UN “Safe Area” of Srebrenica in 1995 constituted the turning point for numerous pacifists. In 1995, Serb security forces overran the UN “Safe Area” of Srebrenica in the eastern part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Dutch peacekeepers supposedly protecting the enclave were

confined to their compound outside the city while Serb forces went on a rampage lasting several days, systematically killing Bosnian Muslims who had sought refuge in the city. The outside world appeared to be doing nothing to stop the atrocities, which cost an estimated 8 000 Muslim men and boys their lives.

Srebrenica left German pacifists (the Social Democrats and the Greens) speechless. Diplomatic means and economic sanctions had done nothing to prevent the biggest single mass murder in postwar European history. It was the Kosovo war when the deployment of German troops in a combat operation marked a real turning point in German foreign policy. For Schröder, the German military engagement in Kosovo enabled to ascribe a new and more self-assured role for Germany. Gradually it became an equal partner for the other European countries. By demonstrating responsibility through engaging in the war, Germany widened its diplomatic role for manoeuvre.

At the domestic level, the proponents of an expanded German military role in international crisis management now gained the lead. They took the core pacifist dictum “*never again war*” and developed it further by stressing the aspect of morality. The shock of Srebrenica caused rethinking on the left side of the political spectrum. It fostered further efforts towards a more active definition of Germany’s historical responsibility: This responsibility was not only a responsibility to oppose war; it was also a responsibility to stop aggression against unarmed civilians; if necessary by threatening force. The pacifists advocated far –reaching German engagement in case of aggression and the violation of human rights in unstable crisis areas around the world.

In the third phase of Germany’s transformation, a pattern emerged what kind of missions were acceptable to most German policymakers and to what kind of missions caused controversy. In 2001, however the commitment of German soldiers to a NATO led mission to Macedonia proved domestically controversial. According to the left wings, it was not a last resort to prevent an impending humanitarian disaster to stop ongoing aggression. Germany was in the middle of getting into this role when the terrorist attacks on America shook the core of their perceptions about themselves and that of the world. The importance ascribed to the events of September 11, 2001 can be compared with that of the end of the Second World War, a zero hour in international politics. The Federal Government of Germany quickly realized that a completely new discourse on security

policy which no longer based on the traditional threat scenarios from the Cold War was needed. Later the same year, the commitment of almost 4 000 troops to the USA military campaign against the Afghan Taliban regime was widely disputed for the same grounds. Already in 2002, German Chancellor Schröder was the first Western leader to issue an “unconditional no” to any German participation in a potential war against Iraq.

The author will summarize the main arguments that are based upon a grounded analysis throughout the present thesis. Firstly, the changes in the understanding of German foreign policy basic determinants (the nodal points of the normalcy discourse) are better understood in the context of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy. The concept of Common Foreign Policy was tested against the Iraqi dispute that revealed the weaknesses of this mechanism. In 2004, the European Union witnessed the biggest enlargement in its history, the success of which depended upon its courage to carry out fundamental reforms on its internal, institutional structure and to develop further in the direction of deeper integration. There was only one alternative to such fundamental reform, the loss of Europe’s capacity to act – and that would be disastrous foremost for Germany. In the context of Europe’s growing role and responsibility it can be stated that nowhere has been the need for common action so acute than in foreign policy. Thus, Germany’s increased responsibility has to be seen in the context of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Both European and German policy will continue to be characterized by a greater reticence towards military action. Foremost, Germany will look first for a political solution, but without excluding the use of force as a last resort. It was the case with Kosovo, with Macedonia and with Afghanistan. In the changed environment greater importance is attached to security policy. It does not mean that the other policy areas have become unimportant. Foreign policy requires a comprehensive approach, embracing security as well; meaning that Europe needs sufficient diplomatic, police, intelligence and military capabilities at its disposal. Those are precisely the capabilities – European capabilities- that the European Security and Defense Policy is intended to provide.

Germany was a traditionally the dominant power in Europe, although its influence had been reduced by its defeat in the World War II. Thus, German unification in 1990 and the collapse of the Soviet empire had re-established the conditions for Germany's dominance in Central Europe. A united Germany due to its economic power and central geographical location has regained its traditional sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. Germany was again situated at the center and taking. Germany's size and economic power into account, it would mean that this country would be politically considerably influential. However, this influence would have to be exercised carefully as the legacy of the past and political and cultural sensitivities on both sides would not allow Germany to exert direct political influence over its eastern neighbors. Germany's neighbors clearly reminded of the past events where the Nazi regime used its central position at the heart of Europe to move towards power positions. The predictions about Germany's more assertive foreign policy or return to the power politics did not materialize either. Instead, Germany was more occupied with the integration of its eastern neighbors back to Europe. For example, it expanded the European zone of stability further east with the integration of the post communist states into the EU and NATO. This was its historical responsibility after having deprived these countries and some other countries in Europe of the possibility to prosper in the Mitteleuropa. Since 1989 Germany has established good relations with each of the Central and East European countries, overcoming lengthy historical legacies of conflict and distrust. It can be concluded that Germany has become a "normal" country that is able to overcome the problems related to its past and move on.

The key to the understanding of German foreign policy lies in its geographical location: situated as a frontier state between the East and the West . In the course of normalization Germany had matured and become self-confident nation. This also manifests itself in the transfer of the capital from Bonn to Berlin: the former seemed to be a provincial capital as compared to other capitals in Europe, whereas Berlin exposed all properties of becoming a „real“ German capital. It denoted that Germany's westward-looking and to some extent provincial character was transformed into a "normal" country now residing in the former Prussian capital with all its inescapable memories of military conquest. Berlin also accentuated Germany's interest in the Central and East European

countries: the movement of the capital in 350 miles eastward, closer to Warsaw than Paris indicates that Germany's interests lie in the east. Moving the capital from Bonn to Berlin denoted a shift in German understanding in geographical terms. It meant adjusting Germany to its new role in the international arena. It has also been said that Germany is the „capital of Central Europe”. Germany has geographically moved to its right place where it really belonged. – to the East., being a frontier state between the East and the West. The question was whether the geopolitical position of the two cities would be accompanied by a similar shift in power. On the other hand, a move to the heart of Europe was an adjustment in geostrategic location of the unified Germany in the new European political context.

The terrorist attacks in 2001 brought about the transformation of German security policy; the role of the Bundeswehr included. Germany is defending its security beyond its borders. It means that threats must be faced up where they arise. Or in the other words, German security must also be defended on Hindu Kush. Geographical distance from a crisis is increasingly irrelevant. That means we can no longer think of security in purely military terms of defending the borders. For example, it would have been unthinkable before to deploy troops to Afghanistan that is located about 6000 kilometres from Germany. In this perspective the Bundeswehr deployment to Afghanistan is justified because German and European security is guaranteed in this state. It also means that there is no guarantee that terrorists attacks do not take place on German soil. Thus, geography and the understanding of geographical distance has acquired a new dimension.

As regards history and especially the interpretation of the Nazi past, it became clear that history have to be taken as it is, and learning from the past acquires a foremost importance. The public discussion about the controversies of German history has shown that it is impossible to draw a final line to German history and call it closed. It is important to view history critically expressing tolerance, peaceful conflict solution and respect for all nations. The rise of power of a new generation who did not have personal relation to the war added tensivity the the history related debates in German society. Since 1998 a foreign policy shift under new Chancellor was expected. It is symbolic that the new German political leadership that has not experienced the World War II were

confronted with the Nazi legacy to a greater extent than anticipated (Holocaust memorial, *Walser – Bubis debates* and *Opferdebatte*). The *Walser – Bubis debate* became a milestone and it is the best example of the debate in which the demand to restrict the public use of history seemed to jeopardize the traditional German consensus on the Nazi past. It showed that German collective memory no longer remained completely intact. There was a need for a re-appraisal of the national dimension of German politics. The *Opferdebatte* identified Germans not only as the executioners, but also as the victims of the World War II. It was about the atrocities carried out by the Soviet Army in the East occupational zones and the terror to which the German population was subjected. In addition, the *Opferdebatte* touched upon the question of the expulsions of Germans from the former German territories in the East, which had been incorporated into Poland and Czechoslovakia after the World War II. The problem of expulsions is important because it indicates how changes in collective memory can affect foreign policy. The German society as a whole has never fully acknowledged the sufferings of the expellees. Nor has it been able to embrace history and cultural traditions and German minorities as a part of German cultural identity. The failure to acknowledge history for what it is, something that cannot be reversed, but needs to be appreciated. For instance, the issue of expulsion has also extended beyond Germany into Central and Eastern Europe where it affected the EU accession negotiations in 2002 - 2003.

The history of Germany is inseparably bound up with the Holocaust, horrific crime against humanity perpetrated against the Jews of Germany and Europe. For Germans, *Auschwitz* has symbolic meaning as it is embodiment what can happen if criminal activities, violences against humanity are not stopped on time. Therefore, it is important to learn from the past and not to make the same mistakes again. Thus, the Germans cannot run from this past, but they must learn to live with it. That includes realizing that the crimes of the Third Reich were not the actions of a small elite group. Those horrors happened because many people in the country willingly went along. Others at first, secretly approved or were indifferent to what was going on around them. The present day Germany has acknowledged its responsibility for that genocide and accepted the obligations such a responsibility entails. One obligation it entails is to vigorously combat anti-Semitism and racism. Another is to pursue a foreign policy which ensures

that never again will war and other horrors be unleashed from German soil, meaning that there will be no repetition of the Holocaust. In the international arena it means that Germany does and will do everything in its power to protect human rights and prevent genocide and similar atrocities.

Germany has broadened the purposes for which it is willing to use the armed forces. No longer restricted to the defense of German territory, the *Bundeswehr* has been deployed for an increasingly wide range of out-of-area missions. In future Germany will be asked to participate more often when the violations of human rights take place or it concerns dangers to security. Although German acceptance to participate will not be taken for granted, certain conditions have to be fulfilled. To sum up, for Germany the use of force will definitely be the last resort.

RESÜMEE

Marju Kõrts

Magistritöö: Välispoliitika normaliseerumine: Saksamaa näide 1990 – 2005

(Juhendajad: Prof. Andres Kasekamp, PhD. Alexander Astrov)

Enne taasühinemist erines saksa välispoliitika, tulenevalt riigi staatusest jagatud riigina, oluliselt teistest riikidest, mistõttu tema välispoliitikat ei saa pidada normaalseks. See oli ühelt poolt mitte normaalne seetõttu, et teised välisriigid piirasid riigi suveräänsust ning teiselt poolt seetõttu, et kahe saksa riigi eksisteerimine tekitas anomaalia saksa rahvusiigi esindamiseks rahvusvahelisel tasandil. Saksamaa vajab taasühinemise järel normaliseerumise protsessi, mille käigus taastati Saksamaa staatus Euroopas suurriigina. Suurriigi staatuse määramise kriteeriumiteks on objektiivsed faktid nagu näiteks geograafia ja demograafia. Käesolev magistritöö uurib välispoliitika normaliseerumise protsessi kontseptualiseerimist läbi vastava diskursuse 4 sõlmpunkti: kaal ja suurus, ajalugu ja geograafia. Töös tõstatud probleemile annab vastuse Saksamaa välispoliitika üksikjuhtumi analüüs.

Normaalsetes tingimustes, kus riikide hierarhilise positsiooni määravad geograafia, majanduslik tugevus, rahvastik, on Saksamaa suurriik. Saksamaa on ühelt poolt normaliseerumas ning teiselt poolt tagasi pöördumas normaalsuse juurde: see tähendab, et ta järgib norme, mis tagavad riigi tegevuse aktsepteerimise rahvusvahelise kogukonna poolt ning teiselt poolt, pöördub tagasi normaalsusesse, sest Saksamaa on alati olnud suurriik. Saksamaal on normaalse riigina õigus sõnastada oma rahvuslikud huvid ning neid ellu viia ka vajadusel vastu teiste riikide tahtmist. See tähendab, et sõjaline komponent saksa välispoliitikas muutub olulisemaks. Saksamaa on saanud "normaalseks" liitlaseks, mis osaleb välismissioonidel väljaspool oma ja NATO liikmesriikide territooriumi.

Käesolev magistritöö üritab läbi neorealistliku lähenemise tõestada, et rohkem võimu ei tähenda ilmtingimata võimuambitsioone, vaid see tähendab rohkem vastutuse võtmist. Kui "võimu" varasem tähendus kandis negatiivset tähendusvarjundit, siis võimu uus tähendus "vastutus(tunne)" on positiivse värvinguga. Mõisted nagu "võim" ja "vastutus" omandavad uue tähenduse, mistõttu muutub ka poliitilise eliidi välis- ja julgeolekupoliitiline mõtlemine.

Käesolevas magistritöös rakendatakse diskursuse analüüsi. Ühe juhtumi analüüsi raames vaadeldakse välispoliitika normaliseerumist läbi sõjalise komponendi osatähtsuse kasvu, mis võimaldab tõestada väljapakutud hüpoteesi paikapidavuse koos kahe põhijäreldusega. Esiteks, saksa välispoliitiline eliit mõistab, mis tähendab olla „normaalne riik“ uues kontekstis. Uus kontekst nõuab kohandumist uutele tingimustele. Teiseks, suurenenud võim ei tähenda, suuremaid võimuambitsioone, vaid suuremat vastutustunnet selle võimu kasutamisel.

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